The clash between interests : bias and predetermination in decision makers by Radich, P. J. (Paul J.)
Paul Rad-ich 
THE CLASH BETWEEN INTERESTS - BIAS AND 
PREDETERMINATION IN DECISION MAKERS 
Research Paper for Administrative Law 
LL.M. (Laws 501) 
Law Faculty 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington 
1985 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
B. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE JUDICIARY 1 5 
1. Early English Case Law and Opinion 16 
2. Current Notions of the Rules Against Bias 18 
3. Real Likelihood or Reasonalble suspicion of Bias? 19 
4. The Causes of Bias 25 
5. Exceptions t o the Rules against Bias 31 
6. The Effects of Bias or Interest 32 
C. THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES AGAINST BIAS TO 
' ADMINI STRATIVE' DECISION MAKERS 
1. Classification According to the Nature of the 
Function 
36 
36 
2. The Actor is a Statutory Body or Tribunal 41 
3. The Actor is a Council or Local Authority 53 
4. The Actor is a Minister of the Crown 62 
5 . The Marginal Lanc"s Board Loan Affair - a Different 
Approach? 
6. The Actor is a Non Statutory or 'Consensual' 
Tribunal 
7. Tying in the Variables 
D. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE BIAS AND INTEREST 
1. Provisions Designed to Promote Impartiality 
2. Provisions Regarding the Concequences of a 
Conflict of Interest 
68 
73 
83 
87 
87 
92 
E. FURTHER MECHANISMS FOR REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 98 
1. Introduction 
2. Specific Alternatives 
3. A Code of Concuct 
F. CONCLUSION 
·93 
10 4 
118 
121 
1' .( ,, ·rr~~-7-~-·\·4cu 
------·-·· 
7 APR 1986 
A. Introduction 
" In a sense , conflict of interest is a luxury issue -
a matter that only an otherwise secure and established 
society can afford to worry a.bout . Only when grosser 
larcenies in government have been reduced to tolerable 
limits , only when overt venality is uncommon enough to 
shock , is it possible for government to concentrate on 
potentials for evil and try and head off corruption at 
its sources . In a backhanded way , it is a tribute to the 
general moral health of gove rnment today that headl ines 
can be mc1de of potential evil . " 
Bar Assoc i a tion of the City of New York 
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This pape r Pxamines the i mp2ct of intere st on the act ions of a 
range of officeholders . The ' clash bet~een interests ' addresses 
those s i tua. tions 1r.1here the d uty of an officeholder to ac t 
accord ing to the delibera te re sult of his judgement and conscience 
is influenced by his pri vate interests or by predeterminat ion of 
the issue in d i spute . l he terms "interest" abd "bias " will be 
f re ouently used and are in need of def inition . "Inte r estn , in 
this context , means having a persona l concern with regard to 
the participants in or subject matter of a part i cular d i spute . 
This concern can stem from any number of fac tors and may include 
financ i al interests , pers onal relationships or , more generally , 
i deo logies and inclinations . It is as a result of s uch interests 
that bi as can ensue . "Bi as " is a pred i sposition to decide a 
cause or an issue in a certain way wh ich does not leave one ' s 
mind perfectly open to convi ction . It results in an inability 
to exercise one ' s functions i~pc1rtially in a particular case • 
. . .. . - ... --· Y-;..c7.~;J.\ ;;: :, .. if"4' •• ~' I ,.,, • " ~- ..,,t ,..: - .., .._-l 
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In evaluating the impact of these interests and the various 
ways the legal system se eks to regulate conflicts of interest, 
a numb e ~ of variables must be considered. These are: The 
types of interest that might conflict, the types of 'actors' 
or decision makers, the types of powers these decision makers 
can exercise and the possible responses of the law. These 
variables serve to illustrate that there can be no one answer 
to any question as to what constitutes interest, nor can there 
be any one means to reguiate such interest if it is found to 
exsist. Any potential solution is very much dependant upon the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
1. The Types of Interest 
(a) The most personal and venal level of interest is bribery 
and corruption. 'Bribe' means any money, valuable consider-
ation, office, employment or ben efit acquired by an office-
holder in his official capacity. 2 The c
onsequence is 
immediately apparant: A preconceived bias that will result 
in a failure to consider a case upon it's merits. This is 
one of the few forms of interest of which it ~an be said 
that a bias will automatically follow. 
(b) A personal interest in th e subject matter for adjudication 
or decision. This may take the form of a pecuniary interest 
in the subject matter. Thus, a substantial shareholding 
in a company which is a litigant in dispute or an applicant 
for a development may cause an officeholder to take irrelevant 
considerations into account when reaching his decision. The 
same result will follow if a litigant or applicant is related 
to an officeholder or is a personal friend. Alternatively, 
an officeholder may have openly displayed a degree of 
hostility towards a litigant, applicant, 
or towards the subject matter of a dispute . Again , the 
officeholder may be rendered incapable of exercising 
independent judgement . 
(c) An attitude towards the issue . This may take the form of 
an interest in an intemporance society on the part of a 
licencing justice or 8n interest in the protection of 
animals from cruelty on the part of a judge hearing a 
case of mistreatment . The interest in these cases i s of 
a more general nature and may not always result in pre -
judgement of a case . 
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(d) An interest in the outcome of proceedings . Impropriety 
will naturally be assumed if an officeholder has something 
to g8in from the outcome of his decision . Thus , a judge 
who is 8 '.'Tler:iber of the company that has issued a sum:TJons 
may be prevented from hearing the matter . On a different 
level , ulterior motives might be supposed on the part of 
a ~inister proposing an urban rene~al scheme for the area 
in which his own house is located . 
(e) A judge may act as a prosecutor and adjudicator in the same 
case . A disciplinary tribunal may , of its own motivation , 
conduct investieations into the conduct of a member of it ' s 
profession and , having already predetermined that member ~s 
~uilt , go ahead and adjudicate upon the matter . This dual 
role is sometimes expressley condoned by Parliament . An 
example is provided by the Australian Ombudsman Act 1976 . 
The Ombudsman may investigate a matter and , having decided 
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that pr oceedings are warranted , go ahead and prosecute the 
case beiore the Administratjve Appeals Tribunal . 
(f) Appellate bias . A judge at first instance may proceed to 
hear the same case on appeal . This question arises more 
freQuently in non- statutory clubs and tribunals . A member 
of a governing body ' s sub - committee , which has already given 
a ruling as to an appellant ' s guilt , may sit also as a 
:nember of the governing body itself upon hearing the appeal . 
(g) At a lesser level is a type of interest that arises , not: 
from any personal or volunt8ry act on the part of an 
officeholder , but out of the very nature of the body of which 
he is a :nember . It is often the case that a member of a 
local authority will have spent some considerable time 
negotiating for and planning a particular development . 
H8ving a proposal firmly in his mind , his office reauires 
him to he2."':' objections to that proposal with an open mind . 
Similarly , a ~inister ~ay be reauired , by statute , to hear 
objections to his own provisional decisi:"l . Given the 
inevitable natur e of this prior involve:nent with the subject 
matter of a case , the rules against bias must be adjusted 
accord i ngly . 
The interest identified in paragraphs (a) to (f) are mostly 
nreventable by the officeholder himself and may render him liable 
to nen8lty or public reprimand . The type of interest ident ified 
in par8granh (g) is preventable by t he legislature or drafters 
of a body ' s constitution . "'he in t erest wi ll not reflect adversely 
on the officeholder ' s o~m integrity , but wi ll be the subjec t of 
criticism on the part of the legislators or framers of the 
body ' s constitution . 
2 . The Types of Actors or Becision Makers 
The officeholders with which this paner is concerned are : 
- Judges and Justices of the Peace 
- ~embers of statutory tribunals 
5 
- :".embers of non- statutory , or ' consensual ', tribunals and arbi-
tra tars . 
- ~embers of local authorities 
- i·:embers of Parliament 
- f.:inisters of the Crown 
The courts are conspicuously structured to demonstrate their 
object of i~per~onal justice and their detatchment from the 
personalities of the combatants . The ostensible , sometimes 
ostentatious adherence to an impersonal ' law ', the removal of 
the judge to a n aloof position above the struggle , all conduce 
to an air of impartiality . ~his i mpar tiality is heightened by 
the process for a judge ' s ap~oint~ent . ~l though the Jud icature 
Ac t 1908 provides only that jud~es are to be appointed by the 
Governor- General , in practice the appointment is made upon the 
reco~~endation of the Frime ~ inister in the cac·e of the Chief 
Jusitce and , for the remaining judges of the High Court and 
Court of Appeal and for District Court Judges , the appointment 
is wee upon the recommendation of the Attorney- Ge neral. 
Consult;tion is normally sought fro~ the Chief Justice , the 
Solicitor- General , the Secretary for Justice and from the 
Pres ident of the lew ~ealand Law Society . 
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The statutory tribunal is a creature of government , designed to 
' deal exclusively with a particular area of adjudication . These 
areas are many . So~e examples of the multitude are : Trades and 
professions , land and property , taxation and prices , salaries 
and conditions of employment , r ~ce and equality , penal matters , 
social security clai ms or more specialised ~tters such as 
abortion , censorship and deportation . The nature of a statut ory 
tribuanl is often very much akin to that of a court : The function 
of the Small Cla i ms Tribunal is to bring parties to a dispute 
to an agreed settlement . The Ercadcasting Tribunal hears 
allega.tions brought by a complainant a gainst a broadcaster . 
The disciplinary bo~y of a profession will hear an allega.tion 
bnmght against a particular member of that profession and 
bodies such as l icencing Committees and the Kotor Vehicle 
~alesm en Reg istration Authority will hear the anplicant and any 
number of objectors who mi gh t be nresent at the hearing . In 
these ways , opposing parties will present their cases to an 
inde nendent adjudicator in much the same way as is true of a 
court of law . Some statutory tribunals , however , are of a 
wholly different nature . There 'Tiay only be one liti ga nt , as it 
is often the case before the Taxation Review Authority_ 
3 
or the 
Re lease to ',fork Committee 4
, the functions of the tribunal may 
be , not to de termine the ri ghts of opposed litigants , but to 
de termine the ri gh ts of classes of persons . This is true of 
tribunals dealing with matters relating to salaries and conditiions 
of employ~ent . Alternately , the tribunal may not adjudicate 
upon the rights of any persons at all but may only act in an 
advisory capacity - as is the case with the Hotel Investmen t 
Ac count Ad visory Committee . 5 _ 
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Members of statutory tribunals are usually appcinted by the 
Govern6r- Ge~eral on the recomme~dation of the .1inister whose 
department is responsible for the particular tribunal . Often , 
there is provision for some input in the appointment procPss by 
an organisation who will be particularly affected by the area of 
the tribunal ' s jurisdiction . Beca use some members are appointed 
.from organisations upon v1ho they will adjudicate , they are not 
aivorced from but are affiliated to the subjects and subject 
matter for adjudication . 
11e '.Tlove furthPr away from the icy impar tiality of a court 1t1i th 
domestic or ' consensual ' tribunals . These tribunals are primarily 
concerned with the administration of internal discipline within 
bodies such as educational institutions , trace unions , clubs and 
professional ass ociations . The term ' consensual ' is oftPn use d 
to depict the voluntary nature of R ~ember ' s action in joining 
the association , thereby voluntarily accepting t he jurisdiction 
of the association ' s governing body . It may be the case , ho~eve r , 
t~a t such consensualism is a ~yth; that a mernb 0 r has no choice 
hu t to so submit himself if he wants to join the assoc iation in 
crnestion . rhe uneoual barga ining powers of the prosre ctive 
me'.Tlher and the governing body hei ghtens the argument that , as 
is the case with the courts of law , the juri sdiction of a rart -
icular governing body c2.nnot be avoided if membership of the 
~ss ociation is sought . 
i\ernbers of these tribunals or disciplinary bodies are normally 
elected by the members of the organisation as a whole . In this 
way , they are not removed from the persons upon who they will 
ad;udicate but will often be familiar with the issues and the 
8 
conduct of ~he parties involved in a d~spute before they assume 
their role as adjudicators . 
A purely consensual dPcision maker is an arbitrator . Consensualis~ 
2rises from the fact that the arbitrator was chosen erually by 
the respective parties to a contract . There is strong argument 
for the proposition that , because the parties have voluntarily 
submitted themselves to the c=irbi tr8tors jurisdiction , they cannot 
bring a complaint on the grounds of his impartiality . 
Members of councils , local bodies , catchment authorities and the 
like are elected to office by the people of the municipality over 
which that body exercises jurisdiction . In this way , an i~portant 
difference arises between these bodies and the courts and stat-
utory tribunals . ~ jucige or tribunal member may have preconceived 
views on certain issues but these should not be made publicly 
known . A member who is elected to office , on the other hand , 
is often elected by virtue of a mand8te , pursuant to which his 
views on a particular subject are an important public issue . It 
may be that , because of such a mandate , a member already has a 
bias upon assuming office . 
This comment is true also of ~embers of Iarliament and Ministers 
of the Crown. One of the platforms upon which the recent National 
Government were elected were its "think big" energy development 
projects . The application of the National Development Act to 
these projects (thereby bypa ssing otherwise necessary planning 
consents) was not the result of an operative bias arising out 
of predetermination of the issue , but of a commitment to the 
electors . 
9 
As we ~ove ~urther away from the judicial sphere , the impartial i ty 
of officeholders , while still i~portant , is not reg~rded as an 
essential attribute ; it is one of many other conflicting duties 
and responsibil i ties . A court must only concentrate upon it ' s 
du ty to judge without fear or favour . A Minister of the Crown 
must weigh this duty aga i nst others and , as a conseouence , will 
not be subject to the rigorous judicial standards to ensure that 
impartiality in the public eye , and in practice , is preserved . 
3. The Types of Powers 
The powers of the bodies just identified are many and varied . 
In some cases , they are narrowly confined , in others they are 
broad indeed in terms of ~atters that are b be weighed and taken 
into account . In some cases , they are of a particular , isolated 
character and , in others , of an ongoing , managerial type . In 
some cases , they are a power of final decision and , in others , 
reco~mendatory only . 
~hese variations may be grouped rnore specifically : 
A body may have the power to affect a particular person by 
making a decision regarding that person alone . ~uch a power is 
exerciseable by a court or tribunal . It may include imprisonment , 
the imposition of a fine , the refusal to grant a licence or to 
register an applicant as a salesman or disruRlification fro~ a 
trade or profession . Powers such as these affect important , 
personal rights and are therefore deserving of harsher standards 
to enforce impartiality in those who exercise them . 
Cne step removed is a body having the power to make a final 
decision of consecuence to a p8rticuiar litigant without 
provifing a remedy that affects personal rights . An example 
10 
is provided by the Broadcasting Tribunal . The greatest.remedy 
that can be awarded to a successful complainant regarding a 
breach of privacy or unjust treatment by a broadcaster 6 
is a 
direction to the offending broadcaster that ' appropriate action ' 
he taken . No penalty is imposed or relief afforded the complain-
ant . 
A body ~Y have the power to affect a large number of people by 
~aking a general decision of practical significance to them all . 
rowers such as these are fenerally exerciseable by a local 
authority or a Xinister o~ the Crown and include the decision to 
rroceed with a construction , to stop a street or to alter a 
w8terway . Although the decision is not ~irected to a particular 
nerson , individual rights , such as the right to undisturbed 
possession and cuiet enjoyment of one ' s land , may be affected . 
Because of the general nature of the decision , many factors must 
be weighed and taken into account . These include the rights and 
views of others in the area , government or local government policy , 
employment in the region and the development of resources. 
A body ' s powers may be limited to that of a recommendation , 
t h ereby having only the potential to affect individual rights . 
Th is is true of the 0aitangi Tribunal and of the Planning Tribunal 
under the National ~evelopment Act andunder certain provisions 
of the Town and Country Planning Act and the Public Works Act . 
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Further distinctions can be drawn in considerinf how powers such 
as these are exercised and how they are to be found. The powers 
of a cart of law are widespread 2nd are found in a great number 
of statutes or in the inherent jurisdiction of the Hi gh Court . 
The powers of statutory tribunals can be easily found in one or 
more particular statutory provisions and , in the case of a non-
statutory tribuna l , in the provisions of the body ' s constitution . 
The uowers of a g iven 1iinister are not easily pinpointed and 
vary according to the portfolio for which he is responsible . 
Unlike the courts and tribunals , a Minister ' s powers are not 
necessarily exercise2ble by him alone . He may exercise his 
nowers individually by directing the activities of his department 
and collectively through the dec isions oi cabinet . In addition , 
powers can be exercised 2.nd 'e cisions made on behalf of the 
1·"inister by high ronking department officials . Al though the 
:·linister is still answerable to larlia:nent for a ny such dec ision , 
it brinps into play yet another catecory of dec i s ion ~aKer - the 
publ ic se rv:c,n t . ,-;uch 8 practice "Tl8Y be condoned by s ta tu te or, 
in the absence of st8tutory au thority , reco gni sed as acceptable 
under the Ca rltona line of cPses . 
7 
The application of 2 ~ini ster ' s po~ers are not incident - specific 
a~ is true of a court . } owers are exercised through the pre -
uaration of le ~islation , the allocation of funds in the budget 
~no throu~h the application of g ene ral policy to particular cases . 
12 
Viembers of parliament who are not 1,1inisters exercise influence 
only . '11hey do this by speeches and votes in I'cirliarnent and , in 
practice by their activities in the party room and rarty committees 
and by representations to Ministers and their advisors . 
4 . The Resnonses of the Law 
The legal system responds in a number of ways to decision makers 
motivated by bias . These responses take the form of rules 
developed by the legislature , the courts and by more voluntary , 
less coercive methods . 
The following responses are found in statute : 
P prison sentence of up to furteen years may be imposed on a 
judicial officer or Minister , and of up to seven years on a 
r~e~ber of Parliament or ~ublic servant , who accents a bribe in 
his official capacity . 8 
An officeholder may be disrualified fro~ of~ice upon acouiring 
a conflicting interest . 0 
j 
- An officeholder may be reouired to d isclose a conflicting 
interest that arises and to stand 6own from of~ice or abstain 
from voting for the purposes of that particular case . 
10 
Cther remedies are provided by the High Court in the exercise of 
its r,owers of review . An· officeholder or body may be prohibited 
from sitting to view a matter if bias is demonstrated , an erring 
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body or officeholder may be directed to hear the matter again 
or , if that body or officeholdir if found to be so biasect that 
it would be unreasonable to expect them to rehear the matter 
imnartially , certiorari may issue so as to nuash any dec ision 
the:v have ma<:'e . 
A number of informal responses may operate in relation to ~embers 
of Farliamen t anc. public servants . A iriinister may be liable to 
renrimand by the frime ~inister , demotion to a less important 
nortfolio or to a directiort to resign . A Membe r may be liable 
to expulsion from the ch8mber and a public servan t may be liable 
to d ismis ~a 1· or a reduction in salary . 
A further response is reflected in the establishment of committees 
of in~uiry for the purrose of suggesting appropriate ~eans to 
r 0 gulate conflicts of interest . From these reports , two over-
riding ' solutions ' can be drawn . The first i s the avoidance of 
conflicts of interests by reouirinr an officeholder to declare 
his interest in 2 p?rticular case to his collea~ues . In this way , 
the weight to be attached to 8 particular state~ent or decision 
can be adjusted accordingly . The second is the avoidance of 8n 
interest by the co~pulsory re r istration , at regul8r intervals , of 
al l personal interests of a kind that could beli~ely to conflict 
with an o!ficeholder ' s official duties . 
Th is paper be gins by loo~ing at the common law bias rules as 
they apply to judges and justices . The following section exa~ines 
attempts that bave been made to apply these rules to officeholders 
of a more varie~ nature . The very nature of the se bodies and of 
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the powers they exercise preclude the operation of the common 
law rules in toto. A number of variations have ensued. Thirdly, 
the paper views attempts that have been made by the legislative 
to regulate conflicts of interest in particular bodies. Finally, 
the paper considers various other methods for regulating conflicts 
of interest as brought to light by the committees recently set 
up in Britain and Australia for that purpose. 
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B. COT·'I:1.~cN LA:/ F'RINCIPL-S:J AIPLI.0D TO THE JUDICif,rZY 
The common law of bias developed initially to control judicial 
offices . It is necessary to consider that law first before 
turning to the application of it to officials of a different 
kind . 
These common law principles are rather clear cut , applying as 
they do to officeholders whose impartiality is regarded as 
essential . Their aim is to prevent all but the remotest sus -
picion of bias , their application is even and has changed little 
over the years . The section begins with a summary of early 
Lnglish case law from which present principles derive their 
existence . It :noveP to state the basic principles of what mc1y 
he called the ~odern notion of the nerno judex maxim and , spec -
ifically outlines the various tests that are c=ipplied to determine 
whAther bias can be seen to exist . The various causes of bias 
will be note d , as will some exceptions to the rules . In dis -
cus sing these principles , it will be necessary to make re~erences 
to cases and situations that go beyond the rules applicable to 
the judiciary . These ~eviations are often necessary to clarify 
the basic rules and reflect the fact that rules applying to 
particular officeholders cannot be viewed in isolation but 
form an inte~ral part of th~ whole law as it relates to bias . 
. 1i th these principles 8S a bc1sis for the paper , it 1,vill be sePn 
how they have been varied by the courts and by Parliament when 
a ttern p tinr to a pply the:n tobodie s whose impartiality is not 
re va~ded a s beinf their most essential attribute . 
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1 , ~arly ~nglish Case Law and Opinion 
Larly common law principles refarding disrualification for 
interest were clear and simple . A judge was 1isaualified for 
direct pecuniary interest and nothing else . Although Bracton 
tried , unsucces sfully , to incorporate into English law the view 
that mere " suspicion" by a party was a basis for disoualification . 
11 
it was Coke who , with reference to cases in which the judge ' s 
pocketbook was involved , set the standards for the time in his 
injunction that "no man sh8ll be a judge in his own cause . " 
12 
Blackstone rejected absolutely the poss ibility that a judge might 
be disnualifiect for bias as distinguished from interest : 
11The law will not su::pr.;ose the possibility of bi8s or 
f . ~ . r1 II avour 1n n JU\:ge . 13 
Iecuniary interest too~ many fcrms . = judfe rnipht be dis -
rual ified as in Dr Bonham ' s case 1 1\. because he received the fine 
which he had the power to inflict; and the Mayor of tlertford 15 
was 11 l8yed by the heels " for sitting as a judge in an ejectrnent 
case in which he was the lessor of the plaintiff . ~ siDilar 
charge of interest arose whenthe judfe ' s status as a citizen 
and taxpayer of a unit of soc iety might be affec ted by his 
decision . Thus , for examnle , in a case involving a pa upe r , a 
judge was disGualified for interest because the dec ision affected 
his taxes . 16 ihese cases went too far , !or , i~ judges were 
d isoualified as taxnayers , ~ome suits could scarcely be decided . 
/lj_ncl ful of this difficulty , 1-arl iament , in 1743 , provicec triat 
tax~aying justices of the peace might sit in such local govern-
:nent cases . 17 :?ro;n this g rew the modern doctrine of ' necessity"; 
that jucges should not ~ecline to sit when no substitute was 
17 
readily available . As Pollock expressed it : 
1rThe s.ettled rule of law is that , 21 though a judge had 
better not , if it can be avoided , t2ke part in the 
decision of a case in which he had any personal intere s t , 
yet he not Only may , but must do so if the case cannot 
be heard otherwise . 11 18 
A variant of ~ntere st ' is ' relationship ', the problem when a 
judge participates in a case involving his relative . Oddly 
enough , the },nflish courts , held , in Brooks v .:Uvers 19 that a 
judge was not disnual ified by a relationship , but that a jury 
was . In the l atter connection , courts were faced with deciding 
v.:h8t degree of relationship necessit2ted discual ification , a 
problem which , it it ' s no~ern context , rem8ins as perplexing 
today as it 1t1as then . A.s ,,.,as noted in 1572 
20 
"all the in-
habit8nts of the earth are descended from Adam and LVe and so 
sre cousins of one aY1other 11 but "the further removed the blood 
is , the .';Jore cool it is" . 'fhe line w2:s c:r2vm , in th8t case , ?.t 
the ninth de~ree . 
In shor t , the common l8w was simple in the extreme . Jud ges were 
discu8lified for a financial interest in the subject matter of 
the proceedings . Bias arising out of ot~er ~atters such ~s 
per3onal relationPhips Pnd prior indic?tions of ~ttitude ~ere 
not seen as reasonable causes to overturn a decis ion . The test 
~2s nroof of bias ; that 8 significant fin8ncial interest did , in 
fa et , Pxist. 
18 
2 . Current Notions of the Rules Against Bias 
One of the earliest leading cases affirming the ne~o judex in 
causa sua. doctrine as we know it today was ~ imes v Grand Junction 
Canal 21 There , Lord Chancellor Cottenham had affirmed a number 
of decrees made by the Vice - Chancellor in favour of a canal 
company in which Lord Cott~nham was a shareholder , to the extent 
of several thousand ·uounds . Lord Campbell said : 
"Ho one could suppose that lord Cottenham could be , in 
the remotest degree , influenced by the interest he had in 
this concern; but , my Lords , it is of the last importance 
that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own 
cause should be held sacred . This will be a lesson 
to all inferior tribunals tc take care not only that in 
their decrees thPy are not influenced by their personal 
interest but to avoid the appearance of labouring under 
such an inference . " 22 
I'his d octrine wc1s 8pplied ecually to cases where no pecuniary 
interest was involved . In~ v 0ussex Justices , ex parte EcCarthy 
23 
the acting clerk to the justices wa also a ~ember of the firm of 
solicitors who were actinf for one of the parties in a dispute . 
The clerk retired with the justices in casP they should desire t o 
be advised on any point of law . Although the conclusion was 
re21c:i.ed without consul ting the derk , Lord l-iewart CJ said : 
"the cuestion is whether he was so related to the case in 
it ' s civil asnect as to be unfit to act as a clerk to the 
justices in the criminal matter . The answer to that 
question dependes not on what actually was done but what 
~ight apnear to be done . Nothing is to be done that 
19 
creates even j susnicion that there has been an improper 
interfernce with the crurse of justice ." 
It is then a matter of appearances . The need to maintain public 
confidence in the judiciary outweighs considerations of actual 
bias . The ouestion becomes , what is the correct test to 
determine whether there is an appearance of bias? The courts 
have adopted two : 
3 . Real likelihood or Reasonable Susnicion of 3ias? 
The 'real likelihood of bias ' test was formulated by Blac~burn J 
. -:, T' d . 1 n :1 V • 1. 2 n 2 4 
. 
11 ·.!herever there is a real likelihood that the judge would , 
from kind red or f8vour , or any other cause , b8ve a bias in 
f2vour of one of t ll e parties , it would be ve r·y wrong for 
hiPl to 8 Ct . 11 
This test wa s expressley a d apted by Vaughan Jilliams LJ in~ v 
~und erland Justices 25 and was 8pplied in New t ealand in Healey 
v ~auhina 2 r . A problem re~ained however - whether the real 0 
likelihood test was to be objPctive , based on the evaluation of 
~he reviewing court , or whether it wa s to be a ' reasonable man ' 
test . R v Barnslev Licencin ~ Justices 27 seemed to have settled 
the ~uestion in s2ving that the real likelihood of bias had to 
be 
11 determined from the nrobabil it ies to be inferred from the 
circumstances , not upon the i~nressions that might reas -
onably be inferred from the circu~stances , not upon the 
basis 0£ t~e impressions that ~ i ght reasonably be left on 
20 
the mind of the party aggrieved or the public at large . 11 
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However , doubts are cast upon this formualtion due to cases such 
8S i~x parte Lewin , Re i;fard 2g , an Australian case , where 
McClements J formulated the test thus : 
n-,fould the rec=,sonable man , knowing the facts , draw the 
inference that the 11Bgistrate would be likely to be 
biased one way or the other? 1' 
Amid this uncertainty , the ~nglish Court of Appeal in l~nnon 
30 
see~s to have further complicated the :11atter by introducing the 
lesser test of ' a reasonable suspicion of bias '. There , the 
chair:nen of a rent assessrnmt committee lived with his father 
w~o was tenant in a g roup of flats controlled by the same comrany 
':."' ose rent increeses v.1ere under revie,,.; . Lenninc: l'·IR seems to have 
interwoven the two tests . The followine ~uote from his judge -
ment is worth setting out in fuJl . (The Pmphasis is mine) 
11 There must be circumstances fro;.1 which a reasonable ;:ian 
would think it likely er r,robable that the chairman w:uld 
or did favour one side unfairly at the ex~ense of the 
other . The court will not inouire into whether he did in 
fact favour one side unfeirly . buffice it that reasonable 
aeocle might think he did . The reason is plain enough . 
Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is 
c es troyed \·1hen right - minded reople go away thinking ' the 
jud[e was biased ' . 11 31 
At one coint , Lenning ~R talks of nrobability at the instance of 
the reasonable man and at another , he refers to what the reas -
onable man might think - a little less than probability . 
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Edmund Davies LJ clearly f2voured the ' r easonable suspicion of 
bias ' test~ Danckwerts LJ seemed to favour the reasonable 
susnicion approach but said that he found it extremely d ifficult 
to :112.ke up h i s mind , contenting himself to conclude that it 
1::8 s 11 not wise II for the cha i r:nan to have acted . 
Un 3 v Co~~onwealth Conciliation and Arb i tration Commission , ex 
~A rte The An~liss Groun 32 it was held that public conf i dence 
in the courts of law may be undermined by a suspicion of bias 
reasonably , and not fancifully enterta i ned by reasonable minds . 
ThP joint judgement 11.eld that the expression of altitude by the 
Co~mission favourinf an eQual pay policy and even a step taken 
in further8nce of that pol icy were not sufficient to engender 
'1 reasomible SUf'T'icion in the minds of t11ose v,ho ca rrie before 
the tribunsl an~ the [Pner~l public that the tribunal and it ' s 
~e~be rE would not bring fair Rnd unprejudiced ~inct ~ to it ' s 
c1rJ ,4udica tion . 
To ~econile the two differPnt te~ts , ~it~ore p~j Aro n con 
34 
sur:;aest th 2t the r e8 l li,<PJ ihood 8p:9roach should be used to 
?vo id invalidation of dPc ds ionf' whPrP there is R minor technical 
breach and to avoi~ 2n over- stri c t apnlication of the nule to 
ac~ ini strative boai 0 s . . :) ln _, V 
~a~borne Ju st ic es , ex p2rte rea rce 
35 
where the court remarked 
th2t the rec1son2ble suspicion test 'd8S being urg·ed as a wa rrant 
for invalidatine orders on quite unsubstantiated grounds and 
u r1o n the II flimsiest pretexts of bias 11 • ·.rhttmore and Aron son go 
on to supgest that the ' reRsonable s us pici on of bi as' test is 
appr opr i ate to cases where i t is neces s ary to avoid embarr asmentor 
wh e re i mpartiality of deci sion making i s essen t i al and there is a 
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danger of loss of publiG confidence if apparently biased decisions 
are allowed to stand. 
There has been speculation as to how much difference there really 
is betveen the two tests. Sachs Lj in Hannan v Bradford 
Corporation 36 said: 
"I doubt whether, in practice, materially different results 
are produced by the real liklihood of bias test or that 
adopted by the county court judge ("whether a reasonable 
man would say that a real danger of bias exsisted") if 
there is a difference, I uphold the latter and respect-
fully adhere to the school of thought adopted in Lannon's 
case." 
If confusion existed in Sa.eh LJ's mind, he has compounded that 
confusion for others by equating the trial judge's ''real danger 
of bias" with Lannon ' s r! reasonable suspici on of bias" . Wade 
37 
follows the view that, in most cases. either test will lead t o 
the same result: 
" This might be so in all cases if likelihood is given the 
meaning of possibility , rather than probability . For , if 
there is no real possibility of bias, no reasonable pe rson 
would suspect it." 
But , it is submitted , there is a material difference be tween these 
two tests. It is a far harder task to prove that it was really 
likely that an officeholder was biased than it is to show a 
suspicion that he may have been biased. One of the more recent 
statements on this matter by a New Zealand court was that of Mahon J 
in Anderton v Auckland City Council 
38
. It was not necessary for 
Mahon J to review the tests relating to appearances 
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of bias for , in the end , the case turned upon the pure exercise 
of a rliscretion by a ~inister . Nevertheless , the learned judge ' s 
exersise in this respect will prove to be of great assistance to 
subsequent courts when faced , in different circumstances , with 
an alle fa tion of bias . 
After reviewing a ~aft of case la~, throughout the Commonwealth , 
I~hon J concluded that the tests were clearly distinct and ~ay 
be used in different dircumst?nces . i . e : (1) ~ party may prove 
actual bias . (2) Presumptive bias through pecuniary interest 
will operate as a discualifying factor upon mere proof of ~hat 
interest . (3) Presu~ptive bias based upon a ' real likelihood 
of bi8s ' c8n be usec \·:~en there is evidence o: pecuniary or 
ot~e= 5~te rest s . A reviewinf court will assess for itself 
1::he the r the i mp8 rtial observer , a pT)ri sed of a 11 the relevant 
·2.r- ts would anei r''?r that tr.'.:' re::il lL~elihooci existed . (LI.) 
Presumptive bias baseo upon a ' re8sonable suspicion of bias ' ~8Y 
be proved hy relying soley upon the manner in which the pro -
ceedings were conducted . The court will judge the impression , 
to be considered objectively on the mind of a liticant or 
observer unacouainted with any outside facts or circumstances 
~rcated bt tte outward form or ccnduct of the proceedings under 
review . 
If this line of reasoning is followed , an applicant for a writ 
of:certiorari or mandamus has two options : if he has some 
evidence of favour or bterest , he must set out to prove a real 
likelihood of bias . 'l'hi!=: 1·1ould be the case where there is a 
pecuniary interest in the matter for 2djudication on the part of 
the judp-e or if the judge or officeholder is 
known to be partisan in fc1vour of or against a particula r litigant . 
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If -::here is no such evidence however , the applicant need only 
show that the appearance of the proceedings mi~ht give rise to 
a suspicion of bias . This 'dOUld be the case where 2n office -
holder instigates proceedings and then goes ahead to adjudicate 
on them or where a clerk who has an interest in the proceedings 
retires with the judges to assist in the making of a decision . 
In this way , the felt need to avoid even the re~otest suspicion 
of bi~s in order to retain public confidence in the judiciary 
?17. 
reruires no evidence as to the actuality of bias . 
As well as the two tests for bias introduced thus far , it is 
necessary at this stage to introduce a further test applicable 
to a different category or officeholders . As hinted at earlier , 
this 11'12S the test unon which the Anderton case actually turned : 
if an officeholder is riven , by statute , a discretion as to the 
exercise of a power , he must actually exercise that discretion . 
If the officeholder ' s mind is so foreclosed , because of an 
operative bias , that he will not even consider alternative 
grgu~ents , ~e has failed to do what Parliament has asked of him ; 
to exercise his discretion at all . 
However , what is the position where bias is disproved , or , 
alternatively , the person allegedly aggrieved by a decision 
ac~nowledfes that there was no actual bias on the part of the 
ferson or body whose.decision is being challenged? In Sussex 
Justices bias was disproved yet the applicant still obtained his 
remedy . In Lannon , an acknowledgment by the applicant for 
certior2ri of no .actual bias did not prevent the issue of the 
writ . Conversely , in Barnsley , Bevlin J acknowledged that , on 
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the facts, a reasonable person would have suspected bias but 
in his own mind there was no real bias; on this basis, relief 
was refused. 
DJ Mullan 40 postulates that, ev
en allowing the thoughts of 
the reasonable man to be the governing test, it is till pert -
inant to ask if justice is really seen to be done if an applicant 
for certiorari is allowed his remedy after disclaiming actual 
bias. It does seem a little indongrulous for such a litigant to 
argue t ~at, on the facts a reasonable man would have suspected 
bias and at the same time to say that he , the applicant , knows 
that there was in fact no bias . If the applicant has such know-
ledge then, for him at least, justice has been seen to be done . 
4 . The Cause of Bias 
(a) Pecuniary Interest 
R v Rand 
41 
decided conslusively that a personal pecuniary 
interest on the part of the adjudicator raises a conclusive pre-
sumption of bias irrespective of the other tests. Thus , where 
licencing justices , who were directors of a brewery company that 
was apploying for a licence, resigned their directorships and sold 
their shares immediately before sitting as members of the 
licencing authority, it was held that their recent pecuniary 
interest, viewed in conjunction with the fact that they had 
supported the application as justices , disqualified them from 
sitting. 42 
However , it is to be noted that a remote pecuniary interest will 
not disqualify. In E v McKenzie 
43
, it was held that magistrates 
should not be disqualified because three of their number awned 
shares in shipping companies which were insured in an association 
which was a member of the ~hipping Federation of which the 
in:ormant was an official . 
(b) FaJ11ily anrl Ferso~al Relationships 
The disoualifying effect of family ties is so well known that 
is c2use Jittle difficulty and 11roduces little case l.?.:w 
44
. 
The same may he said of ~ersonal friendship ca-es but , in 
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Cottle v Cottle 
45 
cir Eoyd ~erri~an F warned of the difficulties 
that may arise if this assumption is ta~en too far : 
"It would "be a :prenostorous thing if a suegestion were to 
be made that , because of the mere fact of some sort of 
acouaintance between a justice and the narties , a bias or 
a nossibility of bias existed . If such an exacting test 
were ~u t unon t he right of justices to sit , it may very 
well be t'.'lat th" 1.-::iole structure of suJ11mary ~urisdiction 
would be upset . 11 
(c) Per2onal Hostility 
Strong IH?rsonal ani1:1osi t:1 tow2rds a .pa rty 1,:ill diS( ualify a 
judge from 2djudic8ting . /,. conviction , by an Irish 1-Jagistrate , 
was ouashed when it ·,;sr: s':1.ov:n that very bad feeling existed 
beb"Pen hi!TI and the clPfPnc:ant ' s f2.mily and that , shortly a:i:·ter 
the hearine , heh?.~ used words indicative of Pnmity towards the 
defendant . 46 ~uch demonstreted bias may arise e0ually out of 
2 hear i ng . In .:', X rarte vchofield , .{e Austin 
47 
, a magistrate 
heard obstruction char~es arainst two men , brought by a police 
constable . 0uring the course of the hearing , he descr i bed the 
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two men as perjures and convicted them . He then went on to hear 
cross - summonses for assault brought by the two men against the 
constable . Certiorari , naturally , i~f.uea . 
A further Pxample can be taken from outside the purely judicial 
sphPre . In ~hite v Kuzych 48 , the respondent was found guilty 
by the investigating committee of his union of publicallv opp-
osing the union ' s policies . Their Lordships found that there 
~as , before and after the trial , strong and widespread resent~ent 
felt 2gainst the responcient by many in the union . They concluded 
thet if the so - c2lled 11 tri;::,l" and the p-ener:=,l meetinp- which 
followec hc'.r1 to be concucted 'cy peJ"sons previously free f2-"0111 all 
hi~s and prejudice , this condition was_ certainly not fulfilled . 
(c:) i\ttitudes Towards the Issue 
Ceneral exnressions of hostility or attituces held towards an 
issue do not dis0ualify . ·J:'he vie·.-1 of lalles C .b in '( v '.'.'he 
~ecorder and Justices of the County of iublin 
4
~ is fe nerally 
regarded as being accurate : 
" 'J'he interest or bias which disoualifies "Tiust be re2l 2nd 
substantial enc suc"h 88 was likel:,- to in:Juence the :':inci , 
not a mere interest in hu~anity , or an ~nterest in the 
protection of ani~als from cruelty . ~uch an interest would 
no ~ore disrualify a magistrate than an interest in the 
supression of a vice . ~he interest or bias that 
discualifies ~ust be sonething reasonably liKely to bias or 
influence their minds in the particular case . 11 
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As a result , the refusal of an application for a publ i can ' s 
licence by the :uarter ~essions was not held to be invalid by 
reason of three judges comprising the ~uarter Sessions being 
subscribers to an association for the prevention of intemperance . 
However , in an earlier ~ew 2ealand case of similar facts , such 
inclinations were fuund to constitute bias : In Isitt v (uill 
50 
the majority of the licencing committee for the Sydenham Listrict 
were co~prised of prohibitionists . Over a period of two years , 
they refused renewals of all liouor licences in their district . 
It was found that the committee expressed their determination 
not to grant any licences , not on the §':round that there were 
circumstances within their knowledge and peculiar to the-district 
which rendered it unncessary to grant such licences in the 
district , but on the ground that licenced houses were improper 
and could not , under any circumstances , be reouired . Incetinr 
on a foregone conclusion , they failed to consider each case on 
it ' s merits according to the statutory criteria . 0uch a con-
clusion brinP-s Isi tt v r, uill wi tnin t:he bias thct l'alles C B s2id 
1·1ould dis,...ualify ; a bias liKely to influence their minds in the 
particular case . ~oreover , the nature of their preconceptions 
would influence them in every case that came before them . 
·r 11is case turned on the s2me point es dicl t:he .Anderton case . It 
turned , not on a breach of natural jutice , but on the f2ct that , 
in acting pursuant to a foregone conclusion , the committee mem -
bers had effectively closed their minds to any alternative 
arr:uments . In doing so , they had failed to do what Parliament 
hacl asked of them : To exercise the diacretion reouired by 
st?tute . 
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fhis st~te of 8ffairs brings to lirht 2 perhaps irreconcileable 
confli_ct in. the nature of elected officeE= such as a licencing 
committee . On the one h8nd , they are entitled to be elected 
pursuant to a mandate , which ~ay , as in the case of Isitt v 'uill , 
take the :crri of a very strong bic1s . If electeµ mer;ibers are 
entitled to assume that such a p©licy is 18Voured by th8 elec -
torate and in carrying out their official duties , they can act 
pursuant tc it . Cn the other hand , they are often reouired to 
adhere to particular statutory criteria in making a decision . 
It is cften the case that these criteria leave no room for the 
operation of particularly strong p6licies . The consequence r,ay 
then be that there is little room for the full operation of such 
r,olicies . 
(e) Ln Interest in the Cutcome of t~e Frcceedings 
In~ v ~ondon City Council , ex parte A~Kersdy~ 51 , a cc~cittee 
cf councillors briefed a solicitor to oprose an application for 
2 :-:iuf:'.ic and dancing licence on their be:1r1l f anc then :r:;roceecled 
to sit with the Council 1:1.hen it considered the application . 
, ·and 2.mus issued . ~imilarly , Ltd , Re 
IIorsington 
52 , it was held th2.t a justice of the reace is dis -
oualified from receiving a co~plaint and issuing a su~mons 
arainst the company when he is an officer of the union which laid 
t::ie corr.pleint and which may recover the penalty imposed . 
(f) ~d~udicators as ~rosecutors 
T~is is perhaps one of the most glaring cases of being a judge 
in one ' s own cause . rhe obvious nature of the interest involved 
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recuires the citation of only one ex2mple . In response to 
allegations that a medical practitioner had acted indecently 
towards women , an optional board of registration sent women to 
the doctor ' s surfery in order to test the validity of the claims . 
As a result of their findings , the practitioner was called before 
the board for a hearing . }rohibition issued to prevent a con -
tinuation of the charcqes , 
53 
(g) Appellate Bias 
It is of some interest th~t , at common law , there is nothing to 
prevent a trial judge from sitting with an 8ppellate court to 
hear an 2ppe2l against his own decision . This is not the case , 
however , outside the judiciary , ~annan v Er2dford Coruoration 
54 
saw a boarrl o~ rovernors ter~inate a teacher ' s employment . A 
sub - committee o~ the Corporation ~et , in the exercise of it ' s 
stBtutory power , to hold an inouiry into whether it should 
p~ohibit the disniss2l . The chair~an and two members of the sub-
cornmi ttee ·,·er0 8lPo members of the school ' s governing boc.y . It 
was held that the crovernors did not , upon 6onning their sub -
committee hats , cease to be an intergral part on the bo~y whose 
action was being impupned anci it made no difference that they, 
did not personally attend t~governor ' s ~eetingA , 
It is in these are2.s that the rules aga.inst bias which 1!1ere 
developed for the courts become strained , often to the point of 
absur~ity , if they are to apply to bodies having a continuing 
involve:7lent ,dth the matters in issue , which h;:ive been elected 
on a policy or have some general role in relation to the area of 
8G1:1inistration . rhe ex2mple has already been taken of a licencing 
commitee. Others inclu~e F local authority that ~ay be 
commited to a town pl2n or a member of a tr8de union elected 
to office because of a line taken on certain issues. It is 
officeholders such as ~ese with which this paper is primarily 
concerned. 
5. Lxceptions to tr.e i\Ules t,i:rainst Bias 
l'he 'doctrine of necessity' orerates vihen the rules governing 
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;:i tri bun; l con ternpla te th;:i t 8n ad juc ic2 tor may have conflicting 
interests and where the officeholder' s task, if not performed, 
v;ould rrevent a r,2.rty obtaininp-recress. rl'he instances in which 
the doctrine orerates WPre stRted in C'~ane v Alcyon Shipping Co 55 
thus: (1) . '}'ere the tr.:_hunal orjected to as interested is the 
only tribunal that can deal with the subject mater; (2) ~here 
the legislature ~as directed the interested tribunal to decide. 
A statutory ex2mple is s58 of ~~  Town and Country Ilanning Act 
1c77 which rrovirtes t~at a council may negotiate for the purchase 
of land and reach acreernent with a develo~er on a mutualy 
accepteble plannin~ scheme anrl this fact alone in not a fround 
for chalenge to a Cr'Hncil 's 0ecision to r;c 8'.'lPac v,i th the 
proposal. Hence, the ~axirn that no man shal act as a judge in 
his own cause ~ust yejJf to the lerislature' s intention that he 
:'.:'al. 
! recent :rew L,ealanr. example of this r.octrine in action is the 
decision of the Privy Council in Jeffs v New ~ealand ~airy Board 56 
The 1:ev1 L:ealand Dairy Board i,.ras obliged to determine zones of 
oneration in respect of certan dairy factories. The Board h2.d, 
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under it ' s statutory powers , advancert money to one of the dairy 
factory propietors and was clearly in a position of having a 
financial interest and thus disoualified from resolving t~e 
zoning issue . In th~ir Lordship ' s view , the conclusion was 
inescapable : ~arliament intended in conferring the power to 
determine zoning issues to make an exception to the general rule . 
The challenge to jurisdiction was therefore rejected . 
A statute may , however , only provide limited protection . The 
statutory shield may be narrower than it first 2ppears . If 
bias is actually proven , the decision ~ay be ouashed . The 
statute must thus be carefully constructed and it ' s limits care -
fully measured . A privative clause might for instance , despite 
appearances , ~e interpreted as affecting form and not subst2nce 
?n~ as not protectin[ proceedin~s ~rom the defect of actual bias . 
F. L'he .-.Jffects of Bi8s or Interest 
• 1 }1 en 2 n 8 d mi n j_ s t r 2 t iv e 2 c t o r d e c i P i on i s sub ;/' c t to j u d i c i 2 l 
revie~ , the court can intervPnP on t~o rroundc : Gl~ra vires Fn~ 
error on the face of the record . ~ince biaP will not 8ppear on 
the face of the record , the court necessRrily intervenes on the 
~armer ground . In discuc9in? t~P ultra vires nature of a 
~ecision , most com~entators 8re of the vie~ thPt t~e nrpscnce 
of bias ~eans th2t the tribunRl is improperly constituted so 
thRt it ~as no power to deter~ine the case and , accordingly , 
that :tts decision :mJ.st be void and a nullity . 
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de .::.;mi th 58 
notes that most of the cases relevant to this proposition are 
concerned with the effects of non- compliance with the audi 
2lteran partem rule but sugEests that it would be incongruous 
33 
to adopt a diffe1·ent analysis for the rule against interest and 
bias . He does make reference to the fact , however , that there 
is some authority to the view that adjucication by one who is 
disoualified at common law for interest 8nd bi2.s makes the pro -
ceedinrs voidable ; not void , so until tiie decision is ~uc1shed , 
it cannot be i~pec1ched collaterc1lly - by mandamus . 
The issue seems t:i rc1ve been settled in 1:ew LieE1lc1nd by the 1984 
Court of Ap~eal cPse of Love 8nd ~obson v forirua Citv Council 
59 
The re it was held that if ivalidity of the Council ' s decision was 
found the dec ision ~8s c1t leE1st ace facto operation unless or 
until it is declared to be void or a nullity by a competent body 
or court . In that sense and durinf tr.8t ~eriod , it continues to 
have some effect or existance in law . 
11 :.'h;::i tever J.c=inguare 'Tligh t be usec to describe the crna li ty of 
the rlecision pencing the declaration in apnropriate pro -
ceedinfs that it is to be set aside as invalid , it cannot 
be ccnsiriered as totally void in the sense of being legally 
"'.l.On - exi s tent . 11 
;·Jindful of this decision as declaring the current state of 
rew Zealand law , the traditional practice in licencing cases 
of sending the case back to the licencing authority by 'Tlandarnus , 
unacco~nanied by certiorari is to be noted . An unesca~able 
nroblern with this anproach arose in Isitt v r uill . clad there 
been any reasonable prospects of the licencing committee per-
for~ing the duty entrusted to them by the law , the proper course 
of action would have been a mandamus , ordering the'TI to hear 
and determine the case again . The evidence , however , disclosed 
eo biased a state of mind on t~eir part that it was unrec=isonable 
to expect them to ~e able to exercise thP discretion gi ven to 
them by l aw . It was s2id that , in such circumstances , the 
respondent was entitled to certiorari to cuash thP order . It 
was not within the powers of the court to decide that the 
respondent was entitled to a renewal of his licence . 
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The remedies of certiorari , mandamus and prohibition are dis -
cretionary on the reviewing court . After viewing the ~erits of 
a case , the court ~~Y , in the nroper exercise of it ' s discretion , 
refw:oe to issue the \·:ri t . 
This discrPtion is exerciseable even where there is a statutory 
' priv~tive clause ' see%inr to exclude judicial review . 
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:io~ever , ~nis~inic v ?oreifn Co~rens~tion Commission F
1 
shows 
t~ct , 1.1hen v1orcs in.::, statute oust the fO't!er of the High Court 
to review ~ecisions of an inferior tribunal , they ~ust be con -
strued strictly anrt they ¼ill not have the 0!fect of ousting that 
-:--c'.·e:r if t;1e infe::·ior trihun-?l Jr12:, ::-icte0 ,,.;itbout jurisdiction or 
if it 1'>12:=: c:one scmethinp- or ~~ilPd to ro sw1etlling 1,,·hich is of 
cuc'ri 2 n~tur 0 th:--t it ' s decision is a -1ullity" =~ut , if the in -
ferior tribunal has ~erely m8de ~n error of la~ , which foes not 
affect it ' s jurisdiction an° if it ' s cecision is not~ nullity 
for soMe reason sue½ as a hresch of t~e ruler of n2tural justice , 
the ouster ~ill be effective . Alle~ations of bi2s fO to tho 
court or tribunal ' s jurisdiction to hear the ~atter at all . ouch 
privative clauses tron ~ay be i~nored . 
The matte r of the effect of judicial decisions inspired by bias 
becomes far more compound when it is found that a judge has been 
corrupt for a length cf time , so that his errors are woven into 
the fabric of the law . The comrlexity of t his probleo is 
illis-tra t ed by an incicent tl'B t arose in the United 0tates in 
the 1930s . 
~ 2udre was found ~uilty of accepting bribes from litifants to 
cecire cases in iheir favour . ·rhe ouestion v1c=is , what was to be 
rlone about the cases in which he had taken bribes? It was de -
cid ed that they s~ould all be reheard by a reconstituted court . 
The cases all invloved ~atents and , in a number of them , the 
ccnvicted judpe had ~eclared the patents to be invalid . A period. 
of years ensued before any do ubt of these decisions arose . 
Lurinf this tiMe , it was assumed that certain of the patents had 
leyal force , in fact , one of the de cisions had become a leading 
c~se in patent law and was relied upon by other courts in de -
cirinf the validity of still other pa t ents . . ~en the cases were 
rehec1rr, , a rn1mber of t':1ern 'r·ere reversed so that the IJatents in 
cuestion were finally ~eld to be valid . The further ouestion 
then ~rose as to what should be done with the lost years during 
whicti the ratent - holder was deprived of rrofits and royalties he 
chould have enjoyed? lhe solution was to pass a special Act of 
Congress extending the life of the atent by a neriod enual to 
tha.t during which it was assumed to be invalid . Fuller 62 
rescribes this 88 " rouizh justice" 
II ' rough ' because seven years in the 1(·40s cannot be 
the sc1 .. 1e as seven years in the 1 S30s , espec i ally when 
account is taken of the effPcts of technological progress 
that viould tend to reduce the value of the patents ." 
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Bias and interest , then , not only result in advers e effects to 
a li-tigant~but can produce se rious consequences for the effi c ient 
operation of the law . 
J ith t ~ese principles in mind , th e re~ain er of this paper does 
three things : 
(1) It considers their applicat i on to a variety of other 
decision ~akers . In doinf this , it recofnises that some 
cases do not turn on the issue of natural justice at all 
but , instead , on the failure to exerc i se a d iscretion due 
to an oper2tive hia3 . 
(2) It consiciei:'s certain of J\=:rlic:iment ' s responses to interest 
and bi8s . 1his ta~es two !or~s . ?i~st , legislative 
atte~pts to rro~ote i~fArtiality in bodies which , be ca use 
of their vPry n2ture , ;:,re inherently bi2sed and second , 
:provisiorn3 1.vllich ciicte:te the consecuences of c> persorn1 l 
b i as ste~~inrr :ro1 an office~cl~ers pPr2on8l , not public , 
2ctivities an~ 2ssoci8tion2 . 
( 3 ) It presents some furthPr :rieans for ceguletinr confl icts of 
interest . .any of t~Pse are of 8 self - rcrul atory nature 
a nd do not sh;::,re t~e ccrnculsion inhPrPnt in statutory 
re;-ul2 t ion . 
1 . CJassificstion Accorr~i ne; to the ~~ature o: the ?nnction 
It bas been the tendency in t~e past for the cou rts to classify 
officeholders accordin~ to th? n2ture of their function And , 
on this basis alone , to c.ecir~e 1;,1hether or not the rules a£21inst 
bi;:ip ;:ire applic21ble . ·.!hen the functio n was classified as 
' admin i strative ', courts tended to the view that bi21s was an 
irrelevant cmcept . This principle is often said to have stem -
Med from 5rome v Bath Justices 63 
where Viscount Cave said : 
" If there is one :r•rinciple v.'hich forms an inter[r8l pnrt 
of the ~nglish law , it is that every member of a body 
enFafPr in a judidial nroceeding must be able to act 
jur icially ; anc: that it has been held over and over again 
that if R :ie~ber of such a body is subject to a bias in 
favcur or arainst either ?arty to the tispute or is in such 
a ]osition that bias ~ust be assu:ied , he ought not to 
ta~e D8rt in a decision or even sit upon the tribunal . 
This rule has been asserted , not only in the case of 
courts of justice or other ·ucticial tribunals , but in the 
case o~ authorities which , alt~ough in no sense can ~e 
calleri ccurts , have to 2.c t as judges of t':le rL~hts of 
others ." 
Th i s citaticn cannot , however , be used as authority for the 
proposition that only if the functions of a decision - Maker are 
considered judicial can the m~mon law ,rinciples apply . It ' s 
enrhasis comes in it ' s last line - such principles must be 
2dhered to by officeholders ~aving the power to act as judges 
of the rights of others . 
A si:iilerly misunc.erstood passc1fe was t he following emote frcm 
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Joint Comm i ttee ( 1920) ltd 64 , where A t
1dn l J said : 
11-1.·/herever any body of pe rsons having le c;al a utho r ity to 
determine ouestions affecting the ri ehts of subjects and 
having the duty to act ~udicially , act in exce ss of their 
lega l authority , they a re subject to the controlline juridiction 
of the Kings Bench Division exercised in these wri t s '' (my emphasiE 
It was not until Ridge v B2 l d\·1in 65 th3t true mea n
ing \ '8S given 
to the phr2se "h.::iving the duty to act judicially": '1.·he phrase 
was there as a consecuence of the existance of a ''l ega l authority 
to de termine the quest ions affecting the ri ghts of subjects . If 
a le gal authority of th2t nature exists , then there i s a ti uty to 
ac t jucl ici 2lly . 11 
uubseo uently , in ~ur2 yaopah v.?ernando ~6 the lrivy Ccuncil J 
continued the moveme nt aw8y from the classification appro2ch by 
stress inf that , in de termining whether the rules of natural 
juPtice apply , a court must look at the entire context , both 
statutory and f~ctual . It mus t consider three t~inrs : (1) 
":!1iat i s the nature of the property , the office 11el 1i , stc1tus 
enjoyed or services to be perfo r~e d by the co~plainant or in-
justice? (2) In what circuinst2nces or upon 1:. 11at occ;:osicns i s 
tte pers on claiming to be ent i tlec. to exerc i ;-,e the iTleesure of 
control entitled to intervene? (~) .~en 8 ripht to intervene 
is proved , i::ha t s2nction i s ?.V8 ilahle b be i mposed? 
11he c ircu·11s t ances in 11.111 i eh c1 ci u t y to act a ccord ing to t he prin-
c iples of natural justice we re extended even further in 
~8 fan8ya s i v rlinis ter of I :'1~igr a tion 67 Now , 8 c2 uty t
o 8c t 
Pcc or~ina to thP rrincinl es of n?tura l ~ustice ~ill be implied 
whenever a les;iti '"'lc1 te expectation 
is created in the affected ~arty that they have ri~ ts under the 
law and thRt they will he heard . 
Similar observations have been ~ade in rearlberp v Varty 
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anrt 
in J v livernool Corroration , ex parte Liverpool Taxi ?leet Cp-
erators Association , 0 In the former case , Lord Pearson said : n , 
11 
.. 'nere so"1e person or body is entrusted by }arliament with 
a~~inistrative or eYecutive functions , there is no rre -
su~rticn that co~pliance ~ith the rules of natural justice 
is reruired , ?lthoufh , as Ferliament is not to be presu:ned 
to act unfairly , tne courts may be 8ble in suitable cases 
( rerhc1 -ris 2.lways) to i:n-rly an o bliga tim to act with fairness . 11 
In th~ l~tter c2se , ~os~ill 1 J saicl : 
11 1:i:'he '80 1.,ver o: t':1e cru.rt to interve e is not li·nited ; as 
once was thought , to t':1ose cases w~ere the function is 
ju~icial er ruasi - jtidicial . The modern cases show that 
tliis court will intervene "'lore 1·.ridely that in the past . 
-~ven vih ere tl1 e function i s s;:: ir to be ac minis tra ti ve , the 
court will not hesitate to intervene , in a suitable c8se , 
if it is necessary to eY1.sure fairness . 11 
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This j_s the aunroac:i ac.o!)tec1 by ::P\·J ~ealanci . In Lower .ilutt Ci tv 
Council v D2.n.~ 72 .' ' ,~Carthy I observeci t':18t the clear- cut clis -
tinctions between ~~inistrative functions and judicial funct i ons 
i2 not to be ncceptec! as an answer to a ca$e where bias is 
::i 11 er-ec1 • In. tec1d , 1:1he tr: er the rules 8 [8 inst bias apply 
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"is to be decided upon a realistic exa'Tlin2tion of the 
legislation, the circumstances of the case and t~e subject 
:n2iter under consideration." 73 
It is to be noted tJ.1a t sor;ie co:nmen ta tars, in 2 t te:nr .ing in 2 
si~il2 r ~2inner to 2void the labeling of a body' s functions 
create classifications of their own. Robert ~eid and Hilel 
Lavi~ ?d submit that the power to affect rights is quasi-judicial 
2nd a lack of it is 2d~inistrative. dcde 7 5 ~3uggests that the 
term 'cuasi-judicial' was introduced so that the principles of 
natural justice :nifht be 2pplied to the~ as far as practicable . 
. _. uch reasoning brings the 1;1hole mater back to sauare one. ie 
A power to 2ffect rifhts is cuasi-judicial so thn bias rules 
2 T;nly, vhi le no such pov!e r '1.? ke s the .:unction adimins tra ti ve 
~ ~ ~" bi2s rules 2re inaurlicable. At.?chin~ Jabels in t~is 
'.,,.,y beciy,s the !'is% thct s tribun2l ,·il riake a neci sion, 1;1hen 
·rie01inr the pof::sibili ty of bi . ,s, 1,1i thout 8 true evalu2tion of 
the le;irl2tion, the circu~rtances of t~e c2se and the subject 
matter un(er consideration. 
Bearing this in mind, t~e purpose of this se tion ir to evaluate, 
in relation to the variou s offic8hol~ers identified in ~art A of 
tl-is naper, to w"iat extent the :,rincipl0s ciscussed in :~·;:irt '3 are 
arplic2ble. In relation to each of the four categories of ·office-
holfers here to be discussed, the nature of the office and its 
essential defferences from a court of law wil be noted and 
recent cases wil be discussed to determ1ne ·ust what test is 
2pplicable in deter~ininr whether or not a bias i s present. 
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2 . The Actor is a Statutory PoArd or Tribunal 
' Tribunal ' is a word embr2cing many kinds and sorts . A 
standRrd appropriate to one 11ay be inappropriate to another . 
Facts ·,;hich iay constitute bi8s in one may not amount to bias 
in another . The ouPsticn 11us t be , what is the standard to 
apply to this tribunal? No t , what is the standard that a:riplies 
to tribunals? A standard appropriate to a body concerned with 
commercial arbitration 11ay be inappropriate to a public inauiry 
that neither he8rs contests between parties nor decides anything 
but merely makes a report th8t others rnay or 11ay not act upon . 
~ome examples of the diffe rences in nature and remedies may be 
The ~~all Clai~s lribunal is very much a~in to a court of law . 
It ' s nrirnary function is to brin~ the r2 rties to a dispute to 
an arreed settlement . 76 Ehe tribunal ~ay make an order award
ing 
~amages , renuiring specific performance or declaring a contract 
to be void . 77 An order of the Tribu
nal is final and bindin£ on 
all parties to the proceedings . 78 ·ra~in~ a cautious step out -
side the judicial arena is the Lroadcast ing iribunal . The 
primary functions of thi~ :ribunal ere to ~e~r w8rrant applications 
an~ to determine complaints alleging breaches of programme 
Ptand8rds broupht by members of t-e public agains t a \·.'arrant 
holder . 79 A potential conflict is provided by s68 of 
the 
Broadcas ting ~et 1976 . Cn the one ha nd , it recognises the duty 
of the Tribun2l to act judicially and , on the other , it reouires 
the Tribunal to ~ave repard to povernment policy , comminucated 
~D the Tribunal by directives of the Kinister of Broadcasting . 80 
.'.:he tribunal ' s gre2.test pov_;er is to impose a rionetary penalty of 
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r500 if it is of the opinion that a broadcaster has breached the 
conditions-of it' s warrant. St Apart from thef'P r2re cases, the 
remedies of the Tribunal are limited to recommending 112ppropriate 
actionfl to the broadcasting bod:v by which theprogra:nme 1das 
broadcast or to giving a direction to the broadcasting body 
reouiring it to broadcast a state~ent tht refers to fue complaint. 
Jo form of personal redress (by way of costs or damages) are 
provided a successful complainant. Even lesser remedies are 
available to the ~aitangi Tribunal. rhis Tribunal is to con-
s ider claims from :laoris that they Eire or are likely b be pre-
judicialy ~ffected by an Act, re~ulation, Order in Council or 
2ny policy or ;=;ct of the C:r:'01:m. 83 T:ie ·r·::-ibun2l's only remedy in 
the c2se of a ~el-founded clai~ is to reco~mend to the Crown 
th2t action be taken to comnensate ~or or remove the preiudice. -4 ' ~ d 
1~] 1 of these bories, and the 1T1:1ny others 111h0Pe nature, function3 
rn~ re"e6ies differ t o even preater extent2 ~~  be subjected to 
~le~~tionc of bias. This lack of unifor~ity :n~ke~ t~e ~roblem 
i:n~en~ley more difficult an~ subtle than the pro~le:n of bias in 
the courts themselves. 
A further problem wit h statutory tribunals is that, in many cases, 
statutory provisions as iD their embership can form an appearance 
of 'built-in' bias. I'ri~arily, tis srea~s tc previsions as tc 
a member' s oualifications and as to the :nethod of appointment. 
,Jtatutory nrovisions regarding qualifications can reouire ~embers 
to renresent certain areas of society or certain incustries. eg 
The ~ducation Authorities Appeal Authority -eight members are 
to represent emrloyer organisations and ~ree members are to 
82 
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represent employee orgRnisations . 85 ~he Representation Commission -
one member~is to represent the_Eovernment and one member is to 
represent the Oppositio~ . 86 
~ome statutory rrovisions re ~uire membe rs to be chosen~from 
asso6iations established to deal with the particula r area of 
jurisdiction . eg Mo tor Vehicle 3alesmen Registration Authority -
three members are to be members of the f.~otor Vehicle Lealers 
Institute 87 Iublic ~ervice A~peal Board - service officers are 
to be me~bers , ~ast or present , of the Iublic ~erv ice Association . 
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Other statutory provisions re auire the presence of ex- offico mem -
bers . 8£ The I1egal Aid Board (as v1ell as the chairman and two 
other members) is to include the Jecretary to the Treasury , the 
0ecretary for Justice anr, t re Chair:T12.n of the 0oc ial Security 
Commiss ion . 89 The he~resen tation Comoission is to include the 
0urveyor- General , the Govern~ent ~t2tistician , the chief Electoral 
Officer , the ~irector- General of t~e lost Office and the Chair-
man of the local Government Commission . SO 
As to the method of appointment , a statute often re½uires , or 
practice ensures , that nomin8tions for mer.1bership are sough t 
from organisations with 2n involve~ent in the area in ~uestion . 
The statute may reouire that a member is to be appointed by the 
Governor- Gene r al on the recommend2tion of the appropriate 
l·'.inister after consultation with c1 person or body outside the 
department having responsibility for appointment . 1xamples of 
tribunals following this peocedure are : The District Law 
Prac titioner ' s Disciplinary Tribunal - consultation with the 
appropriate District Law 2ociety 01 and the Jlanning Tribunal -
one member is to be 8p.L ointed after cmsultation with the I'Tew 
Liealand Counties Associi=ition anc one men:ber is to be appointed 
after consultation with the f.1un icip8l Corporation of l~ew 
L,e8la nd . 02 Alternatively , the statute m8y reouire that the 
'Jember be 8:p:rointed by the Linister after consul t8tion with an 
outside nerson or body . 1x8mples of bodies following this 
procedure are the Cooperat i ve Lairy Companies Tribunal -
members a-p:!'ointed after consultation with the New Zealand :'..,airy 
Doard ~; 3 and the Hotel Associa.tion of New ::::;ealand Disciplinary 
Committee - consultation with the Chief bxecutive of the Hotel 
Association of Kew Zea land . GJ 
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Due to these factors and 2lso to the t~e f act t hat t he function of 
2 nurnber of statutory tribun8ls is to provide the Government 
••
1 i th access to expert advice within a narticul8r area or sub;iect 
m2tter , the anpearance rresented is that m8ny mem~Prs of stat -
utory tribunals are not civorced from but are affi1i8ted to 
matters that are likely to come within their jurisdiction . 
~uch 8 state~ent cannot , however , be viewed in isolation anti 
should be clarified 8 little . It is often the case that stat-
utory tribun2ls are not involved with decisions c1ffecting peoples 
rig~ts and , to this extent , 8n outw8rd appearance of impartiality 
is not essential . eg The primary purpose of the Bro8dcasting 
J:ribunal in the 2.-i:-ea of complaint resolutions is to keep 
bro8dcasters in check and not to provide a remedy tu a suc -
ceRsful comnlainant . Complaints are primarily concerned with 
breaches of the programme standards set out in section 24 of 
the Broadcasting Act 1976 and of te rules dra~n up by the 
Iroa~cas ting 'illl~c Jommittee . Under section 67 (1) (b) of the 
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1976 Act, the Tribuanl may hear appeals from the decision of 
the Broadcasting Complaints Committee if unjust treatment or 
an invasion of privacy is alleged but, even in these cases, no 
remedy is provided for a successful comp;ainant short of direct-
ing the offending broadcaster to remedy the situation. The focus 
then is not on the rights of complainants. It may be postulated 
that it is for this reason that the Tribuanl is to have regard 
to government policy under section 68 of the 1976 Act; thereby 
detracting from the appearance of impartiality; at least in the 
public eye. 
Thsi is not true of all cases. The Motor Vehicle Salesmen 
Registration Authority and the Pu~1ic Service Appeal Board have 
the power to deprive someone of their livelihood. The need to 
preserve an air of impartiality seems to be outweighted by the 
need to secure the presense of specialist members. The following 
cases deal with such situations applying of t en different tests to 
establish whether a requisite degree of bias is present so as to 
dis qualify a member from acting. 
In Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration 95 
the Council had judged the plaintiff guilty of 'infamous conduct 
in a professional respect' and erased his name from the register. 
The inquiry was instituted at the instance of a society who aimed 
to promote honourable conduct in medical practitioners. One of 
the members of that Committee was also a member of the Council. 
The court saw it t0 be impossible that any reasonable person 
would think that he was bia:ed or that in substance or in fact 
he could be liable to be even suspected of bias. Again, the 
Council had the power to affect an individual's rights by de-
priving him of his livelihood and so the judicial principles as 
to bias apply in toto. 
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A decision with sir1ilar facts to Allinson reached the sane 
result but by vray of sor1ewhat strained and unusual re8soning . 
In Re I\OSenfield anc College of r:1:vsicians and SurF-eons 0 ,... , it ..10 
was contended fuat me~bers of a disciplinary committee of the 
collefe were hearing appeals 2eainst their own decision . A 
first ~eeting of the co~~ittee had found the nlaintiff guilty 
of misbehaviour and nut him on probation . A rehearing resulted 
in the ~l2intiff oeing ~ut on a speciel register but not dis -
~issed fro~ the charges against him . ~o~e of the ~embers of the 
first co~~ittee were also ~embers of the second committee . It 
Vl2S S2id the> t : 
w;:hile it seems hiflily undesirc=ible that the Council meetinr::. 
should be co~prised of·members with varying amounts of 
prior knowled~e , I a~ not prenareci to held that the presence 
of ~embers of the disciplin2ry conmittee constituted a 
~enial of ~aturc=il justice . tothing in t~e Act regulates 
or ])rohibits this . " 
This caeoe cen be ternecl 11 unusu2l 11 ::,ecc1use , normally , it is not 
because the legislation does not -crol ibit bi2s tha.t conflicting 
interests a re held to be per~issable but b~cause the lecislation 
s pecifically allows such interests to be present . The only 
stated excention to the oper2tion of the rules azainst bi2s 
('<18tever the test u2e0 2-y he) when an officeholder h;:is pm!er 
to affect individual ' s ri~hts is the doctrine of necessity 2nd 
o nrereouisite to the apnlication of the doctrine in an author-
is8tion by I\:irlj_?"'.lent that the officeholder ,TJa.y have a conflictin§; 
L-mrest . 
~he comnittee in 1osen~iel~ hac the power to , md die adversely 
affect the riphts of the a,Jellnnt but this ~as not thought to 
be enough to warrant the oreration of ju~ici2l principles . 
A difference in the n?ture of a stPtutory tribunal ' s function 
riving rise to cifferent and lesser standar1s of im part iality 
being reouired in illustraterl by the Few ~ealand Case of Turner 
v 4llinson 07 The ~urners had bought proper ty in an area zoned 
resiclential . 'J1hey annlied , under s35 of the Tovm and Country 
Planning Act 1~53 for a s~e ified depar ture to enable the~ to 
be atle to establish~ sho~rinr complex there . Appeals aga inst 
tn e re zo::iinr ':.'ere hea rc1 by tl1 e :J.'own and Country llanning A rpeal 
~osrs . ~he Chai~~an of the Beard had alrea~y suggested this 
re zoninf:
0
, ;-;:nm·;in,, -ch2t it a'.'~1 ier to the '.'.:urner ' s lc=ind . mhe 
recision to r·:::cint the v-·e;:;on.i.nr \'!2.S objected -:o on the [IDJ.nd that 
the "embers of the ~oard had already exrressed views in favour 
of t~e arnlication . Turner J said : 
" In 8 sensE' , it is ·prereterrnination, but it .is a kind of 
~recete~;ination neculiarly char9cteristic of decisions of 
this kind . ~he mention , and the recognition of it by the 
tribunal itself does not indicate that \ind of predetermin-
ation that amounts to hias . It does not anount to refusal 
to hear evir..ence or 8r;_:U71ent . It si 'Tl?l:V recocnises facts ; 
anr1 one o:· t'1ese :r~cts j s that 1,'f'nat haR ~lreaciy ha;:pened 
affects ~~at is to harr~n an~ May necessarily Rnd inevitably 
o-erate jn °o~e derree as a restric ti onr on the poss ibilities 
o;en to the tribunal cases still to co:ne before it ." 
(YJ:V emnh2sis) 
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The apneal did net succeed because so~ething nore than the 
ex7ression of ~reconceived opinions was seen as necessary to 
cmsti tute bias. An anne2.r2nce of bic1s v1as not sePn to be the 
2nnlicable test. ;, number of rec1sons can be 2.cvanced for the 
application of this lesser standard: 
48 
'rhe primary differ'J'rnce betv,een this tribunal 8nd those discussecl 
in the previous h10 cases is that boecies such as the Tovm and 
Country Planning Appe2l Board do not always view maters in 
isolation. The ~ater of rezonin~ in order to establish a 
s'.10-cping centre wil, of necessity, renuire r:iuch prior thought on 
the nart of members supportin; the nroposal. Unli~e cases such 
P s AlinRYJ., the ac tu81 he?. ring ,1il not be the first encounter 
t"1 ey have -1i th the ;-ri2 te r anc'., ar di ti on;:i ly, it is of ten as a 
result of their o~n action~ in pro~osin~ or ?greeinr to such 
8che"nes trot a hearinf by ·,·ay of objections t:ci,{es plc1ce. Cther 
re:ieons that c,=m be 2c!v"'nced for this lesser ::tc1nc'.arc2 a.re tha t i l 
i~ not an ±ndividu2l' s livelihoo6 th:it is 2t sta~e; the interest 
involvef here is the lesser ri~ht +- . .j.. t,0 r'1JleL, cn~oyment of a street 
by 2 nu~ber of people who ~ay ~e ci8runte~ ~y ~~  re~ter 2mou~t 
of ~otor an~ ne~estrian traffic. !revelPnt here, but ~bsent in 
other cases, is the existance of an i;,iportPnt co..,.,.-.'?tj_11J' intere:;t 
-that of the anpelr:nt: Sy the ti:ne the s1tit '.r:=>2 broi_;_cr11t, VF' 
ruilc1in_~ in _"es:pect of ,,hich the c1pnlic2tion ·A,::,s "1.?l< e '·12.s n2rt-
j_ci]_l~r CO';pletec' 2t 2 cost of r',·50 00". If tb0 3pnrov2l 1_:,i ven 11:is 
~u~shed, the builring couldn' t h.:=ive 1cen used for it' s intended 
:,ur:pose. 
If th? case of lurner v Alinson pr ovid ed some certaint y with 
regard to the fact that a bod:v v,hich hcis a continuing i terest in 
49 
the subject ~atter for decision may reouire so~ethin[ less than 
/ an appearance of bias test , tl en the recent ease of i{ip-g v 
University of Waikato qg introduces a degree of uncertainty as 
to the appJicable test . 
r ~j-Cf , c1 senj_or lecturer at './aikato University , together 1:1ith 
a ~radu2te sturient , had writted an article in the University ' s 
s tudent "'.:)aner alle[ing that inacequate sunervision of the Fni -
i.-erc;i ty ' s bioloc;y isctorie l8boratory had probably resulted in 
students cJyinz of cancer anr_ t:1at t: e Dniversj_ ty had cmcealed this 
m2tter to saferuarc its [ood renutation . A committee appointed 
by the i'lnister of Eelath unanj_r,1 ously found that there was no 
relationship between the causes of death of the itudents and 
exnosure to ionising rariation . ~s a result of this reDort , the 
Lnive2-·sity Council establishe6 c1 co'TJ:::ittee to consider what actim:_ 
should be ta~en in respect of the conduct~of the authors of the 
article . 'fhe conimi ttee reco:ii:lend er t:ha.t ::r R.igg should be dis -
~1is sec. . As reouired by the university of 'da i!rn.to Act 1 °63 , the 
Ac8de~ic Board 'TlaCe a recommendation to the Council to the effect 
t"rnt .. r 3.i[C ' s services as 2. '1'1er:1ber of the a;aff should be c1 is -
nensed wj_th . 
Cne of :·r Rigg ' s c1rnund s for challen~ing the decisions of the 
Council and t'1e 13oc=ird was that they had been 1 otivatec by nre -
'1etermination 2nd bias . 0pec ifically , it was alleged that they 
consicerecl that the actions of '.;r Licg constituted an attack on 
their personal academic and nrofessional standards and interrity . 
?urthPrmore , it was c1lleped that their failure to disqualify 
the~~elves from articipatj_ne in the determination of proposals 
ri::-,12 tins to .\r :.j_f £ ' s c.i S;Jissa l vi ti8 ted the University ' s cie ci sio:r: . 
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~~  Visitor of the University of Jaikato, the then Governor-
Gen~ral ~ir Davi~ Beatie, directeri two Commissaries to innuire 
into the mater of the complaint and to report on the possibility 
of :,ny relie: to :·r ?.ifg. The test adoptec by the Co:nmissarj_es 
differ2 fro~ that of the ccurt in Turner v Alinson in that it is 
s~ecificaly st2ted to be a test of appearances: 
11 0·oes it ar,Jwar from al the evidence that al or any of 
the bodies or individual had so conducted theMselves that 
the in:or:'lec. objective observer would consider th2t they 
haC cloref their minds 8nd ~ere no lonrer giving 8enuine 
consi(er"'tion to t' l . . b .eo th ., I ne ive issues e.10.-::-e ,e11 r100 
~h0 Co~rnissarier 2cknowle(~ed that the n?tures of the Council and 
·:oc:i~,: '::ere :;ucr. that the~.r hc=i,', of necessity, a nrior anc continu-
L10· involve:12n.t ·.-·ith the 2ub~ect :!~ter o: 8 sis ute. 'fhe ':.7ni-
v0~;ity of ,';:,i1-:z-to .cct exy-iressley reoui:".'es Ronrd 2nd Council 
~-wr~bers to be the s211e reoy.ile who 2re interested in ac:nects of 
t'1e aff;:,irs of the University . :-1embers of the School wil nat-
11r0ly cive oninions on the dispute nrior to the hearinr and they 
·:il contribute to determining 1-1h2t st2ndc1rc3 s}0oulcl be 81):pliecl 
to an 2ssess~ent of the authors' 2ctions. ~t t~e s2~e ti~e, cer-
tain of the;11 r:1ust also sit ;:,s ,_-:-:nbers of the 1'ni versi ty' s Council 
8nc Bo.? rd. 
r'.'le necessj_ty .?!nd inevi t2bili ty o: this dual role h;:,s lee the ·re.,, 
~.ePlanct courts in r::1w:·ner 8nri, ;:,s v•il be seen, in Dan,< and 
tnfPr~n to i~rose te~ts of 8ctu~l bias upon the evalu2tion of 
the rev i e1·1inr court. I 1). th n =2£.f., e Co:n'lissaries found . ,r 1!igG' s 
cl?i~ to have substance due to the test of an appearance of bias 
based  u pon the evaluation of the impartia l and informal bystander. 
They saw that, although the dual role of 
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Council members (c1s juc!rres enc c1clvocates) ii.s un2voidc1ble , it will , 
at 8 certain point , create c1n c1rpearance of preju~genent or an 
inability or unwillingness to give the issue genuine consideration . 
They found thc1t ann2arance to exist in this case . 
This findinf rtoes not souare weJl with the Turner decision . The 
Arne;:,1 Board there and the Council here c1re similar in nature to 
the ex tent that they both have , of necessity , a continuing in-
volve~cnt in the subject ~atter of a case . Evaluc1tion of the 
ccnse0uence of this nrior involve~ent differs . In Turner , and in 
B2n'.c anrl Anc! e rton , it led the courts to reject 8 test of an 
an--:ec1: ranc e of bias ; in D ' _ll iJ'fI, ' the Comoissaries re~arded appearances 
22 an essential fActor . 
T}:P difference het 1: 1een the c2ses r-:,,2y be seen to ste:n from the 
vari2ble of t~e nower exerciseable by the respective bodies and , 
consenuently , th 0 perscn2ble richts that can be affected by any 
r:n:e:cj_s8 of tnat no1:1er . In '2urner , t'h.e .2oc1rd could allow or 
( isJJ.lo··.r 2n :1pnlication for re 0,oning so ;:is to ciuthorise trsec: 
construction of c1 sunerr:iarket . The rirrit 8ffected by granting 
t~e re~onin~ apnlicati~n w8s th2t of ~uiet enjoy~ent on the part 
of neighbourinf householders . r~e Council c1nc Board in 
the po\'.rer , \':hich indeed it exerciseo , to terminate 1·r _tigg ' s 
e"1n2.oy'11?nt . rot only cic• this 0°nrive him of hjs livelihooc• but 
it lei' t so~1e c.e:ina te rr.ic1r'.c~ on his r 0 '.'ut2. tion . 'l'h e important 
n,c1ture of ric;hts suc11 as these is often seen by the caurts c1s 
v:rru_nc2 for 2pplyinc tl1e 11ore easily sc=,tisfied test of an ap:pe2r-
2nce of bi2s . This has the effect of providing a closer scrutiny 
over c<ecision :12i-cers r.2ving ro 1.:ers to 2.ffect such rirhts but bas 
tl1e unfortun2te conce::uence o.f 2.dd ing priua .facie , a cil?f:r<:?e of un-
c 0 rt2inty and inconsistency to the l~~ . 
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By way of contrast, in R v Ontario Labour Relations Board ex parte 
/ [§11 101 the allegation of bias stemmed , not merely from a prior 
expression of opinion, but by a declaration of 'war ' by a member 
of the Board against one of the litigants. A member of the 
Ontario Labour Rela tions Board was a lso president on the Ontario 
Federation of Labour. The Ontario FOL had virtually ' decalred 
war ' on a 1small number of local unions. One of those unions 
applied for certification, another opposed it. The member in 
question was in the position of sitting in judgement on an issue, 
the result of which would advance or retard the declared policy 
of the Ontario FOL . 
McRuer CJ H C did not think thatthe member would be disqualified 
merely beca use he held membership in the trade union, but 
"I do not think, on any recognised principle of law applic-
able to · judicial or quas i-judicial tribunal s that one who 
has c learly divided loyalties, as in this case, can be per-
mitted to act ." 
This case is of relevance to the observations made at the beg-
inning of this section . The members of the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board are appointed on the nomination of employers or 
employeed under s 75( 2 ) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act 1960 . 
In this way , a form of built-in bias exists as a result of the 
nature of the membership provisions so as to allow members to have 
certain conflicting interests. In these cases, and in cases such 
as Turner v Allinson where, as a necessary corollary of the nature of 
the office members must necessarily acquire opions, reasonable 
suspicion of bias cannot be the applicable test. 
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,; , :::ihe Actor is a Council or -:-,oca l ilu t hori ty , 
The nature of a council or local authority v ari es g reatly from 
t hat of a court a nd fro~ the nature of ~any tribuna ls be cause of 
the r:reat rnL1ber of :.:unctions it pursue s . It s objects are not 
limited to the Adjudication of d ispute s alone . The administrative 
func tions of a loeal body include the development of a p lanning 
sche"1e fo r it ' s area pur~'uant to the Tovm ;:ind Co untry }lEmninp-
tct 1~77 . lroposef rtevelor~ents must fall within the li~itations 
set out by the rche~e , otherwise , an appl i cation for p er~ission 
to Jevi ate from the sche~e must he ~ade . ~hen such an applica tion 
is ma(e , it is the lo cc1 l hody v1ho Plus t consider it , alo1/1rr ·:·ith 
2ny objections to the sranting of consen t that have arisen from 
notific2t ion of the aprlic2tion . fhis , it is tra~itionally assu~e~ , 
is ···here t'nejuciicial function of the J..oc:::l body ; it ' s po 1r·er to 
rffect :rj,·_·ht s , ;:irises . 
~nlike st;::tutory tribunals , t~ere i•· uni~or~ity in the nature o~ 
counci l [. c::H5. loc8l 2uthori ties . 
;:: ;:, to ·.'fhet:'1er or not to cnan.cre ,., to·:·n pl-:,n , nurs 1e a constn~ction 
or stop a s tree t . The result of any ex:ercir-,e o: that nov·er can 
2ffe ct the ri t:hts of a ~,re2.t nu:1ber o_ neoplP , ··:,.,,ether it be trie 
"iour-·e , or tr·,e c.rerition of a nuicP r,ce hy ·:2.v o~ corn:-1erci:=1l :):re·n('Si ~ 
being con2tructe~ in or near a resifenti2l ~rea . 
In lo··er i~utt City CounC' il v :l2n'c 1 ()? ' th0 ·J:::iuncil ente~ec:. into 
~n ~rree~ent with Chal lenre Irone~ti 0 0 JtJ . reyArd ing a lease of 
Pnd . Includec; in the c"[:recrent was an ur1cierta'.-~ing on t:10 nart 
cf the ':ounc il to t2ke all c: tens necessary to stop certain streets . 
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If the Council was unPhle to star the s treets , the agreerent w;::is 
to be null and void and of no - effect . By virtue of s170 of the 
:unicip;::il Corporations ;,e t 1054 , 2nd ne ,_ ixth _,chedule to that 
Rct , to stop a street , the Council must prerare a plan of all 
streets 1roposed to be storped , oren it to ~ublic inspection and 
calJ uron peorle wishing to lodce cbjections . lf objections ere 
receivPrl " the Council shall forth,vit11 ;::if ter the exriration of the 
tjrr.e limited PS aforesaid , incuire into and disrose of the ob~ec -
t ions " 
:,1r>e contention ':'as that the Council 1,12s sc restrained as a result 
of their prior arree~ent with Ch~ llenge lroperties that there 
w;::is a r 0 al likelihood that they would feel constrained to dis -
allo1t1 the ob2Pctions . 1101:,1eve r the .::rovis ions of the : unicinal 
Corpo rations Ac t re~uire a Council to consider objections to its 
aYn prorosa l . In this way , as ~as seen to ~e the cPse with a 
nu~tPr of sta tutory tribun~ls , t~e Council , hy the intention of 
thP 1 epif'lature , is in11erPntl:r biaceC: v1i th reparc to .street stop-
, i nv . -::'"ii_s does not , :1cwever , 2uto;TI2tic8lly prE'c lude the o·,eration 
of ;::iny rules 8fainst hias . i'r: 0 1.r1ords 11 innuire into Pd disrJose 
of' ' in s170 o_: the _,unici-r,c1l So rrorations ,,,_et lee'. the court to 
accert tl18 t the Council ' s t;::if;,;: is not ":'er-ely to Eict as 8n 8SSe.rbler 
c=inrl. r2 .. sser- on of :acts c1nd considerations . ThP ,ouncil ,,,2s thPre -
forP not 8n:V less boun~ to applv the rules of n2tural ju~tice to 
itr rlecision makin~ . lt still ~c=i~ to act fairly . The buiJt - in 
tios , however , reruired somPthing less of a Rcrupulous i~partiRlity , 
" ·e t11in':c th~t tr:e st2te of im-r1a:rtiali ty th2.t is re ouire( is 
the cc=inacity in a council to rreserve a freedo~ , notwithstand -
inp e2rlier inv 0 stications 2nd decisims , to cipproach t:1e duty 
of inciuirinf into ?nrl (~ iPposing of the objections 0,·ithout A 
closed mind so-that, if considPrations advancPd by objectors 
bring them to a different framP of mind they can, and wil 
fIO back on thej_r proposalr: .11103 
In the context of this ouote, to deter11ine whether~ council has 
approached a mater without a closed mind reruires actual procf 
of an operative hiar. L'he proof, it seems, is to be retec"'minec 
by the court itself, for, in P2.n,{, it 1:1as held that thP extent of 
t~e council' s prior involve~ent with Chalenge Froperties Ltd an( 
the council' s contracted oblip2tions with the firm, ~eant that 
tne council coul1 not bring 2n entirely im,artial mind to the 
~ctjudication, 2nd ro prohihition irsue0. 
0-:t-rp11c.J_v, i:ficult, if not i-rpos,~icle, to tPl the stc1te of 
2 '"'Fm ' s :;J l n c:. 8 t any .? iv P n t i rn e • _: o ,. ever , i: 2 1: i s to ry o: n e f;-
o t i c1 t ions can tP s:novn and if c~ocu:nents c8n be prerentec to the 
crurt s~o~ inr that thePe np~otirtions ~11ounte~ to otli~ations, 
The aipJicRtle test in such circu~st2nces 1:·2s broug~t ~c lirht 
~ore clearly in Anderton v ~uc~lRnd ~ity G0uncil 104 fhere, the 
council 1,roposed to establish r1 8:"C'T 1-inrr '"'1Rl . rxt to 21 re2 y 
ex:i s tinr s1'i or,s. The problem was that the Janrl rrorosed for this 
venture ~as ~oned residential. '.exonint inv0J vPs a r,ublic he8r-
inr o: o~~ections at ~~ ~ the Council itself ir to be the ad-
• • • .j. ~uc.1 cc=i ,~or. ·J.'he cnmcil cle2rly had P finan ial interest in the 
outco~e of the arplicaticn for re7oninf, ior jt owned p2rt of the 
J2nd ororosed to be affected and it ~ad alrPady entered into an 
?free~Pnt to lease the cRrpRrk areR at ~15 OOO ~er annum and the 
s11op s ites \<then they became availRble 2t ~10 OOO per annum. 
:oreover , it ":1.ad been nerotiating closely ·,.1i tn ;:in 1,ustralian 
company reEardinr the construction of the ccmplex for a ~eriod 
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of six ye2rs . It is impcssible to rleny that he association it-
self ref]ects not only a real likelihood hat the hearing of the 
trorn1x,nv ' s c2se lr'Du]r be controlled by;:, nre2udge"".lent rut a ctrong 
Drohibility thet t"liis result would ensue . :reither of these tff''Stf' , 
however , ~ere a~rropriate in a case such as this : 
11 l'r..e tenr_J Pncv to £'2vcur its own scheme rr,us t h2ve been im -
~licitly recognised oy the le~islature in constituting the 
council the pri~ary 2d~udicatjve tribunal 2nd the conseauence 
~ust be , as l Pee it , that rresu~rtive bias is necessarily 
excluded as;:, &ro1md for invalidating the decision of the 
co':irni ttee . I ar.1 s .?.tisfied that v11at must be proved in this 
, t 1 j . t , f' t' ' , d . t rl • I I c2se ic c.;c ua p.:'e(e-:rr·n1n;:-:. ion o ;1eaoJ~.1cc1.e1... issue . F'S 
I~ -=ipplyiYJ.f! tris test , it 1:·;:is >1eld tlvt t~ie council hed become so 
c 1 o~-:elv c1rsocir1tPC1 \·'i t}i the cornr,2iny in atte:npts co secure plc1nninf 
/~'ron J ··,r:t on to sa:v t:12t the members of 
U:e counciJ convenec, the ne2rinr- \•"i th 2 closed "".lind , i'Tirervious 
to wh2tever evi~ence the objectorf ~iuht su~mit and determined to 
ur11old the valic:i ty o: the cn1::1erci?.l develornient . 
rhus , in t~·o recent case? , Xew ueal8nd courts h2ve insisted that 
locc1 l borl iP. s o hf e r-ve ce rt;:i in r:.inirr.um procer. urn 1 3 tc1nd a rrl.s ,.,;"1en 
t~ev eyercise their decision m8~ing functions . rhese 11inirmm 
2t~nf2r~s are secured by t~e test of having to prove actual 
nre-]Ptermin;::ition or hi2s . Ji.s in 'l'urner v Al Uson , tli.e nature of 
the decision '718Ker re"uires a ,:,1:reater st;:;ncl.ard of proof with regard 
to Any claim of bi2s and reruir 0 s a le2sPr (egree of impart i ality 
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on trie :i,c1rt of the decir.;ion rT:c"L{er . M"'8in , the n2.tu1·e of loc;::il 
roclies is the k 1""' f2ctor : 
tion , it is ;:, result o:: tr1Pir o .. n 8ctions th-::;t 8 heElrinr~ , by ·1·121y 
of objection." t?KPf:' pl?.ce , :-:iorF?over , the lei:::is:tature h2P express -
1.ey conc.onec1 thif :,~2cticp . ·" larp:e nw1bPr of ~eo 1)le r:1.2y be 
~f~0cte~ by thF? propos8lP hut t~e int~rPsts involved ?re not of 
ouc~ importance q3 to reruire a les~er st?ndarf ; a court may be 
te~pte~ to impo?e s less strinrent test if 2 nu~ber of ;eople are 
Jikely to lose their ho~es as a result of the loc;::il authority ' s 
actions . Comretinc interests are o!ten involved , especially if 
necotic1ticrrs it1i t:1 c1 r:evelc,e-r 'l.?ve resul tec-1 in some exrendi ture 
on the develo~er ' s pRrt end , furthermore , in ~nderton , the council 
,;;::,s entit~ec-1 in t:1P CiUP e:xE·:-cise of its r-t;:;tutor,v r,0 1.-.1ers , to 
2~~loy thRt lFn~ tc t~e ~est a~vAntage o~ the inhabit2nts of thet 
·.l thourr·1 it is o~ten 8rgued thgt t 1 e 7est o~ ;::ictual ' . . rn8S lS 
i rn=i r p r OT' r i 8 t p (: 1) e t O i t s 1 rn 1/.' 0 ~ ( ,'.:] bi 1 i t y , enr thif is not so if a , ,r 
~ecision h~s resulted fro~ 8 historv of ~lanninf anci 11rior neg -
otiation that is conC:onec: by 1;:irJi:=i .er:.t . lhe i~~csition of a 
lesser test would co~rJetelv ~Ptter the 8~ility of a local auth -
ority to carry 011t tts st~tutorv cuties in T-?f,,<c>e:t o:: town r,l:::in -
nin.:- . 
Consicer a;ain the of tin:" ciiscUSSPd in tre ~reseeding sec -.. ~ 
tion . In a si:nil2r \•'ay to 7:,;;n:-c ;=rnd inrerton , t·.e uecision rria!{ers 
there , o: necessi_ t? , h2ci 8 ;rior involver;ient in the svb2ect :11atter 
of 2 cisrute . ~uc~ invlcve~ent was si~ilarly condoned by the 
lerislatnre . There , t~e test of an ar~ear2nce of bias was ao~lied 
by the Com~iPsaries . J·he reason , it may be supposed :'terns from 
/ 2 factor just i~entifiec :- the nature of thP in~e~efts thAt the 
cecision makers ' decision affects . 
to deprive someone of their livelihood is deserving of a ~ore 
lhis ~Actor is often not inherent in 
the powers of a local 8uthority . Their decision c?n sf~ect a 
l8rfe number of people in 8n indirect 1·12y ; its powerf' c1re not 
exercised 1,·i th any one psr·ticular 1 erson in mind and. so the i~~·ue , 
snc the r;uestion for 8 reviewing court me1y be seen to differ . 
Like the °';'r8n~lin c2se , ''ihich is discussed in the next section , 
t1e issue often rel2tes soley to the exercise of a discrection 
And not so ~uch to the observance of the principles of natural 
justice . l~e local 2uthority ~ust do 0h2t fArli?ment has and 
~ctually exercise it2 2tatutorv di0creti0n without disclosinr i~c 
~inC to ~OSPible altern?tive arru~ents . I~ , bec2use of ~n op-
f'ol'.'eclof'0c 1 th:1 t c::uc":1. c::;lte~native 2.r?UIDPnts ?re not evPn consic1.erec: , 
its ~ecision ~ay bP successfully c·uPPtionei . 
The Applicability o~ any jurlicial ~t~ntiar~r at Rll in certai~ 
cases by local authorities has been hroupht into 0uPstion tv t~e 
<1ecision of 1\ttorney- C}ener8l ex rel-:::,tione Ben:t'ielci. v .. ellin,rton 
Cl. tv Counc1· 1 °'11e c.:::,,.,'-, of '1··.e,.·.1 107 -'-- _, .,,J -
of 2ncl for nei{hhourinf'" l2nr: o-..-,-.rwr by t1le ,PJ linr,tcn City Cou;1cil . 
~o effPct t~e trRnsfe~ , 8n arree~ent was sirne1 un~er which t~n 
?n% was to suhmit plAns ~or a multi - storey o!fice building for 
to~n planninf ?pproval . ~he Agreement posed certain oblif?t~ns 
on the council ~hich , it ~as 8lJeced , Rmounted to an 2greem~nt to 
construct the buildinl and to Dssist the h;:,n~ to Eet the nece -
ss;:,r:<:r plEmninc cirt,r:'ovels . :\p:plications for consent to conditionc1l 
use of the site were ~rivertised but no objectiors were rece i ved . 
Cn this basis , the council Rpproved the application . Ihe rlain-
tiff ' s claim was th8t the decj_sion of the cr:uncil did not constit -
ute lawful rlanning rerm i ssion because it had ~een motivated by 
~iRs in ~aking its decision , Lavison CJ held that the degree of 
i~rropiety W8S too minor to warrant the remedies the plaintiff 
sought . The reason Rdvanced for natural justice principles heinp 
inRpplicable was that , because no objections were heard , there 
was no lis inter nartes ~efore the council : 
11 It ric1d no cuty to act .judici8lly in the circumstances 
although there c?.n he little doubt that , had objections 
heen raised to the ban~ ' s nroposals and those ohjections 
had been :,cursuec.: to the r. ea rinp- , tl'ie city counc i 1 v,ould 
t"!'len have l1ad R cuty to the objectors to observe the 
principles of ncitural justice . " 108 
BenfiPld then , arpears to have li~ited the applicahility of any 
rules a~ainst bias to cases where there is somethine in the nature 
of a lis , ~owever , this factor has not precluded the operation 
of some rules 2.gainst bias in other r.c1ses . In 3. v t,:anc11estPr 
Teg-21 ".:.id Commi ttee , ex D8rte ,{ i\ Bnmd !:incl Co I.td 109 (upon 
which Dav i son CJ seemed to hRve based his d~cision) , the conmittee 
had to dec i de whether to ;1r8n t 2 ce rtif ica te for leg ed. c"· id only 
on the b?sis of evidence put fo.r:":":irc by the ::>pplicant ; there ·,19s 
nothing in the naturP of 2 lis , yet the court decided th2t the 
·,ri t of certiorari would lie and thc1t the co'Tlmittee , in deciding 
to 2"r2nt the certificc=-:te , 1 ·1;::,s '.TI?~ing ;::, judicic1l decision . In 
~ , the successful r:pplication v1c1s for prohibition ; a. heari ng 
of objections never took pl8ce , yet the cruncil ·;as obliced to act 
2ccordin~ to sane principles of n~tural justice : Thou~ht ha~ to 
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be given to the statutory criteria and, additionally, the power to 
hold a hearing could be denied if the minds of the council members 
were forclosed. The existence or not of a lis cannot be laid 
down as a difinitive test as to whether judicail principles apply. 
It is one factor out of mapy that should be taken into consider-
ation ; each case is to be jedged on its o.,.m facts. 
The applicability of some rules against bias in the Benfield case 
can be delt with by reference to the principles in Ridge v Baldwin 
dicussed earlier: Does the council have legal authority to 
determine questions affecting the rights of subjects? Although 
no important rights may have been affected by the actual proposal , 
it is clear that, in the nature of the office of a councillor , 
individual rights can be affected . Applying then, the Bank and 
Anderton test, the question becomes - was the council motivated by 
actual predetermination? The facts reveal such a similarity to 
those in Anderton that it could easily be concluded that, due to 
the extent of prior negotiations withe the Bank of New Zealand , 
the council had fettered its discretion so that, by making a 
decision , its mind was closed to any other relevant considerations. 
The legislation has been quick to intervene in these cases s 58 of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 specifically allows a 
practice that, while not prohibited by the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1953, was questionable under the common law in that a local 
authority may hear a planning application for a development about 
which it has already entered into negotiations with the developer. 
Is the effect of s58 that local bo dies have been statutorily excused 
from the requirements of compliance with the rules of natural 
justice when considering applications for planning consent? 
Fyfe 
110 
thinks not. He submits that s58 only 
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rrevents the use by objectors of any arru·oent based ori. suc:1 neg-
• otiations that there was a constructive or ~resumptive bias on 
the par t of t~e council and thAt ' actual preretermination ' would 
still be a ~round for invalidation of the council ' s decision . 
\eici and lavi< 111 afree with this approach in artvccating that 
a st2tutory shield ~ay fail to prevent actual bias . 
ro , the ~~;:mk 2.nd 1~nderton c?ses are st i ll relevant to cases in 
\.-11ic'r1 any c1 efence based on s5o is raised . 
In relr1tion to street stor,ri!l.f , an a:r.end1ent to the ;-Iun i c i .81 
Corporat i ons Act in 1~·75 112 nrovi
r.es that i f there 8re any 
cb~ections to the cc~ncil ' s rlans , they ~ust be referred to the 
LlanninP rribunal . In this w2y , the Town and Country Plann i ng 
~et per~its the council to ect with bias reparding planning 
consent , while the Junicipal Corrorations ~et preclu es a council 
.:' i:OFI so ;:,ctinr, re:::~irci.inf strPet c,toppin[, . 
IosPible reasons can be sucre-~ed ~er each of t~esP Ftatutory 
~rovL·ions v:hich are pr2ct i c~l in t:'l. 0 rrr,elv':·s but , \•1hen vie\1Pd 
together , provi de little co=ip;:,tibili ty . ._Jee tion 58 o.f.' th,,, .'.'ofll 
and Country Plann i nr Act recorrnis~s , 2s rurner v Allison cii~ re -
rrc:irc.ing the '~o\m 2m1 Ccun'try Tl0nninr- Appe2l Board :---nd ::is B::>n'c< 
Pnd Anderton d i d regarciinf loc8l 8Uthorit i es , t~~t it is in~erent 
.i.n t11e neture o: 'ror.ies ·-·ho rr;w.;t spl?nd some t:iim conc0 icerirP; and 
plRnninf a 03rticular develo~nrnt , to have formen some opinions 
2nri preferences . Ii practice proves to be true that th i s provision 
will not prevent actual p~e~eter~inPtion , over ~nd above that 
,.-·1.ich is inevi tcible , t"hen it ':le rely cod i:ies the co:nr:ion la\.r 
~o" it.ion . 
L 
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Conversely , the rPaeon be~in~ section 78 o: t~e .~nicipal Corpora-
/tions Act seems to be~ reco~nition that , inevitable ::is so~e for~ 
of preconception ~ust be , it i~ not conCucivP to 2n apfF2~anc e of 
the funct i ons of tJ1e l,:y2l authority by reriuirinr-; objections to 
thiQ ra~e , such 2n appro2c~ c~n be reen as one of a serie s of 
~aves by F2rlia~0nt to crrate En ~ir o~ imp2rtiality in bo~ies 
that ~2y be seen to be in~erently biasec: . LXa~ples will be pre -
~Pnte~ , a~on pst others , of the recent a~endrnent to the Hu~an } i ghts 
Corn,n i ss i.on Act 1.-rh ich constitutes a Proceedings Commissioner . If 
the Human - P..igh ts Co:::,1ission is of the opinion that a complaint 
½as substance , it ~ay re_er t~e ~at ter to the Commissioner who 
c0 cic1er ··:hethe1' r,roce'?ciin;:·s he:ore the ~v::il On'"'ortunities ':-:: ibunal 
~· l~(-' ' ·;~ rr0n terl . :;_n t:-: is ··;2.y, 2 nv:1be r o: inr: erenrl en t bodies l}lay 
- ~~rt in t~e co~~12~nts rrccofure bPfore? ~ecision is ~eached . 
street sto~nin; , or P fivision ~ithin the 1 oc~l authority itself , 
'.~ereby some meMbers ta~e no rart in 3 rarti ular develop~ent ~u t 
ere resnonsible for hearin: objections to t~e sche~e , will (o 
~uch to preserve in t~e ;ubJ.ic 0ye , and in practice , 
'Jlity ;:m d integrity o: loc2l 'C)uthoritieP . . 
':"h.e ~ctor is ~· :.iniste:::' of t'lie Cro 1 .. m 
t'1.e i:npa rti -
The cof'1:1ents "TJac.:e in !'elc1ti on to tne nature and functions of 
counc ils arply e nuall_',' , or ··10.:reso, to :~inisters of the Crovm . 
rortfoJ io rec•uires a .,inister to m2..<;:e r1 c=iny rl ecisions in \•:1-1at he 
considPrs to be the best interests of the country . At the same 
ti~e , he is often given rower , by statute , to ~ake or confir~ 
an order after hearing objections to it , or a~ter 0hject ions to 
it have been heard . ~n exa~ple cf th~ latte~ cou~se is rrovided 
r·:,r sections 2? to 2/J of the -:-'uhlic ,.or"'-s . et 1 c,'1 . Ihe .·.inister 
o~ !or~s ~av declare cert2in work to be essential ~a as to 
ccrnpuJ so rily acn.uire it under section 22 . ~ny objections to 
such an acouisiticn·are first sen t to the Jlanninp T~ibunal unrler 
section 2LL but , under section Z.4 (ii) , the ,.·;nister 1ay decide 
not to give effect to any reco:J11nend2tion of the '.::ribunal 2nd 
roceed to accuire tte l8nd for a public ~erk . l'.he gulf sen8l'a -
ting a judge and 8 ,· inister then is the irnple"rJen tation , b1J the 
l~tter , of policy . Kotwithstandinc the fact that they mu2t both 
halt ~earinfs or consider the arru~ents of opposinp parties this 
c~u 0 es f8cts t~et wcul~ be bias in the ~or~er b~t not in th 0 ~~tter . 
~-ain , the ~ain conflictinr interP~t that gives ri-e to litication 
j f' nrec: P te:;" 11 in,::; ti on of t'cce i ,..,sue . Cnlike other ount~ies , there 
i::- no snecii'ic stc1tute or stc=itutor7 provision in tJe·.: ~e2.lcr..: 
rerardi~z the financi;:il c=mc1 1 e:rson?l interestG o.i.' ;:ini1:ters . 1 ·1 -z 
The only gui de in existence is tte r 0 c~rt , 2s lonr a o as 1~56 , 
of the hin isters ' :frivete Interests Co''l:r:ittee . I .l1h; c; r·r.o ""O Y•t i" r \ ...... _i_ ~- .... l - J -..J 
~iscussed in rart ~ of thiP naner . ) _he only r'"ui.r!e , tnen , i11 
rev: t".eal2nd 21s to bias in a i1inister o.:.' t:he Cro-.··n, is .::,··nviucl: 1,y 
:;:;,. .:<'r8nklin v 1;inister of 'i:0 1,•n ;:inr. Countrv Planninr- 1111 -che re -
,;pcnc1snt nroposeti , under y,_e,,', lep-islEition , to estahlisrj a ne··: 
to1.·n f,t "teve~,ar;e . lifter h2aring objection'..:; to the c:r;:ift orGer , 
t~1e :inister rlecic~e,' to IJroceerl 1rfi th the rropor'~l . 
~2sr~ thPir ea. e on ctete~entc ~ade jn 2n a(vsnce pre~c notice 
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issue0 ty the resnondent ~nd statements ~ade by the responcent at 
a J'T'Jeetin g that he ,.,12cl, ty that t i11e, co:ipletely 11ac0 up "his minci 
that the r:le3it:netion of .,tevena1e 8;' ;-, new to1.m ·.1oulr; he c2rried 
th t'OtE:h -whatever w2 s sr1 ic: f' ubs e c uen tly. Lo rl _/f1 c1n:{'2 T.tori, (for 
the court) ;'Jici: 
"In my opinion, no ju:-ici2l or nuc1si-judicial dut y was i'"'l-
poser on the responrtent anc any reference to judicial ~uty 
or bias is irrelev.?.nt in the present case. The respondent's 
duties are purely administr.?.tive." 
and lc1ter: 
" Ho judicial duty ':1c1s laid on the respondent a nd the only 
nuestion i s 1·fhether :he hss co"Tlplied 1,1ith the st2tutory 
re0uirements to 2rpoint 8 ~erson to ~olrt a rublic inouiry 
anc to conc.ir;er tr.e ~e;:-son' s report. " 
rim:> f8cie, the forec.:oing_ r,e0:1s to Pet uo the r-:ro:r,osi tion that, 
jf trie n;:iture of the function in r:uestion is l~belecl r1G ac:.1ini-
E:·trative, it is;: :ore.:;one conclvsion th;:it thP -:-rinci:r,les of 
nPtur~l justice are inapplicabJe. Indeer, it is often concluced 
that this :;_s the conse<'uencP o: the -·~2-n,<:J.in C;Pcision. 3ut t}1is 
is not 2t al wr8t t11e c2.se concl 1/ec;. ~~  t8~ 'a<~inistrative' 
W8s used to 0istinpuish the function fro~ one o: a more impr1rtial 
nature 2nd, notvithstanding the fact that the l8bel w2s atached, 
~-Ot'O 'I':!:c=an (erton \"'en t on to sa: : 
11In such a case, the only rround of chalenre ~ust be either 
that the res~oncient did not in fact consider the report and 
the objections, of which here there is no evidence, or that 
his Mind was so foreclosed that he fave no Eenuine consider-
2tion to then. !' (r.y emnhasis) 
Franklin , then , was purely a case of a fnilure to exercise a 
/ ciiscretion . It was the ;,unister ' s cluty , under the 1;e1:1 '1'01t.'ns 
Jct to draft an order and rna~e it public so that objections 
coulc be h earc1 . ~fter hearing the objections and receivinL· an 
intPrim renort fro~ a co~mittee constituterl by the Kinister for 
the nurnose of considering the "1roposal ( the t1.ri th Com:Tii ttee) , 
the Minister hn~ a ~iscretion , in weighing up the various sub -
~isssions , as to ~hether to ~aKe the relevant order . Because 
11 the .c;r,pell;:=mts h2ci not established that in the respondent ' s 
~neech he had forejudsed any eenuine consideration of the ob -
1ections11 they hacl not est.::iblished th2.t the resrionc.ent h2.d 
8ppro2ched the 11JattPr ~ith a closed ~inrl , thereby failing to 
eYercise his discretion . 
c:1 L,_,F. v '.}o·,rernor- C:eneral 115 c2r.1e to very much t:he sc:-me con-
clusj_on . 'There , tl--ie ~.ation2l -evelo:-''1°nt Creer (ifo 2) 1991 
2:inlie'i the ~i2tionel j~evelo:p:-:ient ;1ct 1979 to thP Aramo,3n8 ....,11Jelter . 
cihe effect o: the Creer in Council \:c?.s to en-::,ble nornal st2tutor:v 
by~ single Flanning !ribun?l he;:irin[ , to be followed by a r 0 port 
2nd :-ecommenc.8tion to the .•iinister of £.atir;m,l _1=,;velop:;1ent , 
rat~er that ;:i bindinc ~ecision by t~e Tribunal . The plaintiffs ' 
contention \\'"'S th8t the ~xecutive Council ' s actions 8nc public 
:-,t2te··r1ents ,,;ere ,·uch as to give rise to ? re8l .rrooabili ty :-iw, 
/o··, "P8l lL~Plihooc ,·nc"./or 2 re;:isonable sus-r.icion 11 --: that the 
rx 0 cutivo Council h2d r:',eter':]ined in advance to ;ic'.visP anrl consent 
to ~he 2~rroval of the ~p~lic~tion c?.nd that , forth~ reason , the 
'.
0 .~L,jon ',Jas invc1lif' for bi2.s . 
F.6 
.:1he jurtc;e:::: of t'1e .Je',-: ,ec.L=:,nr~ Court of ,,"0pe;::il [0'·1 it as fal lecious 
to !'egard this es a. c'isc::ualificetion , r~o·.1'1lents '..Jr::rP .:1ace to the 
effect t11et nrojects of the ;~inc1 for 1,1hid1 t'.1e IlPtional ,evf. lopment 
t.ct is int 0 nrJ,_,r: , wrether govern'lent 1::or>u..' or private 1.•:orK:::- are 
li'(ely to l,e ;1;--ny =cnt',s is evolution and th1t it ·.,,oulrl be naive 
to su nricse thci t f'e1 rlia ··;en t coulr. have ~~ec1n t \ini s ters to ref r2 in 
~ro~ expressine , ~ven strongly , views on the fesireability of 
such nrojectP until the staee of ordering an Order in Council . 
Cooke J considered the only relevant (!Uestion to be 11 whether , at 
the ti~e of sdvisinE the ~akinf of the Order in Council ~ the 
'· inisters cenuinely addressed Uiemselves to the statutory cri t -
eria c',nc ·,1Pre o: t:'te opinion tlvit the criteria .,,1ere satisf ied . 11 
J.'1 ;:-, r:i•1il2:::- 0·:2y to :::-re1n,clin . te. inistPrs , it '.,1as helc , c:j_d 
In con-
sir.erinr tre statutory criteria , they he~ exercised their 
~ifcretion in the ~anner prescribec1 by the le~islature . It is 
only 8ctual -- ·('c'eternin;::itior. th8t ·::il 1 re~:ul t in a :ailure to 
'"i.v0 t}iese c =-i te ris trv_e consicle re:, ti on ; t0 e reby resulting in an 
oppr~tive bi2s . ~icharoson J c0nclucec , to this effect : 
11 A susr,i cion that t:1e ~xecu ti ve '..Jounci l ":'1irh t be incliner. 
to encior3P 2n ~pplication in respect of a ~overnmen t work 
is not enouEh to invali~ate the rlecision raised under the 
subsection . In orfer to c'c so , nredetPr~ination of the 
C'uestj_cn "Just :;e est2.l::lished . 11 (rriy e':1rh2.sis) 
:hers.ir·? riifference between the 2uproaches of Coo~e J and 
r;ic},arc:son J w;iich , in some circurristances , could be significant . 
It turns en their resrective views as to what constitutes this 
rlisrualifying redetcr~ination or failure to exercise 8 ~iscretion 
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8nr: as to when suc}1 ~-rer:eterrninc1tion ·-,ust orerate. 
~he relevant ti,ne fa!:' c=,sseGsinr.: U1e uestion, on t;ool<:e J ' s c1n.uroach 
is at the ti.,.,e of advising the rna~inr of the Order in Council. 
Bec?use t:.e ·iniFters had concluced, at th8t tir1e, t}rnt the ,.-:or~( 
was essential for the major expansion of exports and for rtevPlop-
jne-sicnific8nt opportunities for employment, the le-:irned judge 
con;idPred th.?t the :ninds of tl1e :·j_nisters ,.rere not closed. 
"Eefore tl-)e rlr?cif'ion cnn be ~et 2side on thr.> ["JDJ.nds of dis-
r·ualif~rj :1r: 1:,i.cif,, it ·11.~st 'ce i=>stc11:Jlis~0 ~ , on trie balance of 
prob2hilit±es, t~2t in f8ct the min~s of t~ose concerned 
=o_.,l.Qrc I 
I L • ,-• ! 1 7 
·n ~~ Or~c~ in ~ouncil. It ."";:oy he tnc1 t , in 1 o inf so, they ve re 
,-oinr _., ' . t:1.rough t':1 E· In ~,.;~jtio~, if j t c2n he shown 
tl,~t before th~t t1· vie, t1e 1·11J·c"+PrP_,r .,.,_i_n:~,~; ·;0_I'P. not 0_T'_0n +o , , . cl . ·, , r . _ v • , , - v 
i ': -:rue of c oun i 1 c: 21:.' " nu -:~,er of s tc=; tu to .,.y ri b1Jn;:, J ~-: 
is ·n,"cuir'?" 1-·y c -c2tute to '1:ove 2 r]er-ree of n.,..ior involve'Jent in 
cision t o construct a :=-1°1 ter or a ne111 to··E l:ut it :-:2P-:,3 that 
~)1-en ri2i-:e in 1.,1n2t if: consirlered to be t11e '!Jublic r;oo·;, rather 
that to pursue any private inte~efts Rnd a freat ceal of 
P~ploy~ent and productivity wil rePul t from the prorosals. 
The extent of the nature of a Yinister' s functions gives rise to 
an even lesser standard of tiRs than thAt ap~licable to so~e 
ctatutor:v tribun2.J.s concerned ·,;jth ~oJicy. This is evident in 
~he l9ter said th2t stron~ exnressions of hostility to A rarty 
to~ ~isnute ~il ?jve rise to bi~s. ~~  £or~er case st2ted t~at 
seen as 
or :=i nu·.ber. o: conce:'.'ts ciscusses thus :":ir, C'OlP,led . .L' ','{l vfl an 
ev8luation of the applicable oncent of bias ~y an 2( hoe body 
not constrained by leral precefent. 
~nri rs A ~itzrer2lri ?r~lie~ +o the arrina_ I2n~s Eoard for a 
l_o;?,n to assist tl•e ci.evelo:;1:1,ent o:~ a •:2.stinf ~ro}1erty caled I , .L0Yl0' c., 
Cul l:r' near ·.1 e lJ incton. r:1e 2nl')licants ":ere, rPS".'1ectivel:r, son-
in- J 8.'li nn.d r.au?hter of the then j_nister of At:ricul ture :inc 
:
1icher±ec and were both fr'ends cf the then .:inister of l2nds, 
,:ho ',:as statuto:'.'y c~1air"1an of the ·ar; __in2l L:mc:1.s :Ooard. 
Tl1e loan e1 npJ.ic8tion wc1s twice rejectec by the ?oarct c1nd then 
finally gran t ecl on 1 7th June 1 c:.~30 . h ·-r.er:ibe r of the Beard , _ :r 
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C ~ \hite , then resirned nublicly declarin~ that the loc1n w2s 
\·:ell outside tne ::3c2rC: ' s norn.?l lenc:inc cri teri8 2nd v:c1. ,c;r2nted 
cl"' ,; ref'ult of T):!''ersure from the .. i nister of L2nds . 
The cuestion to be dPcided by the Commission of Inauiry was of 
a dif~Prent nature that th2t 01ich h~s been 2ddressea thus far . 
~
1118 Co'1lmirsjon ,.-;2.s rer-ui:::'e~ to decic:e ,,-,nether action should ~2.ve 
been t:;Jcen 2::--aj_nst the c'ecision in cispute . The task th2.t fc1ced 
the Jo~mission , then , ~as ~uch h2rder that that faced by a re -
vie·:Jin:, court : ='he status 2nc; re:put2..tions of t\:o public figures 
1::r~e in iPPUC' . .'1 revj_e•1rinr:; cour't ":lay stri'-<e do ·'n a :iecision due 
to bi~s •:·i t:1cu:::-- ci oinr any injury to t}le ~'erutc1tion of tn° c: ecision 
r"'I ...... , rr:::i y• 
r . "- t _ • Cne hRP only to ~ec1ll thP ~ordr of ~orJ C2~pbell in 
iy~ 0 s v Gi·anr Junction '.:;2nal 112 ·:.'hen he ,~ai( 
11 :.0 o:1e coul<~ 
, nproPe tl1at lore: C'ottenhc1::i coul,; be in the y, 0 1otest defree in-
lfucn~e( by the interest he ha~ in this concern II iord 
:. pDe'=' re nc<:> of bias . 
It r112.y ,,,ell te t!J8t 8 find inc 01 '. ics vl 1C>n rl ~ublic fi, ure I S 
~s ~ill be S 0 Pn in }art: of this 
n~fPr , it i~ often the c2se t~at 2n officPholdPr ½ill be riisouali -
.'het:her or Ylot t:ist interest 
'.'ill in ::.'::1ct inr'luc,nc'? the offic<?hol(er is not a relev2nt con-
:-' jc1 e r? t i on • .,::-:0"1plr::-s ·.:ill be p:'ovic.ied by sect i on 9 of the 
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7ictori 2 T;n i verPi t y o: · .. ;::,llington 1-'ict 1Sfi1 2nd ;-cect ion 1 4 of the 
/ ?ishe ries Act 1983 . The stc=inrl8rc1 8dont Pci. by t he Corn~ission , 
how~v e r , was one of actual bi8s . 
~be Co~~ission o: Inquiry critici3ed the arp~oaches ~;::,fe by the 
t 1::o .. in i s t ers , referrin2 to the, ;:is 1 'llron.= ', .' not correct ' :=mG 
' nn-;ise ' but founf, none of t11e actions scrut i ni2ec to be 8ctually 
' i~;ro~er ' 11 G The lri~ary r~acon for this fintinr is the stand
-
rrc O . i·~~--rorriety thRt t:1.e Co.,,,,--;ission ir-rr:sed : 
11 :ln:r citte-~.,.,,t to use thrit friendsh:..n or reJ.c;tionsh i p :-:o 2s to 
,,rocure :or t:-,e 2r:'lic2nts ,.n ?C 'r2.nt2[e outoioe the trne 
~eri t 3 of the R~plication ~ust in itself 8~ount t o i~prop-
riety .. jn ~~~ition , it follows that whether or not t here 
if": j_·,,::-rop :~·j_ety .".'lust neceGS81'.:'iJ:v c 0 ~,enc' on 1 ·het11.er t''1P rict 
co•~~18inec'. o: ·,·r;s (one ··:i-:h t'le in:::e:r.t to nrocurf> 8n j,~ -
js eGf-,entjriJ . ~ct i nf wi th stupidity or l~c~ of wis6o~ i s 
not necess;:,rily j_nrroprir:t:v . 11 12 ,--;, 
,~ctual i··'.:pro.,.,,ri e t y , t11.en , w;;,s the t 0 st a-:,nliec: . .\ test of 8n 
P. ppe8 r anee of c=m in: 1 uence on th c ,ro,:;,e r 2w' L::=-;:i rti::: l re rf o r ·,v1nce 
o: !1Uoli c dnties '.:s~:_; 1.-e ,jected y the r;o·nr:1h;sion : 
ll impronriety cc1nnot lil? entirely in t::---.,P c-.:o of t'r.,,, be:"olr1e r. 
i ·ripro:rriP t? bu L ,,._,:,('.)re the rP j · L:. f '1 c t none:. . . . ?or , if tl1e 
s i tu::it i or.. is one ,/~1ere the .:inister ' R intervent i on ccinno t , 
on 2ny rP?SoncihJ.e viF·,; , RPC 1Jre 2n i m:pronPT '•c'v?11t2;, 0 , ho•.-; 
c::=-,n it bs s2ir1 thr:it t'·,ere i:-; ;:or:' ;:. mmc1 for .c:i rP2.r:on2blE'- ::ind 
i··1p::.:::-ti0J ~ystan'.:.'.er' t o i ~:er thc0 t the _rin i ster Pllo\,.'ec the 
fact or rel2ti nr-:,1" -'co e~ ert o-:n inf luence :::m the r r o!)'?r an,.1 
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impartial performance of his duties." 
1 21 
Such a proposition has some merit, given the fact that a Minister's 
career is at stake, but it does make for some glaring contradictions. 
Consider the case of a Minister who, inspired by a personal fin-
ancial interest, attempts to intervene in the decisdon of a tribunal 
so as to influence its decision. If that intervention comes the 
day after the tribunal makes its decision, it would not be con-
sidered improper under this test for, in fact, it did not secure 
an advantage for the Minister. If the intervention has cone the 
day before the tribunal's decision, an improper advantage would 
have been secured and a like inference would be drawn by areas-
onable bystander. Two different results may arise out of the same 
improper act. It should be the fact that the intervention was 
improper that gives rise to a finding of impropriety, regardless 
of the effect it actually has. As Parliament has directed i n stat-
utes such as the Fisheries Ac t, it is the potential influence 
that should be the dominant concern. 
The ~st adopted by the Commission aligns, in some ways, with that 
laid down in CREEDNZ and Franklin; there must be actual improp-
riety. But the Commission, in applying a 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
standard to this test, goes beyond that laid d own by the courts. 
In cases where actual predetermination has been said to be required, 
the test has been held to be satisfied if the court is satisfied 
that the prior conduct of the decision maker meant that he could 
not approach the matter with an open mind. Although a standard 
of proof is not normally mentioned, Richardson Jin CREEDNZ said 
that the decision could be set aside if it was established on the 
balance of probabilities that the minds of those in question on the 
not.-· open to persuasion. 
~e "Uestion that muFt be asked then is , havinc resPrd to the 
function of the /Iinisters , can the stPndarr.i ::iaoptPo by t11e 
8orrJ'Tlission be J ikened to triat 2c orter' 'cy the courts? 
7? 
Judicial Puthority has reruir 0 d proof o~ ?ctual rre~eter'Tlination 
in caees where a decision ~aker docs not vie· ~ rn2tter in iPo -
]8tion but , by neces~ary implic2tion of t~e n~turP o~ thPir 
officP , ~ust have ~ad co~e rrior involverrJent ¼it~ thP tubject 
~Atter of~ (i~oute . 1he invoJve~ent in t1e ~ubjPct matter in 
t:1e :·c=irr·inPl L2nds 3oara c~se ,,,2P not o.: necPssity , it \/8S not 
rerui:recl hy st;:,tut.::, hJ.t 1..'?0 Ptt-:-:ibutPble to the 1,irivatP 2ctions 
of the :.ini~·tPr'"' ::;Jone . ,i~i1~~1y , the hearinf \f2 note 
necPsP2-v refult of ~ny r~ior 9ctionP on the r~rt of the aecision 
Tlrir:> only 
~rien~s - ~ clear ( \'"; '· C! _ ......... ~'or 
2.nC'?f' . 
t0~t sCopted by the ~om~ission is ~ven ~ore stringent and harder 
to satisfy than any o~ thPsP c~ses . As Brookfield points out : 122 
" It simply rloef, not :01101•• thc=it , hec2use criticism of the 
conduct of cert.sin f'P rs ons " 1,,:2 s bot::nd to ;::i ttr::> c t scy,1e 
publicity" t:he stanr.c1rd shoulri. be so ':1.if!h . 11 
:lthou[~ a differPnt ~~tter is in issue here ; the inTrorriety of 
a :-inister anc1 r:ot t'-ie v~lidi tv of 2, recision , ir.J: ror,er inter-
ference 1r1i t"h t'ne i:71[Jartial oper2.tion of the 18 1:; remc=,ins just 
that and cannot ~e cure( by ~n incuirv into whe ther it is 
rbsolutely certain th2t thP interference aid , in fact , influence 
the 5oarG ' s cecision . If the test of ;:in appearance of imrartiality 
is too rii r;h , then tn_e test aoor,tec by t11e Com111ission is too lov, 
for it will only be in rare c?ses that a finding of impro priety 
,,-;ill result . tert a~opted viP~s ·actu?l irnyact of imrroper 
interfer8nce on 8 de cisio~ 2nf not the ~otive behind ~hat inter-
:e rence . uUT~ly it i2 t~e 1~ .ter t~at ~boula be avoided . 
r ~reli~in?ry ruestion to an nv~u2tion of the law rPlatin• to 
ncn - st2tutory tribur..als is the eytent to 1/1ic1" ;-, cou,r-c cf lei·:, 
n2ture . In theory , at least , sut~ission to t~e jurisdiction o~ 
t . e F o v e rn in g 'b o cl y of 2 club , t r 2 d e uni on or r r iv a t e a s s c c i e1 t i on 
is the result of the voluntary acts of ~e~bPrS in joinina t~at 
club , unicn or 2s2cci?tion . If a member of thP non - st?tutory 
body i2 8ctuated by biss , an aff~cte~ member c2nnot cowplain due 
to ~is voluntAry ~creement to let that ~ody judge his 2ctivities 
wi. -tin the org8nisa tion . In contraRt , e tribunal of the st?te 
impos i n~ , without thP consent of those governed , rule~ and 
~ec i2ion~l processes uron in~ividu~lr ~11st be subjPct to scrutiny 
by the courts to ensure thP i~r2rtiRlity oi its oenbPrs . 
:·s 'l·iill be Pxran:::Pc. in thi~ section , the vr-.lirli ty al' t:-,is t:rpe 
of 2n~ur'lent breaks covm for h:o principel rP:1cons . Jirstly , the 
volunta~v or consencual neture o~ non- statutory tribunals rnAv he 
:::i myt'rJ . If 2 member wishes to join an orf~nis2tion , he will have 
no choice but to sutmit himself to t~P jurisdiction of its ~ov -
In Addition , 8 prosnPctive ~e~ber has no barc~inin~ 
strPnct~ to netoti2te his 2ccPrtAnce of that jurisdiction ; it is 
forcec u;1on hirri in the s;:,;ne ~:.re~r 2s is sub;ni:=:sion to the ciut~~o:':'i ty 
o:~ tne m1rts of l?\'' , 0e cone ly , thP :-eve r,ni nc boc; y 02.y have t:i e 
r'0',1Pr to 2:fect j_ ·1port8nt rip~L such 2.s ;::, person ' f; li-velihood 
Inn courts v:ill cf'f'U!11e EHl 2uthori t~, to reviP·.,· t}1e 
...: .".J • ., r:i i t !: -1 ,. r, r voc?, t.,/:'c' : 
I, 
inPtitutio~s , tr~tP union~ , clu1 s ~nr even rrofession2l 
?~3oci8tionP i~ apt to present soeci2l rrobleMs . Those 
\'Jho make nec i sions c;-:n }1;::,rr1 l:r insulcte then.,selves :ro:n t:he 
~eneral et~os of thPir or[snisation .... ~~~licA~icn of the 
rules er:Pinst interest an" hiM~ --nust be te::rercc: ·::i t}i re8l -
js~ , for inst~nce , it mieht be right to renuire evi~ence 
of 2 ctu2l bi8S r2ther th;:in ~ ~ere liKelihoo~ of bias before 
2 recicion is set c1sir..e by ~ court .'' 
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~he nature of consensual tribunals is often a1vocated as a 
reason for renuiring the arplic2tion of ~n 2ctual bias test ie 
(1) ion- statutory tribunals 2re consensu~l in nature . ihP 
~arties havP apreed to the juris~iction of the trihunal : 
it h~s not been forced on the~ hv st8tute . 
(Z) Unlike rtatutory borties , some doubt 2bout the ' ~urity ' of 
t11e administration o~ ju2tice by non - statutory bo~ies is 
cicce,,table . 
(3) ~Y choosi~E fello·· ~embers of their organisation to 
2d~inister discipline , nPmbers accept that discipline is in 
t>i.P r.?nds of r,ersons •·1110 ·.:ill necessarily h.sve some 
forekno,.,leci::--e of the environ:11ent in 1 1hic'1. the issue 
arises ana of the events ~~ich led to thP ]Rying of the 
In thP lipht of these ~2ctors , the rec 0 nt case oi ~loney v 
1 
r , ;1t?]r 
' I 1, 
8Ctual bias tote the 
?f~licable te8t for non- Pt?tutory tofier . !here , the rlaintiff 
~tt 0 ~pte~ to set asirle resolu:ions of the !'2CCi8tion ey~ellinc 
:is rround:J ···E-re -:;"", histor:r or r102tili t~r 
l'':le clefenri:"nt ' s contention ·,·;0 r th2t ~ny tert a_;_ an '.:1ppe2r2.nc 0 
of bi2s ,,,;::is inc1prlicabl"" jn cc=;s'?s ,·uc_l--i c1s this because tl:e 
considerations ·~ich act to dlsrualify e ~embe- of 2 court or 
··t--tutoc/ tribun;:,l are r"if'feren-c to those 2:::-iplyini; Lo ::: ,iooestic 
tri "bun?. l t':- c: rcisin ,'... eu;-o; f i - juii cis J .func cion:- unc1 '? r the ?U tl1 o ri ty 
c' O""Pc, tic tri r•ur.::.~ l bec:::;use lor...: enninf d?finPri the subjects of 
-y,r,0i't-·'I C ~ t- (""";....,, -'·i • 
~uspicion of hias test2 hEive no ~prlication to the c2oe o~ 8 
iteel: r~ises an 2ncnoly in t~2t the defendants concPdef ttP 
:·:->et t:.'.:it t'rie m,t1Jre cf their :unctior.s \,er 0 cw:1si - juc::j_ci?l , :Vl?t 
GJ2ss J ~ went en to t~se 
~is fin~in~ on the C?EP cf 
· us -::: r;:, l i 2 n , o .,.., , s:: e r s 1. n. i on v :::: G w err (;: · o ? ) 1 ? c: i,.r here .:::i i Yon J f' ;::i i rl : 
I._, 
" I is j_:"'rc:?:'+::-r.t to kee-r stec"lc1iJ.y in ~ inr: tnit ,,,:e 2re 
<~E';:-,1 i.n· 1,,i t'n -; cio":1 P:"'.tic fGru, ,'."ct inf under rules 
:te'."tin,... on Cl consensual b;'Qis " . 
' 1 It j ::- 'lot in accorc,;::;ncP '::i t.1-: trie rules n::'.' natur2l 
juPticP to ~~ve ;resenT ~e~ber of tre tribunal 
i t ~, P, 2 J r c 2 e cut or or c n P ,. · 11 c i s in P v i t 2 'ri l y bi 8 s e d 
~,--:-inst t'r.e accused 8S a result of 1.is : :-.rticirEition 
in t 1-:e controversy 1! . 
In ·a1onev , r:J21:;s J J. ·narie nnte 0f t11e fc:ct th8t there '.':as no 
ef'erence to re"lsonable susoicion in ~",owen . ::e uses this to 
surrc -t t~e Lro~osition thElt t~ 0 reruire~en~s of n8tural justice 
2re , in f0~'.1° r 0 .'.'):rects , different 1::here (io;:-;iestic tri'r,un2lP ;:i·rp 
concer~ed an~ ~ctu2l bias is the applic2ble test . 
It is hiP'i,Jy ruest ionable , ho 1tJever , ,,-,hether t,1,e ~owe n c~se c2n 
1° used ~s suthority to surport sue~ 8 !rorosition . 1n :Sowen , 
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the ~ecretar:, of t:he 'iurtrc·li2n , or,;:ers lrnion r.cesPnted tc t:n.e 
Cn t~e f2cts of t~P ~~rticuJ2r 
c2se, j_t ':;:is rwlri t1,;:.t tl-:e secret8ry ,::is 8ctu;.l:v ri;,.seci; 
~2ve led the ccurt to t~P sa~e ccnc]usion. L':'ie case tnen is 
very ~utious 8Ut~or~tv fer t~e A~~lic8tility cf 8n actu8] bias 
test to con~ern3u2l tribunr1ls. 
~ !i.,._) 
_ 2lcnPv ari~e, t~e line nr ~uthority ree~s to ~oint in favour c~ a 
nx~ulsion f~n~ 8 union. 
1 .e t..12.intif.: h2( nc 
_ 1 J e ?tion:.: of 
Tne ,·ne~ t ion !'or t:h e court 
o: t lw uni on , ~-u ':-' j e c t to r i : · '. ·i s :-· e J :=i t · · i11 r n r:i E le 8 sure , th e 
rules of n~tur8l ~uetice ~~  in~nplic2~le. 127 Cn the other 
7c 
8ffecterl his Plis?hilitv for office or ~e~ber~hir in the union 
of >1 i -ri po ::: i t i on .::: t t r .s c t f' t"' e ru 1 e s of n? tu r c, l ju f' t i c e • : :1 e 
of tl--ie l nion ' s f'O\·:ers ; 
11 ·~'h.P rPsult of this :-onpPc1l ':12s :inciisnut?r.ly of ~r·e?t 
i~portQncP to t~e rleintiff . 
lhP duty of th 0 ~xecutive Council 
r C tu;:-- 1 J :.' 
• .L • • f' lE.: __ • 
I~ 
, r- n e r? 1 ru l ': , ? s '." ~ 2, t P ,; i n I ,~ i t t v 'Ji l l ' ; { • -i ,.,~ .... , !'"'" ,·~ . - ' 
..., t c l J_ "' :,·y v .::·~..::::-=-P=-· .;,.v_·_1 r=-Y..:.L'..:.'l:_' __ ·-=--'.-:.c=-i_n-',"'""" _ \,.,._O_n_t_r_o_l __ :i.~_o_;..,_r _d 
0onclu:--ion . 
7" 
en tr1 e 
."0'.:EVPI' , in 
. . 
"lJ C continued ~resence in trero8~droom 
c'urjn(" t.'cie ti::1'? t~e '1c1-':;ter ,,;8s ( iscu:=:sec .::net t"ie renal ty 
:::-,c rePG ur,cn '."'UCt r:resent to 2.ny re8sorn=ibly ::Jincec. 
~2.n ·~o ~new ~he facts Pntecede~~ tc the {l8Prinp 
ir. ·: O :' ( ·"' r( I'(' C ":'I , :1.e rp;:,sr,11.c,:;J e in ~erence to he 
l n. t ~ r- ~- c ~ rf1 ' c, r · e 1 i (" P r 2 l i e; :1 -
that re2lcn~hl 0 inferencP , in ~v 0,inicn , is 
suf~icient warr2~t for conten(in t,>;:::: t , in P, ,8 t-'::er in 
•::':ich t~e ~3oar< ·.:?~, bounr' to 2ct jn jur ici"'l '·.?.tter , 
in<, i V i G Uc! l 1 , -c· i {l t 2 , the 
in ,-toller.v , 111.'P: _ v vq;~;i:.·x Ju,;tice, E'Y r 2 rtp . 0.Ct,8 rtrv to 
It rP~~inr , on the b~~is o~ the nPture of non - e ~tutory 
t~ibun8ls outlined 2t t~P bPginnin£ o~ tbis ~ection, ~ ~ uron 
te~t shouln be a0rlicahl~ tn t~0 se tribun,:lP. 
nrivP a ~er~on of their liv0lihoo~. E}F'.V r•o so in c:,ccorc'.;:.:1ce 
r:o··pr2 ;1r0 b;:-. ,c.c· in contract: . ·ew.ber~ of thP ooc:v ricve su:rpo~P-
Bur, in prsctice, 
i . 1 Oli' to 1.·r c·o,.ni.,:, 
() 
Y -4- ,.. r l . ' (;,0L,-, / • :i:t if 
p l""" .,c --·' . 
~'11_} PS: 
( l·,) o ;:-,_r_:-oint hj 
·c·,evPr, in 1 ,-, -;: .~-- ' 2n 2r1enri:-~·ent ·w28 ;<12rle to the .,rt-itr2tion net 
···:,ich culruJ.e0 tlw loc·icsJ 8I~lic2l·ilit:y of •.ich'.'Ilonc: J ' s r.'UlPs. 
c, 1 
thAt whPrP 8 ccn t rRct rrovices :or refPrPncP of di3 utPP tn a 
2"'.'"' l ies to rPVOlH' the 2utvnissicn bPcauPe the <"rl itr;:o,tor is r::.ot 
ir' 1 ?Y'ti?l , it c':12lJ not re 2 prm nrl :or refw~ i n · t 1 e ?qlic.::ition 
~e en erP( into t~o ccntr2ct . 
qrri t r2tor iP ;ut 2si~e and the nor~RJ rules gs to ~i~s are ]Pft 
tc ~iTly : 
~rritrator , the Arbitration Phould not Eucceed . 
s2ininf r,oei tions to c'noore tteir 8c; jur:ic:::itor , the t 0 st of an 
In th~re rePn0ct~ , con -
~·~acey 1 . ,, . ut·:1i tr : ),:_ 
': I t i::., '12. T'C t O S PP (} C 1 ' ," U [)-;_ i C : 0 1 i 2 .·' , ~1ir 1 '. rei11:-,n1''' trr> 
sr1oulc'. r·0r.uir>? ;:cnytnL'l[' 1n° ~ fJ 'Om non- ,tPtutor:: 1-1or'.ie~, 1.-.r1-·o 
~, 1 j_ V i t\ • 11 
j:1 Li,-c ;·: c+~ _r=-·, 'ir:· :o r:: ,, ~,u. tP c: ,,.,, not in:. c. ren tly no tear l P 
'·. ill t'-10' rcctrjne n: r:Pcecsity . ~-'he 
(' t:' (' !"u. le s en:::ure 
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, C" 
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.i. n - 1 •• r-. ::- t : 0 n . 
not 
rio"".:' 
a reasonable suspicion of bi~s te~t , yet the 0ffect o~ ~-n ~d~ -
7 , ~yin~ in t~ 0 12risbles 
·u·ricion o~ t12s . 
ii. ,i i 
. i: l 'l 
j' 
11'' . t-' "" < r e;f 
o: } "t]P r h'r,~· in 
.., . 
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It is often the c.::i1:0 P , ::o•,;pver , t°h'"' t the trihum,1 ;:1m:t , of nece -
seity , have an amount of ~rior involvement in the subject ~2tter 
of 2 c2se , 
It j_s , thPn ~ccer,tec:. that tnere 
~he first is ~hat the 
~~vourin- ~ ~~rticuJ~r !ro~csel ~ay be sttritut-
0econrlly , tr1e 
l':'"if:'l2ture PX~ rEssJPy rer 1Jj_res lcc"'l 2ut~orities to tlClVP 1,rior 
;-roT,02-1ls anci cevelo1::ientr, . 
sees t he test "eir.r hic1s or -. ~er P tf.:'Y' "'ir,? ti 0.:1 ':"';,sec: u· on trie 
;~1e r·uestiol'l hPCOl'.lE:'S , hrl.S t'ne 
."-;::; "'P~Uc?rc:inr t02 r:ir-l·ts 2nc iwrestf' o_: concerned r erPons :::ind , 
on t~e other , the nPeci to nr0Tot0 effic i ency ann r;:,p i d decision 
c· 
inisters o: t'ne Cro···n 
2 .-"inister rriay,h2ve :::. ciutv r.o hi_s Flectors to ~;pp '.'l relic:" n: 
It rray often 'e th;i t , }qt rc,:.n~l t.~ 
or"' -
~e2t ~P?l of jnvolve~ent in th e 
Pyercis 0 h is fiscr 0 tion in that re~rect . 
···i]l rP-sult in" fc=.ilvrp to PXPrcis 0 th;:.;-c r:iiscretion . 
i 11 rPsuJ t if 2 revie·.-·ing court con -
-::r·iteri~, . 
c,n - "[? 1-:-U to<'' Ol i ' f' 
'"' ... - ~ C' L .:.. -,, 
in , .. ,,., ~ ~ t i o !'. -t-; o , t :-, P j s :, u"' ,· ~ n t i,e i.' 0 
r :'"L: , n ,. ,- 0 
• V ' o:: 
. ,..... ,..., , 
'- ' 
of bias 
( r, \ 
. , I 
Oc 
o: lc1nc1 . 
,::,,ry serious 
not the :·etter t;i:e ;it,ility of ;::in of:icE:':"c1rer to c2v·--::-y 01:t the 
d~tie2 cf his office . l.'fl:;_s ,·::,s t::::-ve of '-=-'urnPr v .:,_llison , ~,;:ird-< , 
z·rir~ lir,ertiPs Pre P:fecterl h~· t'--ie exercise of 2 pm··er, this 
fe .t.Pr i~?~' re c. isrl:-icec c:v t11e neec to "'12.intain en a:r,re8r2nce o: 
j_11.vo:i_vjnr.-- non - st8tutorv tribunalP . ~'':'le i'nrort2nt !ersonel ri2__hts 
;:,~~:ectP 11 in tr<?sP c'.:ISE<-:; v,<:>'C'e v--p L~eT'rivcit icn of J ivelihood . 
c~ 0 courts wouJd not lo¼er 
~hP first stP~P ~ro~ thP rrevio~1 invclve~ent of 2n 
iPct ~atter of~ c~~P . 
:'in::incL.l interE:':-"t , t.he ccurtE~ 'i 1 l in:::-i:-,,t U} or Pn 2p_ ear;::ince of 
hi?.P ~P_1_[1[" the Qc1°r,-tiVP tc2t . l: 'r10-,•PVPr , tn.e conflict ;:,rispc; 
out of ~~t;:;tutP , ,1s j_[' thP cEise ';'i t':1 sorie s c<tutcry trib1.1.n2Jf, re -
tribunPl jnriHl j ctj_on , 
·n;::,J lv ho-- ir __:-·:.o-vou1-~ oi' n°cesf'ity . 
ty~~ o~ coniliciinr 
L ' ' 0'1 .;uc 1 ' ~ ,... ')]1~· 1 i (' -t ' t!1e ,. 0 .., l i 0 ,--. 'r- 1 e t~ t 1i l l 1.P - ! 
i.'' ~- t ,,...l ~~F'-~ u:--cri t('P 0 V'l J U0 li01'"'i. o~· r' C' re-,./ i P . ·inP-
0 ov .... ·t. . 
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.; '-' ~ ' 
'.' ·o·v (· r ' 
i::1 
, c~ , · ~ ... i 'l n. · : i 1 ., .. , .... , .,. r-- 'i ·-
'""h ____ (:' I'P 
i. n_:c· ~2.nc c :-; 
' i r J 1.,- ) •. • i 1 -, 
o r rc::--E.0 c1:te it 1:,efor·r. 2nother 
conclvsion -:ind so, an:v ~tc2.rinfr ':1c:uLl not bo i~~2rti;:.,}. l 
is often the case th~ t the J P: ic:l 4ture ex:, ):·p~;:· l_v : rovic ec1 
for such An interminrlinf of function2. 
Cnr' PX"'1~f,1P o: tr.i s i? °!-I'OVi'.lP'.: hy t];.e .-.ucty,<?,li:-:n Crfrv' 
· et 1Ci7f. E'ction 1 ! rrovi( e~ ,{I <1 t th0 Cmr, :s,r1c: n r 2 y 
c2n t~en t?:<:0 the rr:c1.ter tc the ·,.,jhu1vl }-drn:--":'lf. 
,. u b.°' Pc t ion ( ., ) :" e ·:1 c-'; j_ ri i c ::i O , c r r, p l 2. in t -, i ~~  e 1 f ) • 
-1 '.1 
it i :~ v i r~u2 l l:, 
incou rt, "UP to the" :cctrinr o_ 
a·~ ( 1 \ 
I - / 
,.. .. 
- 1, 
l (' " -' 
', ,:_ ' C• ; t T / ,. ... ~· 
, ' 1  1 
I' ~
() .:i.-
J i r rfl( n: 
n tru: tn, 
i. t. 
' a 
I J 
11r· n 
F~ i 
1. Q ., to iffvPP ti · -te 
12r anf monopolies. 1~ t~0 xamin°r co~~iferF it to be in the 
rublic interePt, ~e ~2v furni~h a report to the C0Tmerce 
"c=~1;sc:1"rn ;.·}1;c}· 1·c: J j ..1. ... , L 17G .... 4 u to consicer the rer,ort anr re~c~ a 
finr,l rl0cision.,.,.'7 .i]·1erP ,:,re, then, h:o ex;:,:-11in8tions o:· the I l, 
"'8ter, one 1-Jy t:1e 1',x aminer and one by the Commission a s a result. 
or not to nrocee~ ~nri he2r t'1e M8ter. 
co~2tit ·tes ~n Investi[?tion Com~itee. ~his way, the ental 
t.;ounciJ, 1-rf-o rn8y :",fe8r to re inrerentlv bic1seci due to the f;ct 
;~oes '.'.1.C."'v rp.':11 ·:ritl-, "' co,;_rl2int -:-'rol':l st8rt to .finish. Inves ti ~ci tiC'ns 
So~niteeF consist of four re, i s ered rlentis~·~c are not ~enbers 
tny cc~~l8int rer2rdinf 2 aentist is ~2dP to 
t1w S.,,c1·•n .,olicitor ·:ho is to '18,~e rreliri1jnc?ry investir:iticns 
::ir.·~ '8:V, i:' "'e consic:ers the evirie:ico is su.i"ficient, refer t'1e 
r;:i ter to an Inve s tire, tions Co"T'rni ,:-. ee. 1 Y-' /he Som':1i t t.ee ir1 ~ 
vestif2tes the co,1rlaint ;:n: ,·e:crts it':; -~irn;in~s rcick to the 
t}~ e .Jen t2 l ,o,rnc il. ,.. It is t'.'leYl :t'o.r:' t0e 1 _! I .ouncjl to fin2ly 
c1eci<e ·,;1Ptl~€'.l' th'? r:entist is fUilty c:· ;,rofes0 ion:>l risconcuct 
or inf~~ous onciut. In :>,is 1:2y, UT to four ince!)enc:Pnt r:e.cr:;ons 
~ ~ ~cries Pn ~lfy a ~~rt in the compl8int process before a 
4ecision i~ reac~0 ~ , th~reby, rreservin5 in the public eye, c1nd 
in rr?ctice, t;.,_o in~e11:rity of each. 
0() 
recent E,mendment to thE' Hurr2n rUrrh ts :::;o:--n;1i"'sion .,et 1 cp7 
co,~,12.int ·n~ i: it ··;c,s o: th0 orinion th~t there .. 2.s r, b::--eac~ 
o:: t:rie ,et , i + , ·~ r, - V •I'-'<, the to rrin 2n.v ci vi 1 
rroceerlin~s tefore t~e ~~uzl CrrortuniteR rribun~l . 
37 to the Trinciral ~et . , ection :7( 1) to C.!) provices t:'1""t , 
if the Co~~iP~ion is of t~e orinion that 8 co~pl2int has 
subs tee.nee rnf it is un~ble to RPcure 2 settlement , 
1 t is then 
:or t'ne TrocC'eriinr::-s Corr·missioner to cieciJe whether proc 0 eciings 
t ,...,C).; ,. ... -"- .L __ U' c: ll 
.!.'his 
j ~ h - ~· 
~ -+-
...L {,J .·· ·· ·; 1'o'i:1. t '° tri'oun· l 
t0 inruire into the ccmrl~int . 
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::n tr,e 
covrt fonnn t}1.?t tl' e ;:;r,:,lic2tinn of t'r.e Pt8ture in :-, r;:;se , . :1ere 
cc~?laint i~ ~ut~t?nti8ter is not a viol2tion cf s ?(e) of ~~  
~ccarf~ncP wit~ ~~  rrinci~lec of n2tural justicP. .,C: i ticn-
:=:.l~r, it ':.:as 1r,elr not to re a viol2.tion of s 7 of t':ie '.;r1nar11.cin 
Chsrter of li,·11 E:' ~!'1.d .:_:reer,orrs, puc1r2nteeinp: the rjfh to lifP, 
liberty, ~ecu~it.· c~ the ~erson ~nd t'1.e ri;ht not to be 
<e;river e1e:reo':' l?xce~t in c1cco:'."c2.nce 1,ri th the !)rinciples of 
. oreover, the ~roceedure was hel~ not 
to viol2tP tre r'"U8::'2ntee in s 11 (.-1) of tne Cr.2rter t~12t every 
11.i-·tor~r. 
enit~Pt of 'ti~crou2 soul' or PVPn the robri uet 'cr~ven'. 
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d1e first tivo sre;:-,<: to si.tu;:itions '::,, 0 Te the priv8te interest is 
a~ suc"i a n8ture t~~t i s confJicts \-ith the Prtir 0 :unct i on of 
the public office . ~he c~uceruen-~s.in this 2itu2tion are rlis -
ru8lification of the o[ficehcl~ec or tc nllo~ the interest to 
stc1nd . ·rhe second t\·'o conce~uencPs sre,:,.-;: to 2itu2tions ,.l:ere 
the p riv2.te interest causes 2 con1'lict in P. ,;::i 'ticul;:::,r C8SE' 
i:ere , the interrel8tec eoncer·uences are to ri2close 
th2t interest nnd either to stHnd down for the pur~oses of the 
r ;:,rticular cAse or to a~stnin fro~ votin [ in the m2tter . 
:;'he responses the 12'.; r.rovici 0 s to 3 conflict of int"'rest in this 
sect ion are rlirect 0 d to an o~iicehol~er hi~self so as to 
to c"n officeholcer '·'lJo m:::y F:ub~e, 110ntly c=iccuire :::i conflic tine; 
j_n te ri':' ~, t . ·ro this roint , t~e :ocus ·o~ the p8per has been , 
. e ~-,·n 
position . 
cction co: t:re Victori-"' T-nivPr·~ity of cll ir:. c·ton :et 1°r1 
r,rovic1ee th::it no 1 Pn:on in th,:c. P''lDloyrnent o~' the Univn,:c:·i ty 
P'-1211 co elj •'ble 21, ::i 11e11b 0 r c: thP lniver:-,i ty Council unl 0,,:~ 
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Section 14 of the ~isheries Act 1983 provides th a t no ~erson shall 
be cualified for appointment as Cha irman of the ? isheries 
Authority if he is fin2ncially intere s te d in the fishin[ industry . 
0ec ondly , if any person appointed as Chairman becomes financially 
intere Pt~J , his office beomes vacant . s 14 (3) rrovi des a 
list of circumstances in ~~ich a pPrson is deemed to be 
intere s te d in the fishin~ in ~u s try ; wh ich includes owning 
~ f i shing boat , catching fi sh for the purposes of sale or 
having any involvement with a comp2ny ,.flil.ich pursues any of 
these interests . 
. ~ec tion 3 ( 1) of the Local .Au thorities ( i,1embers' Interest) Act 
1qf8 ~rovides that no person shall becqMe capable of being 
elected 8S a ne~ber of a local autho rity or one of its co~~ittees 
tf ~e had 9nte re d into contracts wit~ the local authority or 
one of its committees that exceeds a velue of ·25,coo in any 
financ i a l year . Se ction 3 goes on , a t some l enr th , to define 
\vh;:;t does 8nd do es not constitute an interest betv:een 2 local 
autho rity 2nd an incorporated company . Th is includes interests 
on the part of a member or prospective membe r ' s spouse . 
~swell as being automatically dis qualified from office , section 
5 prov ides liability upon summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding :200 for anyone acting in any manner while disqualified 
under s ecion 3 (1) . 
~h e t lectoral Act 1956 makes it an offence for a Public 3ervant 
to be a i·;embe r of Farliame.n t . The Act provides a procedure 
to be followed unon a uublic servant wishing to become a . - ~ 
candidate for election . Section 30 provides that , upon being 
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nomincited as a candiccite for election, 8 lubl.i.c .Jervcint is to 
be placed on leave of absence. During such time, he is pre-
cluded from carryine out any official duties and is not 
entitled to any salary or remuneration as a public servant. 
0ection 31 provides that, if a Iublic Servant is elected as a 
!·;ember of Farlia~ent, he is ~eemed to have vacated his office 
as a Public Servant. In the reverse situation, section 26 
provides a fine of "200 for 8ny ;,:ember of Jarliment v.1ho sits 
or votes after he has t:iken up a position as a public servant. 
~hese statutory provisions preclude any possibility of bias 
arising at the outset qnd, e~ualy importantly, preclude any 
2.ppear8nce of bic1s, the rresence of '.ihich can undermine public 
confidence in the ~overnment and its institutions. rlowever, 
there is the ris~ that the co~munity loss from an expert' s 
d i snualification exceeds the co~munity risk arising out of 
his personal interest in the ~2ter at hand, A balance mu$t 
be struck hetween the national interest in using its best 
experts a~d the national interest in protecting the public 
BfRinst dangerous conflictine persona l interests. 
('o) Alowing the interest to continue rhere a re f e,1 :, ta tu tory 
provisions that ac~nowledge t~e existence of a conflictin[ 
interest Rnd then specificaly alow that interest to continue. 
'.:'he only circurnstancec:; in ·.·hich this 1:il be condoned is if the 
interest arises out of the nature of the public body' s functions 
~ ~ not out of the priv~te interests of its members. An example 
of this has 2lr~acy been discussed -section 58 of the Town and 
Country Flanning Act 1S77 ~~ich validates any ;ction by a Council 
in negotiations with R proposed developer before it is reauired 
er _,0 
to hear objections to ?n application for plannin[ consent . One 
interpretation of this section is that local boeies ~ave been 
f tP tu torily excused from the re(luirernen of complic=,nce · 1-•i th the 
rules cf natural justic e \1hen considering such 8Dt,-lic8tions . 
It can be arcued ho¾ever 
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t hat the proper ~cope of sect ion 5P 
is that it only prevents the use by objectors of any argument 
based on the rrior actions of a lc::ml euthori ty that there ':iAG 
any presumptive bias (real likeli~ood or reesonable sus~icion of 
~ias( on their part and thet it wi ll not preclude ' actual 
predetermination ' from operating as a ~esis to invalidate the 
local ~utbority ' s deci sion . 
(c) 0tc1ndinp 00 1.,m fo r the uurposes o: a varticular c8se In bodies 
':
1:l1ere 8 :!:)8rticular interest will not render a ~ember ir. erested 
in every matter th8t comes before it but will only cause him 
to have an interest i n a particulAr case , he may be reruired 
to stand doim from or abstsin from voting in that case . 
.:.:ect i on 46 of the Folice .Act 1 c5s provic es that no member of t11e 
Fol ice Appeal Board shall sit on :::iny ar,peal af fee ting :hi'l'Jself 
and , except with the consent of the aprellant , shall no t sit 
on any appeal relating to promot i on if he was a member of the 
Pro mo tion Board wh ich made tbe determination appealed 8fainst 
or on eny auueal if , in the course of his du~ies , he has 
conducted any inauiry or investication or made a report 
regard ing any r:i isconduct which is the subject 'Ila tter of t11e 
appeal . 
~ec ti on 6( 1) of the local Authorities ( Members ' Interests) Ac t 
1968 urov i des that a ~ember of a local authority , or one of its 
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committees, shall not vote or take partin the discussion of 
c1ny matter in which he has ;:i pecuniary interPrt , other thc1n an 
interest held in common with the public . For the purrorPs of 
subsPction ( 1) , \vhere 8n incorporc1ted compcmy has 8 pecuniary 
interest in a matter before the local 2.uthority , a ~ember of the 
local authority is deemed to h8ve 8 pecuniary interest in-_ the 
m8tter if he or his spouse o~m 10 per cent or more of the 
issued share capital of the company , is managing director of the 
company or 8 controllin[ company . 
Perhaps one of the mat co;:iplete 8nd succinctly worded provisions 
in this rer-;pect is section 1 () of the Lural Bc1nk ing and I,'inance 
Corporation Act 1974 . This provision is wo rth setting out in full : 
11 ::.,ic-c lo sure of interests (1) 4ny director of the Corpor8tion 
v1ho , otheniise tJ1.an Rs 8 rJirector , iE. directly or inoirectly 
interested in arr2neemcnt m8de or entered into , or proposed 
to he m2.de or entered into by the Corporation 8hall , as 
soon As possible after the relevant facts hRve cone to 
his knowledge , disclose the neture of hi8 interest 8t a 
meeting of the Corporation . 
(2) A disclosure unfer this sect ion shall be recorded 
in.the minutes of the CorporPtion anri , except es other-
,.,rise :provic.ed by resolution o: the Corrorat ion , the 
d irector -
(a) 0h2ll nct ta~e part after the disclosure in any 
deliberation or decision of the Corporation relating 
to the arranpement or a[reement an~ 
(b) ,~h3ll be ,disregarded for the purposes of forming a 
0uorum of the Sorporc1tion for any deliberation or decision" . 
_ _, . 
1 • 
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Abs tainine from t2king part in deliberations regardinc a dispute 
will necessarily reouire a disclosure of an interest in the 
matter but the above section makes ouite clear the extent of 
detachment necessary after making such a disclosure . A full 
disclosure of the extent of the conflicting interest is net 
reauired ; only a disclosure of the nature of that interest . 
1\s v'ill be seen in the next section of this paper , disclosure 
alone is often recofnised as sufficient action for a conflictinr 
interest in ~PY covern8ent unctions , but where that function 
involves the mFiking of a decision \·Ji th the pov,er to affect 
peoples ' ri ghts , the followine abstenance from any further 
rRrticipation in the matter is re~uired also . ~he effect ive 
orer?ion of t~ese ~revisions will greatly re~uce th, litigation 
that flows in their absence . 
1ntrocuction 
'T::-i i s :raper ha.s shown that it is often tlle c2se that the com:non 
law rules that regulate bias and interest in officeholders can-
not fully appl y to posit i ons ·~rhere forms of bias and interest 
are inherent . However , to ensure that at least minimum standards 
of i·1partia li ty ;::, re o bse rveo , committees in several countries 
\·1ere established to lciy dovm guidelines so as to avoid conflicts 
of interest , both \Ji .tnin sta.tutory tribunals and on the part of 
t•:j nis te rs 2nd 1 embers of farliamen t . ::embers of P8rl i amen t are 
a catecory of off iceholders that have not been addressed thus 
far in this paper . The re8son for this is th2t they do not , of 
themselves , m8ke decisions that 8ffect the ri[hts of others . 
qo 
- .,I 
1hey exercise influence only . fh is t hey do by sreeches and votes 
in Parliament , activities in the party roo m and ~arty committees 
any be repre sentations to ,·lini s ters and t he ir ad visors . l.'he 
reason for the inclusion of :1embers in the terms of reference of 
the various committees studied he re was to create ~ethods to 
ma intain the high standards of respectability , both in prac ti se 
and appearance , that are importa nt in those pe r sons e lected to 
represent the interest of the country as & \~ole . Co l lectively , 
-~e111bers of rarl i arnen t represent a formidc1ble poi.ver . 
The creation o~ t':1P~e committees represents a complete turnaround 
in att itudec towErds the regulation of conflicts of interest in 
~ublic pos i t i ons : In 3ritE;in in 1969 , the .. eJect Com:nittee on 
·f'~bfc' re:. Intere s ts cons i dered t hat 
" The re2l c~10ice is either to estE,blis':1 ci cu:11brow' inruis -
itorial ~ac~ inery ,fu i ch is likely to be evade~·by the few 
~embers it i s designed to Pnrnesh or to i mprove and ex tend 
t 11e trad i tion2l pr8ctices of t :1e [ouse . " 
The 12tter course 1,;as chosen . The turn2rounc° ',,:as formulc1ted in 
1974 by two resolutions of the 5ritish House of Commons establish-
ing machinery for t he declaration and re gistration of Members ' 
priva te interests . In proposing these resolutions , the Attorney-
General sai d to the House that the change of approach was nece -
ssary beca use 
" The smoke of s us picion wh ich surrounds the fire of real or 
i mae ined corruption i s ci grave suspicion vfuich we face , 
not because we are more corrupt or more of us are corrupt 
th 2n we ever were five yea rs ago but because corruption 
spre2ds li%e an odour wh ich attaches to the guilty and 
innocent 8 like . 11 
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It si first necessary to determine the types of bias and interest 
we seek to regulate, These come under two specific heads : 
- lion- pecuniary interests 
Althouch 2n officehol~er may find it abhorrent to feRther his 
own nest wit~ improper gifts or dubious decisions , he ~ay be 
tempted to assist an industry of organisation with which he 
is associated or to help a friend or relative . The problem 
with these types of interest is that they are nebulous and 
hard to define . =he Jew York Bar Association said 
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11 ~estriction on outside economic affiliations can be 
written with reasonable particularity and enforced with 
mocerate predictability , but no one has yet devised a 
~ethod of sorting out friends acquaintances , relations 
and ]overs for t~e purpo se of a rule re rmitting the 
offici2l to deal with some and not with others ." 
~he Aus tralian Committee of In0uiry into Public Duty and frivate 
Interest 
1 
, 
5 
r,u t forward a test of r,pne2rances very similar to LJ.. ..l .L ... 
that 2dopted by the common ls,: : Does t~at interest loo% , to the 
reasonable person , to be the sort of interest that might 
influence? To this was ad~ed the caution that every effort 8hould 
be made to ensure that the intrusion into the privacy of others 
is minimised . 
1atters that the committees die not consicer are th e more general 
political and ideolo r icrl interest . Interests such 2s these are 
eve:!'.l more nebulous . !=oreover , unless an officeholc.e r makes his 
in te rests kno1.,m , t !ley are virtuc1 lly impossible to tr8.ce . If 
such interests are ma ~e kno~~ to the public , it will be for 
the public to decide it.1hether they are acceptable in :9ubl i c office . 
Shor t of disqualification , interests such as these c2nnot be 
effectively regulated by the mechan i sms suc[efted in thi2 sect ion . 
- Pecuniarv interests 
liere , it i s possible to be more exact in terms of defini tion . 
Three areas can be i dentified : 
(a) Assets There are two extremes . rhe first is dooestic 
assets . rhese include house , car furniture etc . The 
second i s sens i tive 8SPPts ie . Asse ts '.,1hich have a 
part i cu l arly close rel c: tionship ,..ith the duties of the 
officeholder . 5ey·teen these t~ o fal l other varying 
foc11s of perronc1l i t y s nd real ty in respect of '.vhich 
there i s roo~ for rtebnte f~ tc their inclus ion or 
e:,.c lus ion . 
(b) Iiabili ti es ~hese :- 1-.oulc1 "b e treated in the sr:11e i,:sy ;:c,f 
corres:ronciinr· ssr<:t:~ : .'\_ "1ortz;::;pe on property .:-'houlr: be 
trcat eci in t11e Sf!1le .:"'y 2s c··ne,r sh i r of the :rrope rty ; 
a losn fron e firn ~ho ]rofitatility 1·8s influ~ncP~ hy 
~n off ici2l ' s deo2rt~ent Phoulri 
f'ens itive asset \:oulc tP . 
(c) Outside income lriv2te pay~ent for c2rryinf out off icial 
duties may constitute bribery and be caupht by the c rimial 
law . Regar~ing paymen t not directly related to off ici a l 
.utie s ; a conflict may a rise from the misuse of con-
f i dental i nformation reveived in an off icial capacity 
so as to further the source of that income , or fro~ th2 
influencin& of govern~ent act ivity so as to benefit 
that inc ome . A second ~oin~ for cons i deration i s the 
demands made on an officeholde r ' s time and enerEY by 
extr811ural activities . As will be discussed under the 
1('? 
heading of divest~ent , it is often the case that outside 
employment is srecifically prohibited . 
Doig 146 te rris the outside in te rests of :eribe rs of l 8 rli2mPn t 
e1S not only t~eir ~ost ~arket2ble ~ut their most vulnerable 
co~~odity . ~o~e examples can te provided to illustr2te this 
prorosition . 
::r Reacer - E8rris , 8 nast 3ri tish 1:inister of 'rrade 8nd Industry , 
was invited to becone an armchair director of a group of pig 
breedinf comp2nies . It is alleged tDat he w2.s so invited so that 
the croup micht have the benefit 8ncl. prestie;e of have a former 
~inister on its Eoard of ~irectos . ~eader- iiarris received 
::2 , 500 :rer ;:,nnUTn , 8 no - li.,it credit c2.rd and interest- free 
loEins . ~·he corr,T'any colla~sed , owinf :1 . 2 million through bad 
:nc1na ~emen t and fraud . This so ref lee ted on :'':r .1.e;:,c e r - rra rris 
that his local Conservative }arty declined to readopt hi~ . 
In 1°71 , Jeremy Thorpe , li~eral ~arty leacer , jointed a fringe 
bank- London and County Securtities ltct . It trovided £5 , 000 
per year , plus a car and business expenses , in return for his 
opening in - store banKs with the attendant publicity and aura 
of public respectability for the cc~pany . ~he bank collansed 
in 1c73 because it rnc1de s-:Jeculativeloans , loaned long 8nd 
bo rrovred short 2nc'l v,a s invol verl in fr;:iud . .-Ir Thorpe \,·as cleared , 
but it remains a t2le of c8ution , for it could very well have 
led to the collapse of his public life . 
~c-,.,c=:ir du CE>nn , I'ory d r for Taunton ..,.,as 8n 8stute anc. successful 
bu~inessman , He w2s 3ecret2ry 8nd director of the National Group 
of Unit Trusts. 'Among m8ny other business seccessPs, he plucked 
the International Life Insurance Company from a group of 
overseas conglomerates. He i-r2s coreful to ,'.'.lvoid conflicts of 
interests 9nd, when appointed to a I·'linisteriEil rosi tion in 1962, 
he resigned his business appoint~ents and sol~ his sh?res. 
~everthPless, his decision not to accept office in the 1975 
:rha tch er shaclov1 cabinet came 8 s 8 re J_ief to :;J8y 1t:ho feared 
that his fin2ncial career mieht be useri as a weapon arainPt him 
::ind his p8rty. '.":hey v;ere c1\'18re that the entrepreneurial style 
typified by r~r ::.u Cann 1.•1as not ;:; ci.esir8ble asset on the Tory 
f::-ont bench. 
C,'.'.lses such ss these ilustr2te the value of havinr some 
~2chinery to re~ualte outside interests for the appearc1nce of 
irn~~rtiRlity in the public eye, for the pffective anJ ef:iccnt 
ope~otion of ~overnment and often for the benefit of the member 
1ir:1sel:. ·.c0ere 2re, ho1,:ever, difficuJ tie: in le1yin~-60\·,n 
comr1on rie2.['Ures for al catecori0 f" of officeholc'orc-: ':~e 
· e~·tr'.lin: ter sv~·tern is b2:-,'?cl en the 2er0r;:ition of 1;0·.ers -
_:inisters have the ch8racteri,·tics of Plectec: '.-Ter1ber~, o_ 
Farliament and some of the c~~r2cteristics of putlic FervantF. 
In the United ~t8tes, the executive, the leri~l~ture and the 
judicic1rv 8re sepc:r-?,te 9nci co-0r-u.sl bv C.8f'iE"n rnc t'ne up:!_",er 
leve 1~ of t':1 p e:-ecu ti ve brc=mch 8 re ,:i;:,nned t,y re 12 ti vr? ly short-
tcr~ rolitical 0ppointees. .~en st~tutory tribunals and local 
Put~orities are added, a ~~~  v2riety of differin[ functions 
producing different interests that may be in need of regulAticn 
come to J.igh t . 
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2, Specific Alternatives. 
Codes of conduct and methods such as decla ration and registration, 
al though sometime s provide,l i n statute, are all forms of s elf-
regulation; a s oppos ed to defining a c onfl i ct situat i on in a 
statute and providing a legal sanction. The E::almon Committe e 
14 7 
prefe r red the f orrnr;r method, saying that: 
11 rEsprit de corps' can be seriously damaged by systems 
of regulation and scrutiny so rigorous that they inhibit 
leadership by management and imply that people working 
in t h e organisation are unworthy to trust." 
This has been the attitude adopted by committees es tablished 
to suggest means for the regulation of conflicts of interest. 
These committees provide, collectively, four 'solutions'. 
These embody two aspects: 
1. Re moval of the interest; by divestment, di squalification 
or suspension; 
2. Regulation of the interest; by declaration and/or 
registration. 
(a) Declaration 
Declaration is a written or oral disclosure of a. relevant 
interest at the time at which it might conflict. If a 
potential conflict of interest is envisaged by an officeholder, 
disclosure to his colleagues provides information with which 
they can assess his motives in relation to his decision or advice. 
This form of safeguard was adopted in New Zealand in the Report 
of The Ministers Private Interests Committee 1956 148 : 
"(b) A private or personal interest properly retained 
should be disclosed ±n Cabinet if any matter of 
public business coming up for cnsideration impinges 
on it and the Minister should not take part in the 
discussion or be a party to a decision on the ma ttert~. 
There is, however, no specific rule of Standing Order in New 
Zealand to this effect. 
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A resolution of the British House of Commons on 22 May 1974 
149 
expressed the obligation in the following terms: 
"That in any debate or proceedings of the House or its 
committees or transactions or communications which a 
member may have with othere Members or Minister or servants 
of the Crown, he shall di sc lose any relevant pecuniary 
interest or benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or 
indirect that he may have had, may have or may be 
expecting to have". 
The advantage of an ad-hoe declaration is the information is 
available when required and is made available only to those 
who need to know. The probelem is enforcement; it is a rtatter 
of trust for an officeholder to do the proper thing. A 
requirement for declaration in respect of all officeholders 
will do much to increas e public confidence in government. In 
addition, the value of the information is advanced by this method-
there is no need to search for one meaningful item in a register 
containing a general disclosure of all interest. Unlike 
registration, declaration does not require additional staff or 
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expense. The Public Duty and Private Interest Report recomm-
ended that a requirement of disclosure should apply to office-
holders aero ss the board. 
For Members of Parliament, dec l arations should be automatically 
recorded as part of the official record and indexed in Hansard 
for convenience of reference. · For Ministers, the declaration 
should be noted in the Cabinet records. The Minister should 
then either indicate that he will not take part in the discussion 
in question or else he should secure the explicit authorisation 
of his colleagues for t aking part. For statutory tribunals, 
a provision in requiring the declaration of all relevant 
pecuniary interests to the Chairman· of that body should be 
standard in all statutory provisi ons es tablishing such tribunals. 
Chairmen of statutory bod i es and single member bodies should 
disclose such interests to the Minister. Each statutory body 
should supplement any statutory disclosure requirements with 
its own rules, adopted by resolution or otherwise , covering 
such matters as the disclosure of relevant non-pecuniary 
interests. It is particularly in relation to s tatutory tribunals, 
whose nature and functions vary, often greatly, that uniform 
sets of rules become unmanageable. 
The Local Authorities (Members' Interest) Act 1968, as previous ly 
noted, requires, by virtue of section 6, the disclosure of 
relevant interests. 
Responsibility for financial probity has remained largely with 
audit. 
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Section 8 of the Act specifies the Audit office is to be the 
controlling authority for these provisions. Section 33(1)(b)(ii) 
of the Public Finance Act 1977 requires the Controller and 
Auditor-General to report to Parliament ea ch year in relation 
to the performance of his functions, duties or powers under 
any Act. In this way, the private dealings of members of local 
authorities and the general workability of the Local Authorities 
(Members' Interest) Act will be brought to Parliament's notice. 
As a result, Parliament also assumes a 'watch dog' role with 
regard to the private interests of members of local authorities. 
Apart from the activities of audit, however, local authorities 
do not have established means of investigating offences other 
than those which require the police. Concequently, the response 
to allegations of misconduct can va ry dramatically, depending 
on what individual councils consider to be the best means 
available of handling them. 
(b) ~egistration 
Registration is the disclosure of specified interests at 
regular intervals; not only at th~ time when a specific incident 
gives rise to a conflict. The second resolution of the British 
House of Commons in 1974 was couched in the following terms: 
"That every member of the House of Commons shall furnish 
to a Registrar of ~embers Interests such particulars of his 
registrable interests as shall be required and shall notify 
to the Registrar any alterations which may occur therein 
and the Registrar shall cause these interests to be entered 
in a Register of Members Interest which shall be available 
for inspection by the public~. 150 
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The Australian Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members 
of Parliament in their Report on the Declaraion of Interest s 151 
list those interests that should be subject to registration as: 
The names of all companies in which Members have a beneficial 
interest in shareholdings, the location of any realty in which 
they have a beneficial interest, the names of all companies of 
which they are directors and any sponsored travel. Liabilities, 
it was recommended, need not be disclosed. Following the 
resolution of the British House of Commons, the Select Committee 
on Members Interest (Declaration) 152 provided a more com-
prhensive list of pecuniary interests or other benefits to be 
disclosed in the register. These are: Remunerated director-
ships of companies, remunerated employment, trades or professions, 
names of clients, financial sponsorships as a parliamentary 
candidate and as a Member of Parliament, overseas visits 
paid out of public funds, payments or gifts received from 
foreign governments or organisations, land and property from 
which a substantial income is derived and the names of 
companies in which the member, his s pouse or infant children 
have a beneficial interest in t he shareholdings of a nominal 
value greater than one-hundredth of the issued share capital. 
In this way, although a much broader area is covered, only 
particular interests of specified values need be recorded. 
The case for a register is put by the Brisish Se l ect Committee 
on Members Interests (Declaration): 
"The way would then be clear for a Member who can 
contribute special knowledge to a debate to do so 
t . II without reserva ions • 153 
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Moreover, registers are appreciated for their cosmetic value . 
The Joint Committee on Pucuniary Interests of Members of 
Parliament said: 
"At a time when democratic society and its institutions 
are unde~challenge in so may directions, any such 
restoration of faith in dedicated representatives of the 
people would be a wholly worthwhile achievement". 
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A recent situation is Australia illustrates the benefits 
registration of interests could bring. A Minister made a 
decision to subdivide a region into small far ms and to provide 
an access road to those farms through what had been a national 
park. Subsequent disclosure in a newspaper that the Minister 
and his family owned land in the area diverted publ i c discussion 
away from the conservation isso.~ which the decision had 
previously aroused and raised unnecessary doubts as to the 
f th d .. n If the fact of the Minister's reason or e ecisio •155 
interest in the area had been disclosed at an earlier date by 
means of a register, the issue could have been judged simply 
as an environmental one, as to whether or ndnational parks 
should be subdivided for farming purposes. 
A further advantage may be immunisation from common law 
principles. In the cases of many decision makers acting with 
a conflict of interests, the courts do not attempt to see 
whether the person in question has actually been swayed by his 
interest; the possibility that he might have been swayed is 
often sufficient. However, if the subject makes a full 
disclosure that he has an interest conflicting with his duty, 
he may be able to immunise himself from the operation of those 
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rules. This is not to say t hat registration will catch every 
situation that might be caught by the common law rules, but it 
is to say that the effects of a wide confl i ct rule may be 
mitigated for, if any conflict arises, the fact that the 
private interest has already been disclosed makes it more 
difficult to say that he is acting contrary to the requirements 
of natural justice. 
There are, however, a number of arguments that have be en 
raised against the adoption of a register. Unlike the Joint 
Committee on the Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament 
who argued for a register on the basis of a restora tion of 
public confidence, the Committee of Inquiry into Publ~c Duty 
and Private Interest were opposed to its adopti:n. The 
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primary reasons for such a conclusion are worth setting out 
in full: 
"In our view, registers can do little more than present a 
general pic t ure of a person's background, agali.ns t which 
his attitude to the issues of the day can be assessed. 
They can also, we accept, have a part to play in 
isolating specific interests from an individual's 
participation in official business and in keepi ng people 
with impoper interest out of publ i c life, but too much 
should not be built on this. The main sancion against 
specific confl i cts of interest must be disclosure at the 
appropriate time and a register cannot perform this 
function. An individual who was determined to exploit 
public office for his own ends would probably be able 
to find some ways around any registration requirements that 
were not of such complexity that t h ey would generally be 
unacceptable and unenforc eable. Apart from any other 
considerations, registers can be expected to cover only 
major continuing interest; i t would be impractical to 
require the re gistration of each and every business 
t t . " ransac ion. 157 
Some specific disadvantages of registration can be discussed 
under the foll owing head s : 
Invasion of privacy There is a need to strike a balance 
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between the public accountability of officeholders and their 
right to privacy in respect of their personal interests. We are 
primarily concerned with those affairs t hat may affect the 
execution of public duties, but it may be said that all affairs 
can influence an officeholders decision. As seen in the 
example above, a Minister's own home might be thought to 
influence the siting of a land use project. To hold that all 
organisational connections that an officeholder has are 
relevant to his suitability for office and should be made 
known in a publicly accessable register seems an unnecessary 
and alarming invasion of privacy. However, one may subscribe 
to the view that, in standing for election, of consenting 
to nomination for public office, officeholders place them-
selves in a 'glass bowl' and cannot claim to enjoy the same 
degree of privacy as other persons . It is submitted that the 
right to privacy does not form an automatic bar to the 
impositim of any disclosure requirements, provided that a 
sufficient case can be established for requiring the information: 
Anything relating to an officeholders public life or suitability 
for office is a legimate matter for public discussion, but 
1 (} E= 
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his private affairs (relation with family, friends, home, 
sexual relationships etc.) will normally be no business for the 
community. 
Ease of evasion One witness to t he Salmon committee said ''if 
there is no honour, .you cannot cultivate it". Although this 
does act as a reason a§,a.ins t the benefit of requiring registr-
ation, it can be said to be outweighed by the public's right 
to know of the pecuniary interests of those making decisions 
so they can form an opinion as to what weight they should 
attach to those views or decisions. 
Assumption of integrity impugned Advocates argue that Parliament 
is so infre quently troubled by conflicts of pecuniary interests 
that a re gister would call a Members integrity into doubt. This 
may be so if the sole aim of ;a register is to discover 
malpractices, but there are equal, if not greater purposes in 
registration which ba.ve been noted earlier. ie public 
confidence and the proper focusing of an i s sue . 
Difficulities of definition Although lists of interests that 
should subject to registration have been compiled and do 
operate in countries such as Brita in and Papua New Guinea, 
they do not, and cannot, achieve an accurate definition of 
all pecuniary interes~which might be thought to affect an 
officeholders decison. For example, where is the line to be 
drawn in deciding whether parti cular forms of hospitality 
extended to an officeholder could cause a conflict? 
11 3 
Administrative complexity If registration is to apply to 
Members of Parliament, Ministerial staff, Members of statutory 
tribunals, local authorities and members of the judiciary 
(some suggest senior public servants, e'xecutives of media 
organisations and officials of trade unions and political 
parties should be included also), considerable administrative 
staff would be needed to verify the information, to administer 
it and to enforce it. The committees considering registration 
tended to single out Members of Parliament but, as there 
is considerable argument for a registration requjrement 
apply to a wider range of public officeholders, careful 
consideration must be given to the machinery that must accompany 
such a proposal. 
It is a matter for debate whether or not the personal interests 
of an officeholders spouse and children should be subject to 
registration. Because spouses enjoy more of less complete 
legal equality, this may be regarded as an infringement on their 
rights. The position of infant childrent is le s s clear since 
parental rights are exerciseable over them and their affairs. 
It may be that the connectbn is too remote to impose an 
obligation on infant children to make a disclosure. 
Furthermore, questions arise as to what extent a register should 
be made available for public inspection. While the British 
register is accessable to the public, subject to an appoint-
ment being made at l east forty eight hours in advance, the 
Australian proposal was that the applicant would have to establ-
ish to the satisfaction of the Registrar, that there was a 
' 
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bona fide reason for seeking access and the application might 
be resisted by the Member concerned. Jamac±a and Papua New 
Guinea have registers that a.re not accessable to the public. In 
Jamacia, the information is confidential to the Integrity 
Commission and, in Papua New Guinea, disclosures are made 
confidentially to the Ombudsman Commission. 
The anwer ma y be that, for elected officeholders, a register 
should be made publicly accessa.ble, but, for appointed office-
holders who are put into office by the government itself and 
not by the populace, the registers should be kept confidential. 
Where a statutory body decides to adopt a form of registration, 
it w:,uld be a matter for the body itself to identify those 
interests which might conflict with the official duties of 
it members and should, as a conse quence, be registered. 
Because of the often vast variations in the functions of 
statutory tribunals, a uniform set of regif tera.ble interests 
would be undesireable. 
Des pite some of the reservations that have been noted, a number 
of countries have adopted forms of registration. In 1965, in 
t he Un±ted States of America, President Johnson issued 
Executive order 11222. This required senior state servants 
and members of presidential committees, boar ds and commissions 
to lodg~ statements with the Civil Service Commission disclosing 
their own interests and those of their spouses and minor children. 
Registration of the interests of members of Congress was most 
recently upgraded by the Ethics in Government Act 1978. This 
lays down a uniform system of annual registration of private 
interests with provision for public access for the three branches 
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of government. The Act also established the Office of Government 
Ethics to develop rules on the conflict of interests and to 
monitor and investigate federal ethics laws as well as pro-
viding for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate 
criminal allegations against high level government officials. 
In Canada, the Newfoundland Conflict of Interest Act 1973, 
requires the registration of financial interests of members 
of the House of Assembly, members of statutory bodies, their 
spouses and children. The British Columbia Public Officials 
and Employees Disclosure Act requires registration of personal 
interests by members of the Provincial Parliament, public 
servants, local government officials both elected and 
appointed and by candidates for elected office both at the 
provincial and local government levels. Shareholdings, sources 
of remuneration, creditors and real property are to be 
indentified. 
To conclude, it should be noted, with some dismay, that the 
effects of the registrati on requirements in Britain have been 
minimal. Since 1975, two Parliamentary Papers setting out the 
details of the interests registered have been published. The 
refusal of one member to provide information led the Select 
Committee charged with the responsibility for oversight of the 
register to decline to publish any subsequent papers until the 
House made compliance mandatory. This has not happened and the 
register has not been published since May 1976, although many 
members have continued to update their own entries. 
116 
(C) Divestment 
Divestment is the disposal, either permanently or temporarily 
of an interest which creates or may be thought to create con-
flict with public duty. This mechani sm forms the basis of the 
New Zealand Ministers Private Interest Committee Report 158 • 
Principles (1) to (5) require the resignation of directorships, 
the avoidance of speculative investments and the aessation of 
routine work in a professional practice or in a Member's own 
business. 
With regard to statutory tribunals, the Salmon Committee re~ 
commended that, as part of a membe~'s qualifications for 
appiontment, the responsible Minister should obtain from the 
nominee, eiplici t confirmation that he does not currently hold 
any ·, interests that conflict or which may appear to conflict 
with the duties of the office and should secure an undertaking 
that the member will divest himself of such interests should 
he subse Quently come into possession of them. Blanket rules 
as to the types of interest that should be divested for members 
of statutory tribunals would be inappropriate but may , with 
some profit, be included in 1he statutory provisions constituting 
a tribunal whose inpartiality can be regarded as essential. 
The example has already been provided of the Electoral Act 1956 
which prohibits a Member of Parliament from holding any other 
office in the public service. Other examples may be viewed: 
Section 17 of the Public Finance Act 1977 prohibits the 
Controller and Auditor-General from being a Member of Parliament 
or of a local authority or from holding any office of trust or 
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~refit or from engaging. in any occupation for reward out-
side the duties of his public office. Section 5 of the State 
Services Act 1962 provides that a State Services Commissioner 
shall be deemed to have vacated his office if he engages in 
any paid employment or business other that the duties of his 
office or accepts appointment to any other office or position 
in the State Services. 
Alternately, Parliament may expressley allow an officeholder to 
enga ge in outside employment while still reserving a right to 
prohibit such employment if it is cons idered undesireable. 
Section 7 of the Small Claims Tribunal Act 1976 allows a Referee 
to hold another office or engage in any other employment or 
calling unless the Governor-General considers that the proper 
discharge of the functions of a Referee will be impai red thereby. 
For temporary divestments, tre United States of America employs 
two devices: A blind trust may be imposed. Here, a trustee 
controls the interests of an officeholder so as to preclude the 
officeholder from knowing whether he still has certain interests 
or not. Alternately, a frozen trust may be imposed. If this 
is the case, the officeholder is forbidden to buy or sell any 
interests he may have and consequently, has less opportunity to 
misuse official information. 
In 1973, the Canadian Prime Minister laid down guidelines . offer-
ing his Ministers the choice between either permanently divesting 
themselves of their business interests or placing them in trust. 
Either a blind trust or a f rozen trust were acceptable but 
Ministers were u r ged to select a trustee who could be seen to be 
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at arms length from the Minister. 159 If this latter point were 
made to be a requirement, i't would derve to dispell the reserv-
ations held by the Salmon Committee that such trusts may act as 
a facade behind which the conflict of interest woll.lld continue to 
survive. 
(d) Disqualification 
Disqualification is the avoidance by breaking, permanently or 
temporarily, : the connection between the officeholder and the 
interest which creates a conflict by removing him from his office 
or duties in the conflict situation. Discussion has already 
been directed to disqualification and its effects in the previous 
section of this paper, but, in the light of the options presented 
here, disqualification should only be appropriate when there is 
so close an association between the interests and the officeholder's$ 
responsibilities that the other options are not appropriai.te. 
3. A Code of Conduct 
The principles discussed thus far are particular means of en-
suring the observence of general principles regarding conduct 
in public office and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
Attempts have also been made to formulate general statements as 
to ethics and practices to be observed by all categories of 
officeholders. The Australian Committee into Public Duty and 
Private Interest drafted a code embodying such principles. 
(This is reproduced in the appendix of this paper.) The code 
begins by asserting general principles - an officeholder should 
perform his duties impartially, should be frank and honest in 
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his official dealings and should avoid s ituations whe re __ his 
private interests conflict or might reasonably be thought to 
conflict with his public duty and goes on t o set out guidelines 
as to disclosur e, divestment and authorisation from colleagues 
to continue to discharge the duties in question and a s to the 
avoi danc e of corrupt practices, such as the acceptance of out-
side pecuniary advantages for the misus e of official information 
or for the discharge of his public duties. The New Zealand 
Ministers' Private Interests Committee provided two such gener-
al statements in relation to Ministers of the Crown. (This is 
also set out in the Appendix of this paper.) 
It would be of much profit to ratify such a code in single 
statute. Such a code wail.d take the form of a s tatement of 
general principles and sepcify the need for mechanisms s uch as 
declaration . and, if t hought necessary, re gistration. These 
general principles do not encroach upon the individuality of 
any particular officeholder or public body. Individual mechan-
isms for ensuring the operation of these rules and for adapting 
them to suit the particular needs of the officeholder/sin 
question can be formulated in the partiailar statute constituting 
the body in question. It may be that the suggested Australian 
code goes too far in prohibiting any outside employment by the 
officeholders it applies to. This may be appropriate in some 
cases, as is often recognised in statute but t his cannot be the 
case for members of all tribunals for a great number of them 
operate only in a part-time -basis. 
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To maintain flexibility, it would be beneficial to leave the 
avoidance, resolution and enforcement functions to the existing 
disciplinary procedures of the various categories of office-
holders: 
- A Minister would be liable to private or public reprimand 
by the Prime Minister, a demotion to a less important port-
folio or a request that he resign, or -else his commission will 
be terminated by the Gov.ernor-General. 
- A Member of Parliament would be liable to censure by the cham-
ber or to expulsion. 
- A Public Servant would be liable to transf~r, dismissal or to 
a reduction in salary. 
- A statutory officeholder would be liable to either private or 
public reprimand by the Ch8irman of the Statutory body or by 
the responsible Minister or to removal from the office by the 
appropriate procedure. 
There is, however, the countervailing consideratin that tribunals 
should be established with some degree of independence so as to 
distance them from Ministerial control. If a member is subject 
to discipline by a Minister of the Crown, that notion of indep-
endence begins to break down, both inreality and in fue public 
eye. Ministerial intervention, then, should only follow if the 
internal disciplinary procedures of a tribunal cannot resolve a 
conflict. 
Rules of conduct cannot create honesty, nor can they prevent 
deliberate, dishonest or corrupt behaviour. Rather, they are 
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a framework of reference, embodying uniform minimum standards. 
Their special value is in situations which are intrinsically 
cornpilcated, or are new to the individual concerned. Here they 
provide a substitute to working out the right course of action 
f rom first principles on each occasion. 
F, CONCLUSION 
The courts of law have recognised and ruled upon many forms of 
interest that can give way to bias. Legislatures and special 
committees have identified and sought to regulate an equal number. 
The essential questions are always what are the general interests 
that are seen as being bad ones and what tests or standards should 
be ad«)pted in order to determine whether that interest gives way 
to an operative bias in practice, in appe 8rance or both? The law 
has been concerned with two different kinds of interest. The 
first is the private interest of individuals. These the law will 
not tolerate if they cause of could be seen to cause a conflict 
of interest. The second is a form or interest that sterns from 
the very nature of the office in question. It can be a political 
interest or an interest arising out of the dual role that a body 
must, of necessity, play in the decision making pro cess. It is 
often the case that the legislature expressley permits a body to 
pursue extensive negotiations as to a development as well as to 
hear any objections to that development, which the body its elf 
favours. It is often the case that a private associ~tion requires 
of its members an active role in its day to day operations. At 
the same time, it may require some of them to judge the conduct 
of members they know well, with a view to their possible expul-
sion from that 
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association. These types of interest the law may tolerate but 
only to the point that they do not preclude the ability to 
consider alternative arguments; the ability to take into account 
the relevant statutory, or other, criteria. 
The private interests of individual o.ff iceholders can, of them-
seores, be divided into two categories: Those that are the result 
of a voluntary act on the part of the officeholder concerned and 
those that are not attributable to an overt act, but arise out 
of an officeholder's private activities. Both are forms of 
interest, both can be prevented by the officeholder himself but 
each may have a different consequence at law. 
Overt acts that give rise to bias through interest include the 
taking of a bribe~and actively using a position of influence to 
promote one's private interests or the interest of f amily or 
associates. Actions such as hese may be collectively described 
as corruption. They present no doubt as to an officeholder's 
motives and as to his ability to decide according to law. Not 
only will an action or decision that was spurred by corruption 
be rendered invalid but the officeholder himself will be liable 
to suffer the consequences. These may be, at least, a private 
or public reprimand and, in the most blatent cases, dismissal 
from office. The eKample may be taken of ire Marginal Lands 
Board Loan Affair. The Commission of Inquiry was primarily in-
structed to determine whether ther wcEany impropriety on the part 
of any person inrelation to the loan application. Specifically, 
the active participation in the dispute of Ministers of the 
Crown beyond their call of duty was in issue. The clearance of 
the Ministers concerned in that case was largely a result of the 
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standard of proof adopted by the Commission. It may be that the 
criminal standard that was applied i s necessary when such i m-
portant private interest are involved but the possibility of 
corruption existing in public office is a serious reality that 
must be carefully guarded against. Although a remedy was rot 
included in the Commission's terms of inquiry, an unfavourable 
finding would almos t certainly have resulted in the resignation 
of the Ministers concerned. 
An interest that is not the result of an overt act tut arises 
out of an officeholder's private interest places no blame on the 
officeholder himself but m~y render his decision invalid for 
want of an appe a rance of impartialmty. This category of interest 
speaks primarily to a financial i nterest in the sub j ect matter 
for adjudication or a personal relationship or assoctti on with 
a party to a dispute. This relationship or association may be 
seen as favourable to a party concerned or a counting against an 
impartial consideration of his case. Mahon J, in Anderton v 
Auckland City Council 160 provided one of the most recent and 
comprehensive analyses of this area of the law of bias. The 
learned judge saw that wh e r e pecuniary or ot he r interes ts were 
in issue, the question a court will ask is whether an impartial 
observer, apprised of all relevant facts, wuld consider a real 
likelihood of bias to exist. Where the alleged interest arises 
out of the manner in which the proce edings were conducted, the 
court will judge whether a reasonable suspicion of bias may be 
created on the mind of an observer unacquainted wih outside 
facts or circumstances. This second te s t is applicable, for 
example, in cases where an officeholder has, during a hearing 
or consideration of a case, made a pronouncement as to the guilt 
or innocence of a party to the dispute or has ret±red with a 
person having an interest in the ·outcome of the adjudiction. 
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In either of these cases, an adverse finding by a reviewing 
court will see the decision of the officeholder in que$tion as 
being voidable or void.without a ruling on that officeholder's 
propriety. It may be, however, that where the tribunal objected 
to as interested is the only tribunal which can deal with the 
subject matter, where the inclusion of an interested member on 
a tribunal is necessary to form a quorumor where the legislature 
had directed the interested tribunal to decide, the 'doctrine 
of necessity' will act as a bar to a successful claim of bias. 
Parliament too has, albeit in a piecemeal way, formulated a 
number of statutory privisions designed to regulate conflicts of 
interest in particular public officeholders and to specify the 
consequences if such an interest is found to exist. 
In bodies where a particular interest will not render a member 
intereseted in every matter that comes before it but only causes 
him to have an interest in a particular case, Parliament may re-
quire him to disclose that interest to his colleagues or to 
stand down from or abstain from voting in that case. If the 
interest in question will have a continuing effect on the duties 
of a public office, Parliament may preclude such a person from 
being appointed to that office. If a person holding public 
office subsequently acquires a conflicting interest, he may, by 
statute, be automatically disqualified from that affice. It may 
be that the exclusion of stated interests in a public office is 
so absolute that a fine may be imposed on an officeholder acting 
in contravention of Parliaments 
direction. An example is provided by section 5 of the Local 
Authorities (Members' Interest) Act 1968. 
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In furtherance of more uniform rulas. and s tandards, govennments, 
particularly in England and Australia, have established committees 
of inquiry to identify those interest that migh t give rise to : a 
conflict and to suggest means for regulating these interests. 
Agreed responses include those already i dentified: Declaration 
if an interest will cause a conflict in a particular case and 
either divestment of the interst or disqualification of the 
officeholder if the interest will cause a conflict on an on-
going basis. The means of regulation that has spurr ed most 
debate is the compul s ary registration by all or selected cat-
egories of officeholders of specified private interests. Not 
only would registration bring any ulterior motives immediately 
to light without relying on an officeholder's own sens e of 
public responsibility but it would go far to restore public 
confidence in the government and its mauy arms . Some resistance 
is provided by those forwarding an officeholder's right to priv-
acy and speculating on the ease with shich registration could 
be evaded and the effects it could have on an officeholder's 
integrity. Although there is some merit in these views, as we 
move towards open government, should we not also be promoting 
the openness of those who govern? 
The second major type of interest that has been a major source 
of concern and litigation is that which stems from the nature 
of the office in question and not from the voluntary acts or 
private activities of a particular person. The inevitability 
of certain appearances of bias existing has often been given 
as a reasonfor the inapplicability of the judicial tests of 
a real likelihood or r easonable suspicion of bias. It is 
inevitable that members of a statutory tribunal who are 
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selected from a body upon which they will adjudicate will have 
a prior involvement with the subject matter or litigants of a 
case, thereby promoting an appearance of partiality. It is 
inevitable that a local authority will have pursued negotiations 
with certain developers before hearing objections to their 
proposal, thereby raising suspicious as to the motives for 
their decision. It is inevitable tha t Ministers of the Crown 
will openly pursue government policy when deciding on a 
particular case or project, thereby giving rise to an appearance 
of predeterminatton. It is inevitable that certain members 
of a private club or association will also hold polsitions on 
its governing body and will adjudicate upon the propriety 
of its members, thereby negating an appearance of detached 
impartiality. 
Interests such as these will be tollerated to a point. The 
state of impartiality which is re quired is a capacity to 
preserve a freedom, not-withstanding earlier investigations, 
decisions, or involvement, to approach the determination of 
and issue without a closed mind so that alternative arguements 
may be rationally considered and, if substantiated, can cause 
officeholders to go back on their proposals. The test adopted 
to gauge such impartiality has repeatedly been actual predeter-
mination of the adjudicated question. Variations may ensue 
when account is taken of the further variable of the type of 
power involved and the effect it can have on personal or 
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property rights. The case of fil.gg_ 161 illustrates that, not-
withstanding an amount of prior involvement with the subject 
matter of a case, when important personal ri ghts, such as the 
right to employment, are at stake, a test that is harder to 
satisfy may be imposed. The test adopted in the fil.gg_ case 
was a combination of those i dentified thus ' f ar: Whether the 
informed observer would consider that the officeholders had 
closed their minds ie. The appearance of bias must lead an 
observer to think the officeholder is biased and not merely 
create a suspicion to that effect in his mind. 
Questions arise as to the right of the courts to adjudicate on 
the propriety of members of private, voluntary organisations 
or clubs. The response, provided by the Daganayasi case 162 
is that a court will not only intervene in cases where the 
decision maker has the authority to affect a person's rights 
but also in cases where a legitimate expectation has been 
created in the ~1rid ·6f a n- affected pa rty tha t ~ is case will 
be heard according to law. As in the~ case, the rights 
that are affected by non-statutory disciplinary bodies are 
impaftant ones. To ensure that justice is seen to be done to 
a party for whom a decision may have serious conc equences, 
a test of an appearance of bias has become prevalent. 
It is then a case of weighing the necessity of the interest, 
so as not to fetter the ability of an officeholder to carry 
out his duties, against the rights of parties to a decision 
to have their case determined in an impartial way. It is 
often true that the harsher the effect a decision will have 
on private rights, the more willing the courts are to detect 
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an operative bias. 
In recognition of the difficulties presented by a body that, 
by its nature, is inherently biased, Parliament has, in several 
instances, intervened by way of legislation to remove such 
an appearance and to make for a more impartial decision making 
process in practice. The typical form this legislative 
intervention takes is the creation of another body or office-
holder so that they may assume one of the inherently biased 
body's roles. Objections to street stopping a.re now heard by 
the Planning Tribunal and not the local authority fowarding 
the proposal. 163 An Inv
estigations Committee determines whether 
a complaint is of sufficient substance to be forwarde d to 
the Dental Council so as to preclude the Council assuming 
investigatory and adjudicatory roles. 164 A Proceedings 
Commissioner decides whether proceedings before the Equal 
Opportunities Tribunal are warranted so as to preclude the 
Human Rights Commission from inve s tigating a matter as well as 
deciding whether proceedings are warranted and 'prosecuting' 
the ca se before the Equal Opportunities Tribunal. 165 The 
involvement of an increased number of independent bodies in a 
der.ision making process goes f a r to preserve in the public 
eye, and inpractice, the integrity of each. Concequently, 
their effective operatm will reduce the amount of litigation 
that flows in their absence. 
In a haphazard way, the courts, legislatures and public 
Qornrnittees e s tablished to deal with particular instances of 
impropriety and with conflicts of interest in general have all 
contributed to setting in place a set of rules and standards 
to be adhered to by those holding public and private office. 
There rules and standards are scattered throughout case law, 
statutes, Parliamentary papers and public reports. The 
variation in their responses is attributable to the range of 
variables that come into play when dealing with such a wide 
category of officeholders. It is as a result of these 
variables that certainty in this area of the law 
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cannot be readily attained. Of some concern is the 
accessability of the rules and standards that have ensued. 
Adherence to these standards and public conficence in decision 
making processes can only be attained 
if the governing rules are specificially brought to the 
attention of the officeholders they concern and to the attention 
of those their decisions will affect; for wisdom comes only 
through knowledge. 
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APPENDIX 
Code of Conduct Recommended by the Australian Committee of Inquiry A, 
into Public Duty and Private Interest. 
4.9 The Committee recommends that the following Code of Conduct be adopted for 
general application to all officeholders: 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
Under the system of government which operates in Australia the main legislative 
and execuJive functions of government are carried out by Ministers, Members 
of Parliament, public servants and statutory officeholders. Each category of 
officelwlder has a duty to discharge responsibilities entrusted by the Constitution 
and the laws made under the Constitution according to the highest standards of 
conduct. The public is entitled to have confidence in the integrity of its govern-
ment. Officeholders may be required by the nature of public office to accept 
restrictions on certain areas of their private conduct beyond those imposed on 
ordinary citizens. 
The following Code of Conduct embodies principles which should be observed 
by all four categories of officeholders. 
1. An officeholder should perform the duties of his office impartially, unin-
fiuenced by fear or favour. 
2. An officeholder should be frank and honest in official dealings with 
colleagues. 
3. An officeholder should avoid situations in which his private interest, 
whether pecuniary or otherwise, conflicts or might reasonably be thought 
to conflict with his public duty. 
4. When an officeholder possesses, directly or indirectly, an interest which 
conflicts or might reasonably be thought to confiict with his public duty, 
or improperly to inf[ue11ce his conduct in the discharge of his responsibilities 
in respect of some matter with which he is concerned, he should disclose 
that interest according to the prescribed procedures. Should circumstances 
change after an initial disclosure has been made, so that new or (Uiditional 
facts become rrwterial, the officeholder should disclose the further 
information. 
5. When the interests of members of his immediate family are involved, the 
officeholder should disclose those interests, to the extent that they are 
known to him. Members of the immediate family will ordinarily comprise 
only the officeholder's spouse and dependent children, but may include 
other members of his household or family when their interests are closely 
connected with his. 
6. When an officeholder (other than a Member of Parliament) possesses an 
interest which conflicts or might reasonably be thought to conflict with 
the duties of his office and such interest is not prescribed as a qualification 
for that office, he should forthwith divest himself of that interest, secure 
his removal / rom the duties in question, or obtain the authorisation of 
his superior or colleagues to continue to discharge the duties. Transfer 
to a trustee or to a member of the officeholder's family is not a sufficient 
divestment for the purpose. If immediate divestment would work sig-
nificant hardship on the officeholder, possession of the interest should 
be disclosed to colleagues or superiors and authorisation obtained for 
temporary retention pending divestment. 
7. An officeholder should not use information obtained in the course of 
offici.al duties to gain directly or indirectly a pecuniary advantage for 
himself or for any other person. In particular, an officeholder should 
scrupulously avoid investments or other transactions about which he 
has, or might reasonably be thought to have, early or confidential informa-
tion which might confer on him an unfair or improper advantage over 
other persons. 
8. An officeholder should not: 
(a) solicit or accept from any person any remuneration or benefit for 
the discharge of the duties of his office over and above the official 
remuneration; 
( b) solicit or accept any benefit, advantage or promise' of future advan-
tage whether for himself, his immediate family or any business co,,_ 
· cern or trust with which he is associated from persons who are in, or 
seek to be in, any contractual or special relationship with government; 
(c) except as may be permitted under the rules applicable to his office. 
accept any gift, hospitality or concessional travel offered in conMc.• 
tion with the discharge of the duties of his office. 
The impression should be avoided that any person can improperly influence 
the officeholder or unduly enjoy his favour. 
9. An officeholder should be scrupulous in his use of public property and ser-
vices, and should not permit their misuse by other persons. 
JO. An officeholder should not allow the pursuit of his private interest to 
interfere with the proper discharge of his public ,duties. 
B. Principles Forming the Basis of the New Zealand Members' Private 
Interes ts Cornrni ttee Report. 
Basic Principles Which Should be Observed by Holders of Ministerial 
Office Under the Crown in the Reconciliation of Their 
Public Duties and Private Interests 
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
l. A Minister :nust ~nsure that no conflict exists, or appears to exist, 
between hzs public duty and his private interests 
h' Th~ principle. should be observed by a Minister in the arrangement of 
18 1:nvate affairs on assuming office under the Crown and while he 
c<;>ntmues to hold _office_ he shou)d not allow a situation t~ arise in. which 
his per~onal o~ private interests mterfere with the proper performance of 
the dunes of his office. 
In. the :i!.pplication of the principle the conflict of interest must be 
~ciently direct ar:id sub~tantial to exert or appear to be likely to exert 
an mfluence on the unpart:Ial performance of public duties. 
2. A Minister of _the Crown is expected to devote his time and his talents 
to the carrying out of his public duties 
Su_b~ect to reason~ble ~eservati?ns for personal affairs and family life 
a. M1mster _should give. Im a~ention to the carrying out of the duties of 
his office without the distraction of other active or competing interests. 
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